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 Why, despite similar North Korean crises within a decade, have East Asia 
countries responded differently to the U.S. approach toward North Korea, and with 
what consequences? This dissertation explores the contested nature of the North 
Korean threat in East Asia and examines its effects on the formation of national 
interests and the regional order. With an empirical focus on China, Japan, and South 
Korea, I argue that a region-wide pursuit of greater regional roles shaped the way in 
which the East Asian countries respond to the U.S. approach. By employing the 
concepts of role congruence and conflict, this dissertation identifies different pathways 
to regional order in East Asia.  
 This project is based on a comparative analysis of the post-Cold War political 
dynamics surrounding the North Korean challenge. To assess the impact of role 
conceptions on the regional order, I compare the global, regional, and national 
contexts of post-Cold War North Korean crises, in particular the 1998 North Korean 
missile crisis and the second North Korean nuclear crisis. For this research, I 
conducted extensive fieldwork in China, Japan, and South Korea, gathering 
government documents, speeches, and other primary sources. I also utilized fifty-
seven in-depth interviews with government officials and experts, along with a wide set 
of secondary literature, newspapers, and opinion pieces in each country.  
 This dissertation demonstrates that regional role conceptions play a crucial role 
in shaping state behavior and influencing regional order, especially in alliance politics 
and regionalism. The findings from this research also suggest that the success of future 
global proliferation campaigns hinges on grasping the complexities of regional 
dynamics surrounding proliferators. Facilitating role congruence among regional 
actors can contribute to both the success of global proliferation policy and the 
enhancement of regional order. It is also important to avoid role conflict on the part of 
the United States: its traditional role as a regional stabilizer and its new role as a 
global enforcer of counterproliferation and anti-terror strategies. The way it reconciles 
the two roles and harmonizes global and regional priorities will shape the future 
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Introduction and Framework 
1-1. Introduction 
 This dissertation explores the contested nature of the North Korean threat and 
examines its effects on the formation of national interests and the regional order in 
East Asia. North Korea presents a dual challenge as a newly-nuclear global rogue state 
and, at the same time, a traditional regional security problem. At the global level, the 
small, isolated, communist regime has been singled out, along with Iraq and Iran, as 
part of the “axis of evil,” a band of global rogues bent on disrupting the international 
nonproliferation regime. Indeed, the Bush administration proclaimed that the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is one of the two major security 
challenges against which a widespread global campaign should be pursued.1 In East 
Asia, however, the global rogue frame did not take root. Far from being a shared 
security challenge as the current scholarship on nuclear proliferation2 tends to assume, 
the very meaning of North Korea and the nature of the threat it represents have been 
contested in East Asia, influencing the way regional actors respond to the U.S. 
approach toward North Korea and igniting domestic security debates among political 
actors in the region. 
 The regional outcomes in the wake of the so-called second North Korean 
nuclear crisis are puzzling for several reasons. First, despite similar North Korean 
behavior, the regional reactions during the first and second North Korean crises are a 
                                                
1 The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002, The White House, 
Washington, D.C. 
2 Graham Allison, Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe, (New York: Henry Holt 
& Company, 2004); Joseph Cirincione, Deadly Arsenals: Tracking Weapons of Mass Destruction 
(Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002); Alexander T. J. Lennon and 
Camille Eiss, eds., Reshaping Rogue States Preemption, Regime Change, and US Policy toward Iran, 
Iraq, and North Korea (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004).  
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study in contrast. During the first North Korean crisis of 1993-94, North Korea went 
took a series of provocative steps, such as refusing UN inspections of its nuclear sites, 
extracting plutonium from fuel rods, and threatening to withdraw from the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).3 The situation became so volatile that then chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General John Shalikashvili called it the “most dangerous 
crisis” the United States had encountered since the end of World War II.4 While the 
global rogue frame has become a catchphrase of the Bush administration, the imagery 
and rhetoric of rogue states—backlash states, nuclear outlaws, etc.—were also 
widespread during the Clinton administration.5 Indeed, at the height of the crisis in 
June 1994, President Clinton seriously considered a military strike on the Yongbyon 
nuclear facilities.6 
 While alarmed about the prospect of a nuclear North Korea, East Asian 
countries remained passive bystanders during the first crisis. Instead of taking a 
leading role in resolving the crisis, they were generally content to play second fiddle to 
the Clinton administration’s bilateral approach toward North Korea. Although 
concerned about the possibility that the crisis could wreak havoc on the still evolving 
                                                
3 The first North Korean nuclear crisis began in early 1993 when the North Korean regime refused to 
allow a special inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which suspected a 
secret nuclear program in Yongbyon. 
4 Cited in Michael Klare, Rogue States and Nuclear Outlaws: America’s Search for a New Foreign 
Policy (New York: Hill and Wang, 1995), pp. 136-37. 
5 For the burgeoning literature on rogue states, see Anthony Lake, “Confronting backlash states,” 
Foreign Affairs, Mar/Apr 1994, Vol.73, No. 2, pp. 45-55; Michael Klare, “The Rise and Fall of the 
“Rogue Doctrine: The Pentagon’s Quest for a Post-Cold War Military Strategy,” Middle East Report, 
No. 208, Autumn 1998, pp. 12-13; Michael Klare, Rogue States and Nuclear Outlaws: America’s 
Search for a New Foreign Policy (New York: Hill and Wang, 1999); David Mutimer, The Weapons 
States: Proliferation and the Framing of Security (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000); Paul 
Hoyt, “Rogue State Image in American Foreign Policy,” Global Society, 14(2), April, 2000, pp. 297-
310; and Robert Litwak, Rogue States and U.S. Foreign Policy: Containment After the Cold War 
(Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000); Elizabeth N. Saunders, “Setting Boundaries: 
Can International Society Exclude ‘‘Rogue States’’? International Studies Review (2006) 8, pp. 23–53.  
6 Ashton B. Carter and William James Perry, Preventive Defense: A New Security Strategy for America 
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1999); Joel S. Wit, Daniel B. Poneman, and Robert L. 
Gallucci, Going Critical: The First North Korean Nuclear Crisis (Washington, DC: Brookings 
Institution Press, 2004). 
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post-Cold War strategic landscape,7 both U.S. allies, namely Japan and South Korea, 
as well as China did not actively seek a regional approach to defuse the crisis, nor did 
they engage in serious domestic debates about North Korea. Once the crisis was 
resolved through the Agreed Framework between the United States and North Korea 
in October 1994, East Asian countries fully endorsed the Agreed Framework, while 
Japan and South Korea paid most of the financial bills for the implementation of the 
U.S.-led nuclear deal.  
 Less than a decade after the first crisis, North Korea found itself in another 
nuclear standoff with the United States, or what Michael McDevitt calls “an instant 
replay” of the first crisis, involving similar provocative steps.8 In response, the Bush 
administration launched, and maintained until early 2007, a systematic campaign 
aimed at pressuring the Kim Jong Il regime through the Six Party process.9 However, 
regional support was scant. Unlike in the first crisis, and despite heightened tension 
arising from North Korea’s repeat performance, regional actors did not share the threat 
perception of the Bush administration. Instead, East Asian countries were united in 
their opposition to the Bush administration’s efforts to “globalize” the North Korean 
problem and showed greater activism during the second crisis. 
 Given America’s status in East Asia as a de facto hegemon since World War 
Two, the regional resistance to the U.S. approach is particularly significant and not 
easily explained by power-based international relations theories. While keeping 
                                                
7 As one example of the changing regional security structure, in August 1992 the communist regime in 
Beijing normalized its diplomatic relations with South Korea, North Korea’s archenemy. 
8 Michael McDevitt, “Hear We Go Again - North Korea and Nuclear Weapons,” PacNet Newsletter, 
No. 43A, Pacific Forum, Center for Strategic and International Studies, October 21, 2002. For a detailed 
account of the second crisis, see Charles L Pritchard, Failed Diplomacy: The Tragic Story of How 
North Korea Got the Bomb (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution Press, 2007). 
9 In February 2007, the Bush administration agreed to lift financial sanction against North Korean assets 
and managed to produce an agreement on North Korea’s “nuclear disablement.” As discussed later in 
this chapter and Chapter 6, the welcome development at the Six Party Talks has produced a partial 
success such as the halting of the nuclear facilities at Youngbyon in July 2007 and the disabling of the 
facilities in October 2007.  
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diplomatic channels open with North Korea, each East Asian country has been 
pressing the Bush administration to step away from its aggressive approach.10 
Regional reactions in the early rounds of the Six Party Talks underscore the breadth of 
challenge to America’s regional influence. After the first Six Party meeting in August 
2003, for instance, China’s chief delegate Wang Yi declared, “America’s policy 
toward the D.P.R.K., that is the main problem we are facing.”11 South Korean 
President Roh Moo Hyun also warned that “taking too tough a stance against North 
Korea could cause “friction and disagreement between South Korea and the United 
States.”12 Despite his close ties with President Bush, Japanese Prime Minister 
Junichiro Koizumi also urged Bush to have direct talks with North Korea: “[U]nless 
you open the negotiation process, there will be no improvement on the issues.”13 The 
region’s collective concern about the hard line U.S. approach and North Korea’s 
nuclear test eventually led to the February 2007 agreement. In an apparent about-face, 
the Bush administration discarded its previous position of “comprehensive, verifiable 
and irreversible dismantling” (CVID) of North Korean nuclear programs and showed 
greater flexibility toward North Korea.14 
                                                
10 During the second crisis, numerous East Asian heads of state or minister-level officials visited 
Pyongyang, including Chinese President Hu Jintao in October 2005, Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi 
in May 2004, former South Korean Prime Minister Lee Haechan in March 2007, China’s Defense 
Minister Cao Gangchuan in April 2006, South Korean Unification Minister Chung Dongyoung in June 
2005, former Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party Secretary General Taku Yamazaki in January 2007, 
South Korean President Roh Moo Hyun’s visit to Pyongyang in October 2007. 
11 Joseph Kahn, “Chinese Aide Says U.S. Is Obstacle in Korean Talks,” New York Times, September 2, 
2003. 
12 Martin Fackler, “North Korean Counterfeiting Complicates Nuclear Crisis,” New York Times, 
January 29, 2006. 
13 Howard W. French, “North Koreans Sign Agreement with Japanese,” New York Times, September 
18, 2002. 
14 Through this agreement, the Bush administration retracted financial sanctions against the Kim Jong Il 
regime in return for North Korea’s gradual disabling of its nuclear programs. “North Korea Agrees to 
Wind Down Nuclear Program,” The Associated Press, February 13, 2007; Helene Cooper and Jim 
Yardley, “Pact With North Korea Draws Fire From a Wide Range of Critics in U.S.,” New York Times, 
February 14, 2007; Helene Copper, “In U.S. Overtures to Foes, New Respect for Pragmatism,” New 
York Times, March 1, 2007. The agreement seems to have yielded a partial success in July 2007 when 
North Korea allowed UN inspectors to visit and confirm the halting of operation at the Yongbyon 
nuclear facilities, followed by the October 2007 agreement in which North Korea promised to disclose 
and disable its nuclear programs by the end of 2007. 
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 The regional response had implications for the regional order as well. 
Following successful resolution by the Clinton administration, the first North Korean 
nuclear crisis was a catalyst for the strengthening and renewal of U.S. alliances in the 
region, manifested in the so-called Nye Initiative to maintain U.S. force levels in East 
Asia in 1995 and the 1997 agreement on a revision of the U.S.-Japan Defense 
Cooperation Guidelines. Along the way, the U.S. regional influence increased 
substantially, paving the way for its crucial role in the Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995-96 
and the North Korean missile crisis in 1998. During the second crisis, however, 
alliance management and regionalism15 have faced increasing difficulties, while the 
U.S. regional role has been in question and its regional influence is in decline.16 
 The East Asian response to the second crisis is also puzzling in that the 
regional countries’ rejection of the global rogue frame and a collective regional 
response came in spite of the fact that East Asian countries have differing levels of 
perceived threat and disparate bilateral issues vis-à-vis North Korea. Looking at the 
East Asian situation through the lens of parochial national interests, however, ignores 
other important “regional” processes. By refusing the UN Security Council option17 
and insisting on active participation in the Six Party Talks, East Asian countries 
essentially “regionalized” an issue that had previously been addressed bilaterally in an 
idiosyncratic manner (e.g., inter-Korean relations, China’s defense treaty obligations, 
periodic bilateral meetings in Japan). In fact, in the past decade China, Japan, and 
                                                
15 Regionalism in this dissertation is defined as political processes of deepening inter-governmental 
regional ties. In his recent study, T.J. Pempel defines regionalism as “the top-down process of 
government-to-government formation of institutions such as ASEAN, ARF.” T.J. Pempel, 
“Introduction: Emerging Webs of Regional Connectedness,” in T.J. Pempel, ed. Remapping East Asia: 
The Construction of a Region (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005). p. 6. 
16 For a recent discussion of a “complex” regional situation, see Francis Fukuyama, America at the 
Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy (New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press, 2006), especially pp. 174-75.  
17 It was only after the 2006 missile and nuclear tests by North Korea that the UN Security Council got 
directly involved with the North Korean issue. A Chinese expert attributed regional countries’ 
reluctance to hand over the North Korean issue to the UNSC to their concerns about regional 
implications. Interview 13-04, Beijing, November 24, 2004. 
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South Korea have all been highlighting, albeit to varying degrees, the meaning of 
North Korea as a focal point of regional security and seeking to redefine their 
relationships with North Korea. 
 At the same time, the North Korean threat, which was previously perceived by 
regional actors in a straightforward manner, became the major source of domestic 
contestation, with competing domestic political actors framing the North Korean threat 
in starkly different terms. Specifically, for Japanese conservatives, North Korea is a 
“threat” armed with Nodong missiles, while moderates see it as a potential “bridge” 
for Japan to reenter East Asia.18 For conservatives in Seoul, North Korea’s name still 
retains a Cold War flavor: “jujeok” or the main enemy of the nation. On the other 
hand, South Korean liberals view their Northern neighbor as a regional “partner.” As 
China joins the world economy and becomes a “stakeholder”19 in the international 
system, some Chinese elites have begun to see North Korea as a “liability,” while 
others still view North Korea as a “buffer” in the U.S.-centered regional order. 
 What is it about North Korea in the wake of the second crisis that prompted 
such distinctive regional reactions and heated domestic contestation? What are the 
consequences of regional and domestic dynamics for the regional order in East Asia? 
With particular reference to the three East Asian countries, namely China, Japan, and 
South Korea,20 this dissertation aims to show how the variable understandings of the 
                                                
18 This effort is being made primarily to reverse what the Meiji era intellectual father Yukichi Fukuzawa 
termed “datsu-a ron,” a call for getting out of a backward Asia and joining the advanced West in the 
late 19th century. With economic integration and security consultation on the rise in the region, 
however, Japanese contemporary intellectuals have recently made a plea for proactively engaging East 
Asia. 
19 Robert Zoellick, “Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility?” Department of State, 
September 21, 2005, available at http://www.state.gov/s/d/rem/53682.htm. 
20 Russia, the other participant in the Six Party talks, is not included in the analysis as a key case mainly 
for two reasons: 1) to my knowledge, there exists no significant domestic contestation over the 
meanings of North Korea in Moscow; 2) While Russia would also want to expand its influence in East 
Asia, its diplomatic overture toward the North in the past decade, compared with other regional powers, 
was neither persistently made nor anchored to greater regional status or regional vision. However, given 
its great power status (with the UN Security Council veto power) and its abundant oil and natural gas 
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North Korean challenge influence the way East Asian countries formulate their 
national interests and articulate long-term regional visions. More specifically, this 
dissertation asks two questions: 1) what explains variations in the collective regional 
response to the U.S. approach toward North Korea during the first and second North 
Korean nuclear crises? How, despite the continuing presence of U.S. power and 
influence in the region, did East Asia successfully “regionalize” the North Korean 
issue, along the way jointly rejecting the global frame and resisting the hard line 
approach of the Bush administration? And 2) what are the causes and consequences of 
the diversified interpretations of the North Korean problem within each country in the 
region? 
 In answering these questions, this dissertation advances regional role 
conceptions as a key variable and examines the East Asian experience to showcase 
how regional role conceptions affect foreign policy behavior. For East Asian 
countries, the Bush administration’s approach toward North Korea came as a profound 
external shock that had repercussions for how regional security was understood in 
each country. The resulting regional dynamic motivated East Asian states to respond 
collectively in ways that diverged from the U.S. frame while, at the same time, 
igniting varied domestic security debates in each country. Through this process, the 
North Korean challenge set in preparation multiple pathways to a regional order, with 
different degree of consensus emerging across the region and within each country. 
 By utilizing the concepts of role congruence and conflict, this dissertation 
identifies such different pathways to regional order in post-Cold War East Asia. The 
East Asian case provides a useful window for assessing how threat perceptions and 
role conceptions play out in regional contexts and, more broadly, how the region 
operates in a changing global context. By insisting, until recently, on its new global 
                                                                                                                                       
reserves, Russia certainly has potential for playing a greater role over development of the Korean 
Peninsula in the future.  
 8 
role and a particular global frame, the Bush administration ignored the changing 
regional context, along the way losing its formidable regional influence and worsening 
the regional order in East Asia. Future U.S. administrations will benefit from paying 
careful attention to regional role conceptions and their impact on the regional order in 
East Asia, a region of growing strategic and economic importance in the years to 
come. 
1-2. Rogues, Role Conceptions and Regional Order 
 Despite the Bush administration’s claim that the North Korean problem is a 
common global challenge, the actual levels of perceived threat and the degree of 
interest in North Korean nuclear weapons have differed. Rather than being a matter of 
objective reality, national interests are often forged in the process of interaction with 
other nations in various political contexts,21 and the ways nations articulate their 
national interests affects the way in which they perceive the level of threat coming 
from other countries. The presence of multiple interpretations of North Korea in East 
Asia itself reveals the contested nature of the North Korean threat and the contingent 
nature of national interests vis-à-vis North Korea. A careful analysis of the way 
regional actors perceive and articulate the North Korean challenge would provide 
insights into how national interests are contested and reshaped at the domestic level.22 
                                                
21 Martha Finnemore’s metaphor in her Defining the National Interest (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 1996) is a useful example that contrasts with the realist tradition of “defending” the national 
interest. See also Jutta Weldes, “Constructing National Interests,” European Journal of International 
Relations, Vol. 2(3), 1996, pp. 275-318. 
22 For a recent study of such contested national interests at the domestic level and its impact on 
interstate behavior, see Jonathan Kirshner’s study of caution exercised by the financial community on 
the road to war. Appeasing Bankers: Financial Caution on the Road to War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2007). Earlier works, which similarly examined the contested nature of the national 
interest formation at the domestic level, include Richard Anderson, Public Politics in an Authoritarian 
State: Making Foreign Policy during the Brezhnev Years (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993) 
and James G. Richter, Khrushchev’s Double Bind: International Pressures and Domestic Coalition 
Politics (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994). 
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Role Conceptions as a Variable 
 In this dissertation, I argue that East Asian countries’ national interests 
surrounding the North Korean problem are shaped by what I call regional role 
conceptions, a set of ideas held and articulated by domestic political elites about their 
nation’s proper roles and status in a given region. Along with material capabilities, 
how political actors perceive their nation’s role on the regional or world stage has 
important consequences for national interest formation and threat perception. Of 
course, the domestic process of articulating regional roles is often a competitive one, 
since different political groups may have different, competing ideas about the role of 
their nation in the region. What kind of roles prevails in domestic contestation in turn 
has a direct bearing on the formation of policy preferences by altering “the definition 
of the situation and of the available options.”23 
 In his seminal article on role conceptions,24 K. J. Holsti defined national role 
conceptions as policy makers’ perceived “image” of “the appropriate orientations or 
                                                
23 Philippe G. Le Prestre, “Author! Author! Defining Foreign Policy Roles after the Cold War,” in 
Philippe G. Le Prestre, ed., Role Quests in the Post-Cold War Era: Foreign Policies in Transition 
(Montreal: McGill-Queesn’s University Press, 1997), p. 5) cited in p. 88. 
24 For a useful review of role theory in the field of sociology, see B. J. Biddle, “Recent Developments in 
Role Theory,” Annual Review of Sociology, 1986, 12, pp. 67-92. For a discussion of national role 
conceptions in explaining foreign policy behavior, see K.J. Holsti, “National Role Conceptions in the 
Study of Foreign Policy,” International Studies Quarterly, 14, 1970, pp. 233-309; Stephen G. Walker, 
ed., Role Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1987); Chih-yu 
Shih, “National Role Conception as Foreign Policy Motivation: The Psychological Bases of Chinese 
Diplomacy,” Political Psychology, Vol. 9, No. 4, 1988, pp. 599-631; Stephen Walker, “Symbolic 
Interaction and International Politics: Role Theory’s Contribution to International Organization,” in 
Martha L. Cottam and Chih-yu Shih, eds., Contending Dramas, A Cognitive Approach to International 
Organizations (New York: Praeger, 1992), pp. 19-38; Michael Barnett, “Institutions, Roles, and 
Disorder: The Case of the Arab States System,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Sep., 
1993), pp. 271-296; Glenn Chafez, Hillel Abramson and Suzette Grillot, “Role Theory and Foreign 
Policy: Belarussian and Ukrainian Compliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime,” Political 
Psychology, Vol. 17, No. 4, 1996, pp. 727-757; Philippe G. Le Prestre, ed., Role Quests in the Post-
Cold War Era: Foreign Policies in Transition (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1997); 
Lisbeth Aggestam, “A Common Foreign and Security Policy: Role Conceptions and the Politics of 
Identity in EU,” in Lisbeth Aggestam and Adrian Hyde-Price, eds., Security and Identity in Europe: 
Exploring the New Agenda (London: MacMillan Press, 2000), pp. 87-115; Katja Weber and Paul A. 
Kowert, “Language, Rules, and Order: The Westpolitik Debate of Adenauer and Schumacher,” in 
Francois Debrix, ed., Language, Agency, and Politics in a Constructed World (Armonk, New York: 
M.E. Sharpe, 2003), pp. 196-219; Michael Grossman, “Role Theory and Foreign Policy Change: The 
Transformation of Russian Foreign Policy in the 1990s,” International Politics, 2005, 42, pp. 334–351; 
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functions of their state toward, or in, the external environment.”25 Along the line of 
role conceptions, international relations scholars have used various concepts such as 
national self-image26 or elite belief systems27 as key variables shaping foreign policy 
behavior. However, analyses based on individual leaders raise questions about the 
generalizability of a particular individual leader’s self-image to the national level.28 
Another problem with the earlier literature on role conceptions was its focus on 
“psychological” rather than “social” dimensions of foreign policymaking. Foreign 
policy, by definition, assumes relationships with other nations and each nation’s social 
position is inherently intertwined with that of other nations.29 Alexander Wendt’s 
criticism of the earlier role conception literature centers on the tendency to privilege 
“the agentic, role-taking side of the equation” at the cost of the “structural, role-
consuming side.”30 The analysis of role conceptions can benefit from going beyond 
the individual and cognitive dimension of decision-making to capture the social and 
“constitutive” dimension through which actors “define the boundaries and distinctive 
practices of a group.”31 Rather than functioning merely as constraints on 
                                                                                                                                       
Lisbeth Aggestam, “Role Theory and European Foreign Policy: A Framework of Analysis,” Ole 
Elgstrom and Michael Smith, eds., The European Union’s Roles in International Politics: Concepts and 
Analysis (London: Routledge, 2006), pp. 11-29. 
25 Holsti, “National Role Conceptions,” p. 246. 
26 Richard Ned Lebow, Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1981). 
27 Alexander George, “The ‘Operational Code’: A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders 
and Decision Making,” International Studies Quarterly 13, 1969, pp. 190-222; Stephen Walker, “The 
Interface Between Beliefs and Behavior: Henry Kissinger’s Operational Code and the Vietnam War,” 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 21, 1977, pp. 129-168; Cottam and Shih, Contending Dramas; Weber 
and Kowert, “Language, Rules, and Order.”  
28 Martha L. Cottam, “Recent Developments in Political Psychology,” in Martha L. Cottam and Chih-yu 
Shih, eds., Contending Dramas, A Cognitive Approach to International Organizations (New York: 
Praeger, 1992), p. 7. 
29 Stephen Walker, “Symbolic Interaction and International Politics: Role Theory’s Contribution to 
International Organization,” in Martha L. Cottam and Chih-yu Shih, eds., Contending Dramas, A 
Cognitive Approach to International Organizations (New York: Praeger, 1992), p. 24. 
30 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1999), pp. 227-28. 
31 Rawi Abdelal, Yoshiko M. Herrera, Alastair Iain Johnston, and Rose McDermott, “Identity as a 
Variable,” Perspectives on Politics, December 2006, Vol. 4, No. 4, p. 697. 
 11 
policymaking, the way nations envision their regional roles shapes the way they 
formulate national interests and determine the appropriate policies to fulfill them. 
 East Asian countries’ understanding of the North Korean challenge illustrates 
this point. For the regional countries, the North Korea question is inescapably linked 
to their pursuit of new regional roles. As such, we should not approach the North 
Korean issue in isolation from the larger regional dimension. On the surface, East 
Asian countries seem to have disparate, largely unrelated bilateral concerns with their 
awkward neighbor. For South Koreans, North Korea represents the issues of inter-
Korean relations and unification, while the Japanese view it as the source of the 
nationwide outrage symbolized in the abduction scandal.32 For the Chinese, North 
Korea remains a fragile, troubled, communist ally across the Yalu. 
 From these seemingly disparate threads, however, one could find a coherent 
regional theme anchored to the meaning of North Korea. More specifically, South 
Korea’s sunshine policy of engaging North Korea and promoting inter-Korean 
reconciliation is connected to its broader regional vision called Dongbuka Jungsim 
Gukga-ron (the strategy of transforming the Korean Peninsula into the focal point of 
Northeast Asia), positioning itself at the hub of regional economic integration and 
security cooperation.33 North Korea, in this vision, is a key partner for greater regional 
integration centered on the Korean Peninsula rather than the main enemy to fight 
against. 
 Japan’s abduction issue, which was first acknowledged by Kim Jong Il during 
the 2002 Koizumi-Kim summit, was in fact an unexpected byproduct of Prime 
                                                
32 Despite North Korea’s initial denial, rumors about the abduction of about a dozen of Japanese 
nationals by North Korean agents in the late 1970s and the early 1980s had persisted in Japan. During 
Prime Minister Koizumi’s 2002 visit to Pyongyang, Kim Jong-Il unexpectedly admitted the abduction 
and apologized. But the surprising revelation sparked public outrage in Japan, fueling anti-North 
Korean sentiments and making Japan’s normalization efforts exceedingly difficult to continue.  
33 Dongbuka-sidae Gusang [The Northeast Asia Cooperation Initiative], Presidential Committee on 
Northeast Asian Cooperation Initiative, Seoul, South Korea, 2004.  
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Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s efforts to normalize Japan’s relations with North Korea. 
Given that enduring controversy over its past as colonizer and regional suspicion of its 
future role have narrowed Japan’s regional diplomatic space,34 getting deeply involved 
in the North Korea issue was seen as a unique opportunity “to rejuvenate its troubled 
regional status.”35 By participating in the Six Party process, a former senior Japanese 
diplomat reasons, Japan can redefine its relations with participating countries, opening 
“a new strategic position in the region.”36 Put differently, the Korean Peninsula is “the 
gateway to Asia or even to “normalcy” in international relations,” where Japan can 
“solidify a longstanding role in the emergent Northeast Asian regionalism.”37 Former 
Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s normalization efforts were the epitome 
of that yearning.38 
 In China, a communist allegiance to North Korea continues due in large part to 
China’s attempts to enhance its regional influence. In short, the Korean Peninsula 
represents a place where China’s ambitions to become a regional “hegemon” will be 
tested.39 In this view, the Six Party process can serve as a steppingstone for an 
alternative regional security structure that would go beyond the current U.S.-centered 
regional order and enhance China’s regional status accordingly. As Figure 1-1 
illustrates, in the East Asian understandings of North Korea, there is an area of overlap 
                                                
34 The latest diplomatic isolation of Japan was provoked by Prime Minister Koizumi’s annual visits to 
Yasukuni Shrine which worships Japan’s war dead, including 14 Class A World War II war criminals. 
The Shinto shrine also has a war museum, Yushukan, which generally downplays Japan’s past 
aggression and praises the spirit of Japanese. Both the Chinese and South Korean governments have 
vehemently criticized Prime Minister’s visit. For a detailed analysis of the Yasukuni issue, see Daiki 
Shibuichi, “The Yasukuni Shrine Dispute and the Politics of Identity in Japan,” Asian Survey, 
March/April, 2005, Vol. 45, Issue 2, pp. 197-215. 
35 Interview 05-05, Tokyo, March 23, 2005. 
36 Kazuhiko Togo, Japan’s Foreign Policy 1945-2003: The Quest for a Proactive Policy (Boston, MA: 
Brill, 2005), p. 418. 
37 Tsuneo Akaha, “Japan’s Multilevel Approach toward the Korean Peninsula After the Cold War,” in 
Charles K. Armstrong, Gilbert Rozman, Samuel S. Kim, and Stephen Kotkin, eds., Korea at the Center: 
Dynamics of Regionalism in Northeast Asia (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 2006), p. 184. 
38 One Japanese expert claimed that Japan-North Korean normalization became “the crown jewel” of 
the Koizumi government. Interview 30-05, Tokyo, July 15, 2005. 
39 Xiaoxing Yi, “A Neutralized Korea? The North-South Rapprochement and China’s Korea Policy,” 
Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol. XII, No. 2, Winter 2000, p. 79. 
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in terms of the meaning of North Korea as a staging ground for each nation’s 
respective new regional role and vision. 40 Given the salience of North Korea in East 
Asian countries’ regional role conceptions, it is unwise to assume that they would 
unproblematically accept the U.S. threat perception of North Korea and follow 
whatever path the United States would take in dealing with North Korea. 
 
Figure 1-1. North Korea and Regional Roles 
Role Conflict and Domestic Competition over the Meaning of North Korea 
 In advancing an argument based on role conceptions, this dissertation does not 
hold that the mere presence of certain role conceptions can dictate policy outcomes in 
a deterministic fashion. In fact, a key analytical limitation of the earlier work on role 
                                                
40 Interview 07-04, Beijing, November 16, 2004; Interview 04-05, Tokyo, March 22, 2005; Interview 
05-05, Tokyo, March 23, 2005; Interview 27-05, Tokyo, June 27, 2005; Interview 33-05, Tokyo, July 
27, 2005; Interview 22-05, Seoul, May 12, 2005; Interview 38-05, Seoul, August 4, 2005. 
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conceptions was the inability to systematically address role conflict.41 While some 
scholars noted the possibility of conflict among various roles,42 they did not 
investigate role conflict in a systematic manner. Michael Barnett’s study on pan-
Arabism is a rare exception.43 Based on the case study of the pre-1967 Arab states 
system, he effectively demonstrates the way “overlapping institutions produce 
contradictory demands on Arab states’ foreign policy and contribute to regional 
instability.”44 Similarly, countries in East Asia are subject to competing demands 
shaped by different role conceptions. 
 Two such regional roles are of particular importance: roles shaped by external 
forces (e.g., strategically important external powers) and those shaped internally by 
local actors themselves.45 The question that naturally arises is: which type of roles 
prevail, and under what conditions?  Early role theorists generally assumed that in 
case of role conflict, internally-shaped role conceptions are more influential than 
externally-induced ones in determining state behavior.46 Without empirical testing, 
however, we cannot be sure whether internally-shaped or externally-shaped roles 
prevail at a given moment in time. 
 In East Asia, the existing power structure, in which the United States maintains 
a substantial military and economic presence, powerfully conditions regional role 
conceptions through existing U.S.-centered role conceptions. In fact, all the regional 
                                                
41 Stephen G. Walker and Sheldon W. Simon, “Role Sets and Foreign Policy Analysis in Southeast 
Asia,” in Stephen G. Walker, ed., Role Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis (Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 1987), p. 143. 
42 Walker and Simon, “Role Sets,” p. 142. 
43 Barnett, “Institutions, Roles, and Disorder.” For an analysis of role conflict from the psychological 
angle, see Weber and Kowert, “Language, Rules, and Order.” 
44 Barnett, Ibid., p. 274. 
45 Holsti called externally-shaped roles “external role prescriptions,” while others used the term “role 
expectations” to capture the roles shaped by outside forces. Holsti, “National Role Conceptions,” p. 
246; Walker and Simon, “Role Sets,” p. 142. Barnett’s use of “position roles,” as opposed to 
“preference roles,” also refers to the external dimensions. Such external forces include the power 
structure of the international system, global norms, or alliance commitments. Barnett, “Institutions, 
Roles, and Disorder.” p. 275.  
46 Walker and Simon, “Role Sets,” p. 159; Walker, “Role Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis: An 
Evaluation,” p. 242. 
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countries, to varying degrees, seek approval from the de facto regional hegemon, the 
United States, by cooperating with it on various security issues, including North 
Korea. But at the same time, they seek foreign policy autonomy by engaging North 
Korea in their own ways. As a consequence, rather than internally-generated role 
conceptions dictating policy behavior in a predictable manner (as the earlier literature 
on role conceptions assumes), a constant balancing act between seeking U.S. 
recognition and pursuing regional autonomy characterizes regional role conceptions in 
East Asia. 
 More broadly, in East Asian countries one can distinguish two active regional 
role conceptions: those seeking U.S. recognition by stressing externally-shaped roles 
(e.g., U.S. ally, strategic partner) and those striving to secure policy autonomy and 
greater regional status by emphasizing internally-shaped roles (e.g., independent 
regional player, regional hegemon). The higher the levels of congruence between 
internally-shaped regional roles and externally-shaped regional roles, the more likely 
that the regional countries will support the U.S. approach toward North Korea. But if 
there is a conflict between the two roles, regional countries will either resist or try to 
weaken the U.S. approach. 
 In East Asia, domestic debates on regional role conceptions began to surface in 
the post-9/11 era as America’s regional role changed.47 As the Bush administration 
zeroed in on the role of a global counterproliferation enforcer, resorting to coercive 
means and rhetoric, its traditional role as a regional stabilizer was increasingly in 
question. The role shift worried regional actors who prize regional stability and their 
respective regional visions tied to North Korea. In fact, during the first crisis, the 
                                                
47 It is worth noting here that despite the fact that the United States continues to maintain a formidable 
military presence in East Asia, its regional influence has dramatically decreased in the past few years. 
As of this writing, the United States still maintains about 78,000 troops in Japan and South Korea alone, 
even after some portion of the forces were redeployed to the Middle East due to the ongoing War in 
Iraq and the Global Posture Review by the Pentagon. The U.S. Pacific Command website, available at 
http://www.pacom.mil/about/pacom.shtml  
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Clinton administration adopted a strategy of gradual escalation, seeking regional 
understanding and support in the process and thus fulfilling its role as a regional 
stabilizer. In contrast, the Bush administration turned to a simplifying, unilateral turn 
in its global strategy and, until its recent about-face, applied it to the North Korean 
situation, often with little consideration for regional repercussions. Challenging the 
rogue frame, the regional countries soon moved to dampen the problem growing from 
the Bush administration’s approach toward North Korea. 
 The stage was then set for a battle between the United States and regional 
countries on the proper handling of the North Korean challenge. As one Chinese 
expert succinctly put it, while there is “no regional agreement on the North Korean 
threat, there is a regional consensus on maintaining regional stability.”48 A senior 
South Korean defense analyst in a government-affiliated defense think tank observes 
that in the process of preventing U.S. preemption on North Korea in the early period 
of the second crisis, “China, South Korea and Japan got much closer, while alliance 
coordination between the U.S. and its allies, Japan and South Korea, became much 
more difficult.”49 Speaking during a yearlong hiatus in the Six Party Talks in 2004, a 
senior Chinese expert made it clear that as long as the Bush administration maintained 
an aggressive approach toward North Korea, “the regional consensus [on North 
Korea] will be maintained.”50 Against this backdrop, as explored in this dissertation, 
regional cooperation among the East Asian countries improved before and during the 
early rounds of the Six Party talks. 
 However, as the Six Party talks reached a stalemate with no signs of immediate 
resolution, the prolonged crisis gradually gave rise to domestic contestation of the 
interpretation of the North Korean threat and regional roles in each East Asian 
                                                
48 Interview 08-04, Beijing, November 18, 2004. 
49 Interview 42-05, Seoul, August 5, 2005. 
50 Interview 12-04, Beijing, November 24, 2004. 
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country. In fact, contrary to the structural realist assumption, different domestic groups 
“have distinct visions of what the national interest is and how it can best be served.”51 
Political actors “compete to frame the event because how the event is understood has 
important consequences for mobilizing action and furthering their interests.”52 Once 
changing situations call into question the prevalent regional vision, other groups may 
challenge the mainstream view, leading to domestic jostling for a dominant narrative 
that will shape a nation’s collective regional visions. In the process, different political 
actors project different regional role conceptions that mirror their own ideational 
preferences.53 
 The domestic-international link is important to note here.54 In his study of 
Khrushchev’s foreign policy, for instance, James Richter argues that international 
factors may affect “the authority of leaders by enabling them to or preventing them 
from fulfilling policy promises.”55 Despite political leaders’ North Korea-anchored 
regional visions and their objection to the U.S. frame, the continued stalemate at the 
Six Party talks made the realization of their regional visions virtually impossible. In 
                                                
51 Kirshner, Appeasing Bankers, p. 21. 
52 Michael Barnett, “The Israeli Identity and the Peace Process: Re/creating the Un/thinkable,” in 
Shibley Telhami and Michel Barnett, eds., Identity and Foreign Policy in the Middle East (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 2002), p. 69. 
53 In a similar vein, Amitav Acharya attributes the demand of regional organizations in Asia in part to 
efforts to pursue ideologically-driven foreign policy goals. For instance, Acharya links Malaysia’s 
pursuit of the East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC) to “the ideological underpinnings of Mahathirism.” 
See Amitav Acharya, “Regional Institutions and Security in the Asia-Pacific: Evolution, Adaptation, 
and Prospects,” in Amitav Acharya and Evelyn Goh, eds., Reassessing Security Cooperation in the 
Asia-Pacific: Competition, Congruence, and Transformation (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2007), 
p. 36. 
54 Matthew Evangelista, “Domestic Structures and International Change,” in Michael Doyle, and John 
Ikenberry, eds., New Thinking in International Relations (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997); 
Leonard J. Schoppa, Bargaining with Japan: What American Pressure Can and Cannot Do (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1997); Michael J. Hiscox, International Trade & Political Conflict: 
Commerce, Coalitions, and Mobility (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002). The classic 
manifestation of the link is Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: the Logic of Two-
Level Games.” International Organization 42(3), 1988, pp. 427-460. 
55 Richter, Khrushchev’s Double Bind, p. 14. 
 18 
this situation, domestic political actors who stressed stronger ties with the United 
States began to challenge the reigning view56 and highlight the North Korean threat. 
 What followed was domestic contestation between those who sought to ride on 
the Bush administration’s drive to demone North Korea by emphasizing U.S.-centered 
roles and those who remained focused on internally-shaped roles and the meaning of 
North Korea as a regional platform. Different interpretations of the North Korean 
challenge then fit neatly into different narratives about proper regional roles. Each 
group accepts the aspects of North Korea that conform to its own regional visions, 
while rejecting the contradicting aspects. Although “North Korea engagers” in each 
country maintained their view of North Korea as a regional platform, “North Korea 
bashers” exploited the North Korea threat to emphasize U.S. ties and enhance their 
political standing within their countries. In sum, irrespective of the objective nature of 
the North Korean threat, domestic political groups in each country tailored the North 
Korean issue to their competing regional visions.57 
 As shown in Table 1-1, in each East Asian country, those who stress foreign 
policy autonomy and greater regional roles tend to downplay the North Korean threat 
(e.g., South Korean liberals, including Presidents Kim Dae Jung, Roh Moo Hyun; the 
People’s Liberation Army, the International Liaison Department of the Communist 
Party in China; Prime Ministers Koizumi, Tomiichi Murayama, Yasuo Fukuda). 
Instead, they highlight the positive meanings of North Korea in their larger regional 
visions. Other domestic groups tend to focus on ties with the United States (e.g., 
conservatives, including the Grand National Party (GNP) in South Korea; the Foreign 
                                                
56 Leonard Schoppa’s study of Japan’s bargaining with the United States, for instance, shows how 
external pressure (Gaiatsu) can yield different domestic responses. He finds that foreign pressure is 
successful when “latent support for foreign demands can be found outside the bureaucratic and interest-
group circles that ordinarily dominate the policy process.” Schoppa, Bargaining with Japan, pp. 6-7. 
57 On a similar point made in the context of Japan’s handling of terrorism and child prostitution, see 
David Leheny, Think Global, Fear Local: Sex, Violence, and Anxiety in Contemporary Japan (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 2006), p. 6. 
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Ministry in China58; what Richard Samuels calls “a new generation of revisionists”59 
in Japan, such as Prime Minster Shinzo Abe, Foreign Minister Taro Aso). They tend to 
emphasize the North Korean threat, while using North Korea bashing as a means to 
strengthen ties with the United States and enhance their own political standing. For 
them, strategic focus remains the regional status quo, with their preferred regional 
roles as U.S. ally or strategic partner intact. 
 The predominance of North Korea bashers, however, was not uniform across 
the region. A crucial factor has been political leaders’ ability to garner support from 
the larger society and the degree of domestic resonance of the Bush administration’s 
rogue rhetoric. With the relatively low degree of threat perception vis-à-vis North 
Korea and the high level of anti-US sentiments among the public, domestic debates in 
South Korea and China did not result in the collapse of the regional visions anchored 
to North Korea. In Japan, as abduction-related anti-North Korean feeling spread 
nationwide, the previous consensus on the merits of a regional approach collapsed. 
The ensuing rise of new conservatives served to “re-nationalize” the North Korean 
issue away from a common regional understanding. 
 Specifically, as a decade of the sunshine policy of reconciliation and inter-
Korean exchanges substantially lowered the South Korean perception of the North 
Korean threat, Presidents Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moon Hyun’s pursuit of a regional 
role linked to North Korea grew popular among the public, marginalizing the 
                                                
58 Here I am not making any definitive claims about the policy preferences of different political groups 
in China. Given its one party rule, difference in foreign policy preferences among domestic groups, say 
the PLA and Foreign Ministry, over the North Korean issue is often not clear-cut. That said, a careful 
look at the way different groups make comments on North Korea reveals discernable contrasts where 
Foreign Ministry officials tend to highlight the global issues such as the proliferation issue and Sino-US 
ties, while the Party and the military maintain their traditional emphasis on bilateral ties with North 
Korea. For a recent study of variations in Chinese cooperation with the United States on 
nonproliferation policies, see Evan S. Medeiros, Reluctant Restraint: The Evolution of China’s 
Nonproliferation Policies and Practices, 1980-2004 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007).  
59 Richard Samuels, Securing Japan: Tokyo’s Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 2007). 
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conservatives who stress the importance of the U.S.-South Korean alliance. The anti-
American sentiment since 2002 further strengthened the position of North Korea 
engagers in South Korea. Recently, however, the conservative Lee Myongbak 
government in Seoul has put greater emphasis on U.S.-South Korean ties, seemingly 
signaling a changing of the guard in South Korea’s regional vision. 
Table 1-1. The North Korean Threat and Role Conceptions in East Asia 
North Korea Anchoring 
Strategic Priority 





US-directed role conceptions 
-NK as “partner” 
-The Korean Peninsula as the hub of 
regional integration/room for 
foreign policy autonomy 
-NK as “the main enemy” 
-Alliance coordination within US 
global strategy 
South Korea 
Regional hub US ally 
-NK as “buffer/platform” 
-Securing regime security 
-Enhancing regional influence 
-NK as “liability” 
-China’s global image 
-Strengthening Sino-US ties 
China 
Regional Powerhouse Global “stakeholder” 
-NK as “bridge/platform” 
-Regional influence/room for 
foreign policy autonomy 
-NK as the “major threat” 
-Normal defense posture 
-Alliance as a global pact 
Japan 
Major regional player “Normal” state/US ally 
 
 Upon closer review, however, the reality is more complicated. The rise of the 
conservatives in South Korea has more to do with President Roh’s botched domestic 
policies than with the public’s antipathy toward the North Korea-based regional 
vision. In fact, domestic support for President Roh’s Pyongyang visit in October 2007 
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and the sudden, albeit belated, rise of his popularity after the summit attest to the 
continuing salience of the regional role anchored to North Korea.60 It is in this vein 
that the newly elected President Lee also expressed his willingness “to meet Kim Jong 
Il at any time” to discuss various issues including nuclear programs and inter-Korean 
reconciliation.61 In China where political leaders began to question U.S. strategic 
intentions in the region and the North Korean threat rarely captures the minds of the 
general public, political elites remain focused on improving ties with North Korea in 
various areas. 
 In contrast, in Japan, despite Prime Minister Koizumi’s continued 
normalization efforts, the abduction fiasco became too much of a political burden to 
make any meaningful breakthrough in the North Korea-based regional vision. In this 
context, the U.S. rhetoric about a North Korean rogue also tapped into a well of 
Japanese post-abduction anger and anxieties, opening the way for North Korea bashers 
in Japanese politics. Shinzo Abe is a prime example in this regard. Within a short 
period of time, Abe’s widely-publicized anti-North Korean stance catapulted him onto 
the national political stage.62 His North Korea bashing paid a handsome political 
dividend when he succeeded Koizumi as Prime Minister in August 2006. Upon 
assuming premiership, he became the driving force behind Japan’s anti-North Korean 
campaign, while positioning himself as the leader of the “new Japan”63 that purports to 
                                                
60 According to a opinion survey by KBS-Media Research, the percentage of respondents supporting 
Roh’s governance improved to 53.7 in October, a 18.6 % increase from the same survey in August 
2007. Ohmynews, October 6, 2007.  
61 Donga Ilbo, July 7, 2008. 
62 One senior Japanese expert even depicted then Cabinet Secretary Abe as “a single-issue politician,” 
preoccupied mainly with the abduction issue with an eye to enhance his political stature within the 
ranks of the Liberal Democratic Party and the larger Japanese political scene. Interview 04-05, Tokyo, 
March 22, 2005. 
63 His book, entitled “Toward A Beautiful Nation [Utsukushii Kuni e],” calls for Japan’s new security 
strategy focused on Japan’s global role in cooperation with liked-minded democratic allies such as the 
United States and India. 
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be a global player. In the process, the influence of political actors who stressed the 
North Korea-anchored regional role for Japan diminished. 
Regional Role Conceptions and Regional Order 
 The converging and diverging nature of the East Asian response to the North 
Korean challenge suggest that regional role conceptions surrounding North Korea 
have broader regional consequences. An analysis of regional role conceptions can help 
us better understand the evolving regional order in East Asia. In the rapidly growing 
literature on East Asian security,64 one of the key debates since the end of the Cold 
War has been conceptualizing the post-Cold War regional security order. Drawing on 
the prewar European experiences, Aaron Friedberg, for one, projected an image of 
East Asia as “the cockpit of great power conflict,” where an emerging multipolar East 
                                                
64 Aaron L. Friedberg, “Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia,” International 
Security, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Winter 1993/1994), pp. 5–33; Richard K. Betts, “Wealth, Power, and 
Instability: East Asian and the United States after the Cold War,” International Security, Vol. 18, No. 3 
(Winter 1993/94), pp. 34-77; Peter J. Katzenstein, Norms and National Security: Police and Military in 
Postwar Japan (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996); Mike Mochizuki and Michael O’Hanlon, “A 
Liberal Vision for the U.S.-Japanese Alliance,” Survival, Summer 1998; Peter J. Katzenstein and 
Takashi Shirashi, eds., Network Power: Japan and Asia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997); 
Thomas J. Christensen, “China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia,” 
International Security, Vol. 23, No. 4 (Spring 1999), pp. 49–80; David Shambaugh, “China’s Military 
Views the World: Ambivalent Security,” International Security, Vol. 24, No. 3 (Winter 1999/2000), pp. 
52–79; Thomas C. Berger, “Set for Stability? Prospects for Conflict and Cooperation in East Asia” 
Review of International Studies 26:3 (July 2000) pp. 405-428; Peter J. Katzenstein and Nobuo 
Okawara, “Japan, Asia-Pacific Security, and the Case for Analytical Eclecticism,” International 
Security 26(3), Winter 2001/02, pp. 153-185; Christopher Hemmer and Peter J. Katzenstein, “Why Is 
There no NATO in Asia? Collective Identity, Regionalism, and the Origins of Multilateralism,” with 
Christopher Hemmer, International Organization (Summer 2002); David C. Kang, “Getting Asia 
Wrong: The Need for New Analytic Frameworks,” International Security, 27(4) Spring 2003, pp. 57-
85; Muthiah Alagappa, ed., Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2003); Michael Mastanduno and G. John Ikenberry, eds., International 
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Asian order would lead to regional instability.65 In contrast, basing his argument 
primarily on the historical experiences of East Asian countries, David Kang forecasts a 
stable East Asian hierarchy centered on China.66 East Asian dynamics surrounding 
North Korea, however, raise questions about such deterministic accounts. Simply put, 
the East Asian security order is not foreordained to be conflictual or stable. Instead of 
inferring from different, largely dissimilar social contexts (e.g., pre-war European or 
pre-modern Asian), I argue, an analysis of the regional order should be subject to 
empirical testing in specific policy domains as regional actors interact among 
themselves and with external powers in various political contexts. 
 Existing studies also tend to privilege either the effects of extra-regional, 
systemic forces (outside-in) or the distinctive internal dynamics (inside-out) of a 
region as a key factor shaping regional order. For instance, John Ikenberry 
demonstrates how the United States, after its victory in World War II, structured and 
operated a stable post-war international order by binding itself to multilateral 
institutional mechanisms.67 The regional order in East Asia is a natural outgrowth of 
that U.S.-led global order, with the United States stabilizing the regional order through 
its bilateral alliances and U.S.-led institutional mechanisms. On the other hand, other 
scholars point to the inner workings of the region. Thomas Berger, for instance, argues 
that East Asia is set for potential conflict due to the salience of historical enmity 
among regional countries.68 The upshot of his analysis is an image of endemic 
regional instability in East Asia with little prospect of reconciliation. 
 A more accurate account would require an analysis of both the external and 
internal dimensions of regional order building. Contrary to the traditional view of 
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regional order as a simple geographical denomination or a material reality deduced 
unproblematically from the power structure at the system level, regions are “social 
constructs” shaped by political practices.69 In other words, the construction of order is 
a dynamic process,70 where the “boundaries and salient features” of a region are 
constantly in the making, depending on the nature of interaction between external and 
internal dynamics.71 Hence, instead of focusing on either external or internal forces, 
we need to look at the interaction between them. Specifically, if the two regional role 
conceptions were deemed compatible, regional actors would be able to expand their 
regional roles within the U.S.-led regional order. If not, they would resist the 
hegemonic design and the resulting order would be more conflictual. 
 While the Clinton administration’s North Korea policy complemented South 
Korea’s sunshine policy and Japan and China’s greater regional aspirations around the 
Korean Peninsula, the Bush administration’s approach conflicted with regional 
yearnings for greater roles, setting in motion a gradual transformation in the regional 
order.72 More specifically, the Clinton administration’s approach during the 1998 
North Korean missile crisis, commonly known as the Perry Process, showed a 
mutually reinforcing mechanism between the United States and East Asian countries. 
For instance, President Kim Dae-jung did not have to balance alliance ties and South 
Korea’s regional policy. Instead, South Korea’s regional vision thrived under the 
leadership of the United States. Regional consultation during the Perry Process 
enabled the regional actors to play greater roles in dealing with North Korea, while at 
the same time allowing them to support U.S. leadership. No serious domestic 
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contestation over relationships with the United States and North Korea occurred. 
Compatible understandings of the North Korean challenge and the practices of 
coordination and consultation during the Perry Process served to mitigate mutual 
suspicion among East Asian countries and promoted regionalism in the process. In this 
way, both alliance coordination via the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group 
(TCOG) among the U.S., Japan, and South Korea and regional cooperation among 
China, Japan, and South Korea through the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) greatly 
improved. 
 In contrast, during the Bush presidency, until recently, the gap between the 
U.S. and regional understandings of the North Korean question made the U.S.-driven 
roles and the internally-shaped regional roles incongruent. In addition, the rogue frame 
and the coercive U.S. policy stance toward North Korea complicated East Asian 
countries’ efforts to expand regional roles by engaging North Korea. By intensifying 
role conflict, the Bush administration’s approach has weakened alliance ties. As for 
regionalism, by late 2004, a shared regional understanding of North Korea and the 
collective regional resistance to the Bush administration’s approach facilitated 
regional cooperation. But as the rise of conservatives in Japan pushed that country in 
the other direction, the earlier pattern of regional cooperation deteriorated. As a result, 
the U.S alliances in East Asia have been losing a trilateral dimension, while 
regionalism fragmented. 
 Under these circumstances, trilateral cooperation of the TCOG became the first 
victim of growing tensions among U.S. allies. In China, in the face of Bush’s 
inflexible attitude toward North Korea, many suspected that the United States was 
trying to rebuild the regional order to its liking via the Six Party talks.73 In the process, 
domestic groups portraying North Korea as a liability dwindled, while the leadership 
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moved to emphasize the traditional ties with North Korea. In June 2008, for instance, 
Xi Jinping, widely speculated about as Hu Jintao’s successor as China’s top leader in 
2012, made his first official foreign visit to Pyongyang. During his visit, he reiterated 
to Kim Jong Il, “the China-DPRK friendship is inalterable and has withstood 
international flux,” while agreeing with the North Koreans to celebrate the year 2009 
as “the DPRK-China friendship year.”74 Meanwhile, Japan’s initial focus on regional 
dimensions was reversed. As the conservatives assumed key government positions in 
Tokyo, trilateral cooperation with the U.S. and South Korea was replaced by a 
growing focus on the global role of the U.S.-Japan alliance.75 
 In sum, the Bush administration shaped the regional order in two ways: In the 
early rounds of the Six Party talks (by the end of 2004) it provoked a collective 
regional response. Such regional reactions made alliance coordination very difficult, 
while they improved the pattern of regional consultation and cooperation developed 
during the Perry Process. As the hard line U.S. approach and the stalled crisis 
intensified role conflict and affected domestic political dynamics after 2005, a 
contested regional dynamic emerged, pitting Japan against China and South Korea. In 
the process, regional cooperation was replaced with mounting tensions, including a 
renewed China-Japan rivalry and a struggle between South Korea and Japan. Overall, 
as summarized in Table 1-2, while a more inclusive and cooperative regional order 
emerged in the late 1990s, during the second crisis the region has become more 
fragmented and conflictual. 
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Table 1-2. Role Conceptions and Regional Orders 
 Role Congruence Role Conflict 
US Impact on 
Regional Role 
Conceptions 
 The Perry Process in the 1990s 
-Congruence between US-
directed roles and regional roles 
 The Bush Doctrine 
-Conflict between the US-driven roles 




 Broadened, Multi-Tiered 
-Trilateral alliance ties 
-Inclusive, open regionalism 
 Narrowed, Fragmented 






-Alliance cooperation (TCOG) 
-Open regionalism (APT, ARF) 
 Conflictual 
-Alliance problem (end of TCOG) 
-By 2004: regionalism (APT) 
-Post-2005: regional rivalry (weak 
APT) 
*The structural dimension refers to the underlying organizational template of the regional order, such as 
a bilateral hub-and spokes order built around U.S. alliances and a fusion of trilateral alliance mechanism 
and broader, open regionalism. 
**The character of the regional order concerns whether patterns of regional interaction are conflictual 
or cooperative. 
1-3. Alternative Explanations 
 In accounting for the variation in the regional response to the U.S. approach 
toward North Korea, we can consider several explanations, informed respectively by 
power, threat perception, and national interest. The first set of theories concerns the 
power variable. Both the hegemonic stability theory76 and the literature on U.S. 
primacy77 stress the hegemon’s material capabilities and its “ability to put forward 
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new ideas, to define (or redefine) international society, and to exclude those states that 
do not comply.”78 Similarly, critical IR theorists highlight the role of hegemonic 
discourse in shaping state behavior. Roxanne Doty, for instance, argues that by 
repeatedly using such terms as the “foreign,” the “exotic,” and the “other,” a discourse 
by a hegemon could “[make] it virtually impossible to think outside of it.”79 Be it 
hegemonic capability or hegemonic discourse, from this vantage point of power, we 
would expect regional countries to generally follow the U.S. lead in the second North 
Korean nuclear crisis, as they did in earlier crises. The regional resistance in the 
second crisis reveals the indeterminacy of U.S. power in affecting state behavior. 
 A refined realist argument, however, may be better suited to explain the 
regional outcome during the second crisis. Irrespective of the objective levels of U.S. 
material capabilities, if the perceived level of U.S. power decreased, we could see 
subsequent changes in state behavior.80 Crucial here is the regional perception of U.S. 
power. The image of a bounded hegemon captures this possibility in East Asia: By the 
time the second crisis intensified in early 2003, the Bush administration had “bigger 
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fish to fry” in Iraq.81 Given the U.S. preoccupation with, and the subsequent quagmire, 
in Iraq, U.S. influence in regard to North Korea may be questioned in the minds of the 
regional actors, opening room for regional resistance during the second crisis. A 
corollary to this perceived power account is the growing power and influence of 
China, which may have weakened the U.S. regional standing further. 
 The main problem with the perceived power account is the fact that the Bush 
administration had already been challenged by the regional countries in its dealings 
with North Korea prior to the War in Iraq. For instance, throughout the first two years 
of the Bush presidency, preceding the War in Iraq, the Kim Dae Jung government in 
South Korea was persistent in its efforts to change and curb the Bush administration’s 
hard line approach toward North Korea. Similarly, the Chinese leadership raised 
question over the U.S. initial handling of the second crisis, which led to a dangerous 
action-reaction dynamic between the United States and North Korea. After the 2002 
summit with Kim Jong Il, the Koizumi government in Japan also called for negotiation 
between the Bush administration and North Korea. If anything, what worried the 
regional countries during the second crisis was not the perceived decline of U.S. 
power, but the prospect that the Bush administration might indeed imprudently use its 
overwhelming military power against the North, endangering regional visions 
anchored to North Korea. 
 As for China’s power and influence, it is often assumed that over time its 
neighbors will be more likely to accommodate to China’s preferences on various 
regional issues, including North Korea. In this regard, without systematic empirical 
testing, many point to South Korea’s growing deference to China as a key example.82 
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Although some scholars have begun to explore the underlying sources of such regional 
deference to China,83 upon closer observation it is not entirely clear whether the 
perceived power of China is the main driver shaping regional behavior. Despite 
China’s regional ascendancy, the Japanese intensified their rivalry with China. Even in 
South Korea, the story is more complex than the bandwagoning-with-China 
hypothesis typically assumes: South Korea has been in conflict with China on issues 
that are critical to its regional visions. The South Korean government, for instance, 
made a strong protest against the Chinese claim that the ancient Korean kingdom of 
Koguryo was “part of an ethnic minority history under the ancient Chinese empire.” 
When the Chinese foreign ministry appeared to sanction such an interpretation of 
Koguyro history on its Web site in 2004, it provoked strong South Korean 
opposition.84 In short, it is the compatibility of their approaches toward North Korea 
(i.e., internally-shaped role conceptions anchored to the North), not China’s growing 
influence, that helped facilitate Sino-South Korean relations. 
 The second group of explanations centers on threat perceptions. Stephen Walt, 
for instance, views perceived threats as a key driver behind balancing behavior.85 
According to this logic, it is not the U.S. power per se but regional threat perceptions 
vis-à-vis North Korea that should determine regional outcomes. In fact, all the East 
Asian countries are, albeit to varying degrees, concerned about the threat coming out 
of North Korea (e.g., missiles, artillery shells, or refugees). Given the East Asian 
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alliance posture that is arrayed to address North Korean contingencies, in this view, 
North Korean aggressive intentions manifested in its renewed nuclear provocation 
should serve to strengthen the alliance ties between the United States and its Asian 
allies.86 However, not only did the regional countries resist the U.S. approach, alliance 
coordination faced mounting difficulties during the second crisis.87 In addition, the 
fact that the South Korean threat perception of North Korea has dramatically lowered 
without any discernable decline in both North Korea’s material capabilities and 
aggressive behavior begs an explanation.88 
 A more plausible alternative is differences in threat perceptions between the 
United States and the regional countries vis-à-vis North Korea. Despite the U.S. rogue 
frame, according to this reasoning, East Asian countries expressed more concerns 
about the prospect of U.S. preemption on North Korea than about North Korea per se. 
For the East Asian countries, the collapse of the North Korean regime, either by a 
preemptive strike by the U.S. or through coordinated and prolonged sanctions, would 
“wreak an unbearable havoc” in the region as a whole and on the Korean Peninsula in 
particular.89 In this worst-case scenario, regional instability can materialize in several 
forms. While the Japanese are wary of North Korea’s intermediate-range Nodong 
missiles landing on their territory, South Koreans are still being held hostage to the 
barrage of tens of thousands of North Korean artillery shells targeted at the 
metropolitan city area around Seoul.90 A North Korean contingency would be a 
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nightmare scenario for the Chinese as well, since it could entail millions of North 
Korean refugees flowing into the northeastern part of China, a region about which 
Beijing is sensitive because of its role in a new economic development plan.91 
 This approach is useful for explaining a cautious regional approach toward 
North Korea during the second crisis. A comparison with the Perry Process illustrates 
this point. While the Clinton administration in the 1998 missile crisis did not take an 
aggressive, coercive approach toward North Korea, from a regional perspective, the 
Bush administration’s approach, especially in the wake of the War in Iraq, appeared to 
have a greater potential to endanger regional stability. In other words, the perceived 
costs during the second crisis may have been far too substantial to ignore for the 
regional actors. As such, it would be in the interest of the regional countries to seek a 
workable regional solution to dampen growing tension between the hawkish U.S. 
administration and the equally risk-acceptant North Korean regime. From this 
perspective, we would expect to see the Six Party Talks functioning as a regional 
venue for crisis management, pitting the United States against the regional actors over 
proper means to resolve the North Korean problem. 
 While regional actors value reducing threats/costs coming out of the crisis in 
and of itself, the North Korean question goes beyond the issue of crisis management. 
Indeed, during the 1998 missile crisis and the crisis since 2002, the main focus in East 
Asia has rarely been on short-term crisis management. Rather, at stake was how to 
transform the long-term relationship with North Korea in ways that enhance existing 
regional roles and articulate new ones. As one Chinese expert writes, along with the 
goal of “crisis management, China’s diplomacy never lost sight of its strategic 
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interests.”92 In this vein, “[n]o matter how the regional environment changed, North 
Korea would always be of importance to Chinese security and power diplomacy, and 
China would not forsake the DPRK’s sense of a special relationship.”93 During the 
early rounds of the Six Party Talks, South Korea and Japan also made efforts to 
maintain bilateral channels with North Korea with greater regional roles and new 
regional visions in mind. 
 Alternatively, from the perspective of liberal/institutionalist theory,94 finding a 
solution to the North Korean challenge may involve a collective action problem. In 
this interest-based account, the regional resistance to the U.S. approach may be due to 
the presence of uncertainty, private information, or transaction problems. Specifically, 
East Asian countries’ idiosyncratic national interests vis-à-vis North Korea, such as 
Japan’s emphasis on the abduction issue and South Korea’s preoccupation with inter-
Korean reconciliation, may be key factors shaping regional behavior. Given parochial 
national interests vis-à-vis North Korea, East Asian countries should be expected to 
reject the hard line US approach in that it may complicate their own bilateral 
approaches toward the North.  
 By highlighting the divergence between the U.S. and regional countries, this 
account can shed light on the difficulty of finding a coordinated solution at the Six 
Party Talks. One could also link diverse national interests to the different weight of 
North Korea in the regional strategies of each East Asian country. Considering the 
salience of inter-Korean nationalism, the North Korea issue may be most central to 
South Korea’s conception of national interests. In Japan, the North Korean threat is 
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more pronounced, while less so in China. However, what seem to be disparate, 
nationally specific interests vis-à-vis North Korea are in fact the result of different 
political groups stressing different regional roles. One could highlight the emergence 
of Shinzo Abe in Japan as an example of forging distinct national interests on the basis 
of the North Korean threat. Yet, his North Korea bashing was mainly for the purpose 
of stressing Japan’s externally-shaped regional roles as U.S. ally and normal state, 
rather than stressing parochial national interests or mitigating the threat coming from 
North Korea. More importantly, this account overlooks elements of regional 
convergence on the meaning of North Korea as a steppingstone for greater regional 
roles and visions. To test the validity of each claim, we need to examine the different 
regional contexts under which power, threat and interests affect state behavior 
surrounding the North Korean challenge. 
1-4. Research Design and Outline of Chapters 
 This dissertation employs a comparative analysis of the post-Cold War 
political dynamics surrounding the North Korean challenge as the issue intersects with 
the different understandings and policies of the United States and East Asian 
countries. To assess the impact of role conceptions and the changes in regional order, I 
compare the political dynamics both in the spatial dimension (i.e., global, regional, 
national contexts) and the temporal dimension (i.e., the North Korean missile crisis 
and the Perry Process in 1998-2000; and the second nuclear crisis of 2002-present). 
 The research for this dissertation has benefited from multiple data sources 
gathered from China, Japan, South Korea, and the United States. First, I rely on 
various official documents concerning the North Korean issue in each country. With 
the exception of Japanese,95 I use materials both in local languages and in English. 
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Second, I draw on fifty-seven in-depth interviews that I conducted with government 
officials and experts in the three East Asian countries, as well as scores of interviews 
by the local media. I also utilize a wide set of secondary literature, local newspapers 
and opinion pieces concerning the North Korean challenge in each country. I identify 
the salience of regional role conceptions by examining various regional sources 
including speeches, policy documents, and interview materials. Throughout the 
empirical chapters, I employ a method of process tracing which tracks the 
policymaking process to identify the mechanism by which role effects lead to policy 
behavior. 
 Drawing on a comprehensive survey of policy documents, speeches, and 
interview data, in Chapter Two and Three, I examine and compare the American and 
East Asian understandings of the North Korean challenge in different political 
contexts and trace how such understandings led to different regional role conceptions 
and policy behavior. Chapter Two delineates the similarities and differences in the 
American and regional understandings of the North Korean challenge during the first 
nuclear crisis and the ongoing second nuclear crisis. After mapping out broader 
patterns, in Chapter Three, I explore the particular meanings attached to North Korea 
in domestic debates in East Asia and show how they are linked to their countries’ 
regional role conceptions. 
 More specifically, Chapter Two explores how 9/11 and the specter of nuclear 
terrorism gave new meaning to the problem of rogues states and the threat of WMD 
proliferation, altering previous understandings and policy trajectories laid out by the 
Clinton administration. In contrast to the perceptional fluidity in East Asia on what 
North Korea represents, there has been an increasing rigidity in the U.S. perception of 
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North Korea as an urgent, global security problem. This perceptional rigidity/fluidity 
contrast led to different policy orientations toward North Korea. Unlike the Clinton 
administration, the Bush administration has taken more risk-taking, inflexible choices 
vis-à-vis North Korea. In East Asia where traditional threat perceptions of North 
Korea have weakened amid the search for greater regional roles, that U.S. policy shift 
was seen as problematic for the pursuit of such role. 
 Chapter Three delves into domestic contestations over North Korea in the three 
East Asian Countries. Here, the key task is to delineate the link between regional role 
conceptions and policy orientations toward North Korea in the three East Asian 
countries. Crucial in this process is to identify the sources of different role conceptions 
in each country and to show how the roles so conceived have lead to particular 
policies. I will pay particular attention to the policymaking process on North Korea in 
each country by “triangulating” various data sources such as interviews, opinion polls, 
regional scholarly journals, and official documents.96 
 The next two chapters, Chapters Four and Five turn to the impact of role 
congruence and role conflict on the regional order in East Asia. To demonstrate the 
causal effects of regional role conceptions on regional order building, I compare 
alliance politics and regionalism during the Clinton and Bush presidencies. More 
specifically, I assess the contrasting regional dynamics shaped by different U.S. 
approaches toward North Korea and see how alliance management and community 
building worked out differently in different global contexts, transforming the shape 
and character of regional order. Chapter Four traces the Clinton administration’s 
approach toward North Korea during the North Korean missile crisis and North 
Korea’s suspected nuclear activities and reactions to the U.S. approach at the time, 
demonstrating how such negative reactions affected alliance relationship and 
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regionalism. Chapter Five turns to the regional order as shaped by the Bush 
administration’s policy toward North Korea and shows how alliance cooperation and 
regional frameworks changed. 
 Finally, Chapter Six concludes the dissertation with a summary of findings and 
a discussion of theoretical and policy implications. I also suggest possible avenues of 
further research and the possibility of extending the analytical framework advanced in 
this dissertation to other regional contexts (e.g., the Middle East) where a similar 
rogue problem intersects with the regional order. I also explore the potential 
implications of the latest developments at the Six Party Talks where the Bush 
administration began to take a more flexible approach toward North Korea. Although 
the final outcome remains to be seen, how this recent policy shift unfolds in the 
coming years will have significant consequences for regional role conceptions and the 
regional order in East Asia. 
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CHAPTER TWO: 
Global Rogues and Regional Responses: 
The Bush Doctrine and the North Korean Challenge 
2-1. Introduction 
 Throughout the post-Cold War period, U.S. responses to North Korea’s nuclear 
ambitions have been based on a simple premise: the United States will not accept a 
nuclear North Korea. At the height of each of the North Korean nuclear crises, both 
the Clinton and Bush administrations imposed a series of economic sanctions and 
considered military options.97 The similarities, however, go no further. During the first 
North Korean nuclear crisis, the Clinton administration relied primarily on bilateral 
negotiations with North Korea. The underlying assumption was that the North Korean 
threat, while dangerous, was manageable, requiring long-term political solutions. In 
contrast, the Bush administration took a unilateral, coercive approach on the 
assumption that North Korea represented a global challenge—both urgent and 
unconventional in nature—demanding immediate, decisive measures. 
 The different U.S. understandings of and approaches toward North Korea 
shaped, in turn, the East Asian reactions in the course of the crises. While largely 
bilateral in scope, the Clinton administration’s approach was to secure multilateral 
backing in the form of alliance support from Japan and South Korea. During the first 
crisis, the Chinese government also provided support for the Clinton administration’s 
approach on many occasions. 
 A completely different picture emerged in the aftermath of the second crisis. 
While the Bush administration put negotiations with North Korea into a multilateral 
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White House on June 16, 1994 to “help make a fateful decision on the number of additional troops to 
send to South Korea, and to deliberate further on the “Osirak option.” See Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci, 
Going Critical, p. 220. 
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setting, Michael Armacost observes that it was the United States that was pressured by 
regional countries to take a more conciliatory approach.98 When Secretary of State 
Condoleezza Rice raised the idea of imposing economic and political penalties against 
North Korea, referring to what she called “other options in the international system,” 
her message fell on deaf ears in East Asia. Throughout the second crisis, writes Glenn 
Kessler, it has been “the United States, not North Korea that seemed isolated.”99 
 This chapter takes a systematic look at the Bush Doctrine in general and its 
application to the North Korean case in particular. The Bush Doctrine represents a 
radical shift in the perception of and policy toward potential proliferators, such as 
North Korea. Underneath this transformation a new assessment of the uncertainty 
surrounding the proliferation challenge.100 From the Bush administration’s 
perspective, the terrorist attacks of September 11th and the ensuing specter of nuclear 
terrorism gave new meaning to the North Korean challenge. Put simply, the post-9/11 
context has enabled “a new American vision of national security that has redefined 
both the nature of the threat and the U.S. response.”101 Different understandings led to 
different policy prescriptions. Unlike the Clinton administration, the Bush 
administration has until recently opted for riskier and more inflexible policy choices 
vis-à-vis North Korea. In East Asia where the North Korean threat has become a 
matter of domestic political contestation as nations search for greater regional roles, 
the U.S. policy shift was seen as problematic and threatening to regional stability. 
 In what follows, I locate the changes in U.S. policy toward North Korea in the 
broader global strategic context and examine how that shift prompted a distinct 
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regional response. In doing so, this chapter maps out broad patterns in the global and 
regional understandings of and policy behavior toward the North Korean challenge. I 
pay particular attention to similarities and differences in American and regional 
understandings of the North Korean challenge during the first and the second nuclear 
crises. The next section provides a brief overview of the contrast in the regional 
responses to the different U.S. approaches during the first and second crises. This is 
followed by an exploration of the nature of the Bush Doctrine as it relates to the post-
9/11 global security vision, proliferation strategy, and the North Korean challenge. 
Particular emphasis is placed on the contrast between the Bush administration’s 
strategy and that of the Clinton administration. The chapter then moves to the regional 
level, examining East Asia’s response to the Bush Doctrine during the second crisis, 
followed by a concluding section summarizing the chapter. 
2-2. Different Regional Responses to Similar Crises 
 In 1992 when the North Korean government rejected a request for special 
inspections of suspicious nuclear facilities in North Korea by the International Atomic 
and Energy Agency (IAEA), the newly formed Clinton administration found itself in 
the first nuclear crisis of the post-Cold War era. In striking similarity to the second 
crisis, North Korea announced in early 1993 its intention to withdraw from the 
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). In May 1994 when North Korea began 
removing fuel rods from its 25-megawatt reactor, the Clinton administration made 
public its intention to seek economic sanctions on North Korea at the U.N. Security 
Council, prompting Pyongyang to respond with a warning that sanctions would 
provoke military actions by North Korea.102 
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 Concerned about rapidly developing tensions on the Korean peninsula, the 
Clinton administration adopted a strategy of gradual escalation at it attempted to build 
a coalition with its regional allies and China. The U.S. allies, Japan and South Korea, 
quickly endorsed the escalation strategy. In response to North Korea’s announcement 
of its withdrawal from the NPT, Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary Yohei Kono made 
it clear that Japan would support sanctions should efforts to forestall North Korea’s 
withdrawal fail.103 Similarly, the Kim Young Sam government in South Korea not 
only declared that it would take “all necessary steps” to support sanctions, in June 
1993, it unilaterally suspended trade with the North and banned South Korean 
companies from contacting North Koreans altogether. At the time, those supporting 
sanctions in South Korea included Kim Dae Jung, then the leader of the main 
opposition party and later the architect of the sunshine policy.104 The message from 
South Korea was unmistakable: “unless and until North Korea cleared itself of all 
suspicions by way of inspections, there would be no progress in inter-Korean 
economic exchanges and cooperation.”105 
 At their meeting in 1994, Japanese Prime Minister Morihito Hosokawa and 
President Kim Yong Sam reiterated their shared view that unless North Korea allowed 
IAEA inspections of the Yongbyon nuclear facilities, the two countries would join the 
international sanctions against North Korea.106 Throughout the crisis, South Korea and 
Japan sided with the United States over the North Korean issue.107 During a tripartite 
meeting in June 1994, for instance, the United States and its two Asian allies formed 
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“a united front against North Korea” and urged the UN Security Council to consider 
sanctions on North Korea.108 
 Meanwhile, Kim Jong Il’s planned visit to China in early 1993 was reportedly 
cancelled as China refused to accept North Korea’s request for support for its position 
on the issue of nuclear inspection.109 In June 1994, in a meeting with a North Korean 
ambassador, China’s Vice Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxian even suggested that China’s 
role in resolving the issue of expected sanctions at the UN Security Council were 
“limited,” with the implication being that North Korea should not count on China’s 
veto at the UN Security Council.110 As Japan’s Foreign Minister Koji Kakizawa put it, 
“it was important for Japan, South Korea and China—as Pyongyang’s neighbors—to 
send North Korea the right message together.”111 Overall, the regional response at the 
time was not very different from that of the Clinton administration. As summed up in 
a Congressional testimony by Ambassador Robert L. Gallucci, the chief U.S. 
negotiator with the North Koreans at the time, the regional response during the first 
crisis and after the Geneva Agreement was in accord with that of the United States: 
“We stayed in touch with allies . . . [W]e are, all three, together on this agreement.”112 
 In contrast, even prior to 9/11, the Bush administration’s attitude toward North 
Korea caused discord between the United States and East Asian countries. When the 
new administration in Washington refused to follow through on the engagement policy 
pursued by the Clinton administration, East Asian concerns began to grow.113 Worried 
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about the negative consequences for the region of the Bush administration’s approach 
toward North Korea, even the European Union announced that it would play a 
mediating role in dealing with North Korea. Referring to America’s sudden change of 
heart toward North Korea, the foreign minister of Sweden, at the time holding the 
rotating presidency of the European Union, declared, “This means that Europe must 
step in.”114 
 The situation took a turn for the worse as a new post-9/11 global strategic 
blueprint took shape in Washington and Bush’s “axis of evil” speech signaled a new 
direction in addressing the proliferation challenge. The second North Korean nuclear 
crisis hardened the Bush administration’s position. East Asian countries, however, 
called for flexibility. Under the pressure from South Korea and Japan, the Bush 
administration briefly relaxed its stance in a US-South Korea-Japan statement issued 
on January 7, 2003, that expressed a willingness to meet with North Koreans and 
discuss the nuclear issue.115 But the hard line position persisted as the crisis deepened. 
Soon the Bush administration found itself “on a collision course not just with 
Pyongyang, but more importantly with U.S. allies in northeast Asia.”116 Before 
exploring the tension between the Bush administration and East Asian countries, 
however, we need to discuss the nature of the Bush Doctrine and its application to the 
proliferation challenge, including North Korea. 
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2-3. The Bush Doctrine and the North Korean Challenge 
The Bush Doctrine: 9/11 and Global Strategic Context 
 With the strategic blueprint laid out in the 2002 National Security Strategy,117 
the Bush administration gave a decidely militaristic turn to America’s global strategic 
posture. The main assumption of that document was that the United States faced 
undeterrable, irrational regimes bent on threatening their neighbors and disrupting the 
global nonproliferation regime to satisfy their nuclear ambitions. In an era where 
nuclear proliferation increases the danger of nuclear terrorism, so the argument goes, 
the busuiness-as-usual approach is untenable. Such a drastically change in threat 
perception necessitated a new, more proactive approach based on preemption118 
(rather than deterrence), counterprolilferartion (rather than nonproliferation), and 
military means (rather than diplomatic means). 
 In this radical strategic shift, 9/11 proved to be a watershed moment, a 
transformative event that opened up the way for a new frame of reference in U.S. 
global strategy. In fact, John Lewis Gaddis called the Bush Doctrine ‘‘the most 
sweeping shift in U.S. grand strategy since the beginning of the Cold War’’119 In 
remarkable similarity to the Truman Doctrine which laid out a new strategic doctrine 
of containment and the building of a national security state after World War II, 
President Bush effectively “[turned] the crisis of 9/11 into an opportunity to secure the 
endorsement of the American public for a new kind of national security strategy 
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encapsulated in the slogan ‘the war on terror.’”120 As one prominent neoconservative 
puts it, “[September 11] changed the world, and changed our understanding of the 
world.” In this post-9/11 world, he continues, neo-conservatism is “the most plausible 
explanation of the new reality and the most compelling and active response to it,” and 
avoids “the danger of a foreign policy centered on the illusion of stability and 
equilibrium.”121 
 However, the origins of the strategic transformation reflected in the Bush 
Doctrine date further back than September 11th. Christian Reus-Smith, for example, 
links the Bush Doctrine to the ideological underpinnings of the Reagan administration: 
“deep-rooted politico-cultural conceptions of American exceptionalism, democratic 
mission and security through world order tutelage; and the chance confluence of 
historical events.”122 However, it was only after the end of the Cold War confrontation 
that a concrete strategic blueprint based on such beliefs took shape. In 1992, the 
Pentagon worked on the first biennial National Defense Planning Guidance (NDPG), a 
document that, for the first time since the end of World War II, would not highlight 
the Soviet Union as the main threat. Written by key neoconservatives who would later 
become high-ranking officials in the Bush administration, namely, Paul Wolfowitz, 
Zalmay Khalilzad, and L. Scooter Libby, the 1992 NDPG envisioned a potent global 
power so powerful that it would “sufficiently account for the interests of the advanced 
industrial nations to discourage them from challenging our leadership or seeking to 
overturn the established political and economic order.”123 
 The document listed proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic 
missiles and terrorist threats as the main threat, singling out Iraq and North Korea as 
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primary cases. In dealing with these countries, the report made it clear that the United 
States would act unilaterally.124 When the document was leaked to the media, it 
created a huge controversy, with the rest of the world criticizing it as “a blueprint for 
American hegemony.” President George H.W. Bush, and other government officials 
soon dismissed the document altogether. However, Dick Cheney, then Secretary of 
Defense, saw its potential for transforming the global order and told Khalilzad, 
“You’ve discovered a new rationale for our role in the world.”125  
 Although completely discredited during the Democratic administration of the 
1990s, the ideas behind the 1992 NDPG survived, only to resurface with a vengeance 
during the Bush presidency. With the proponents of the 1992 NDPG in key 
government positions, the Bush administration after 9/11 moved quickly on a new 
agenda of reshaping the global order and regional dynamics in key parts of the world. 
In fact, IR scholars in general view the Bush Doctrine as a manifestation of a broader 
strategy of reshaping the global order. The combination of power, fear, and perceived 
opportunity, writes Robert Jervis, enabled the Bush administration to “seek to reshape 
global politics and various societies around the world.” Absent U.S. intervention, from 
this perspective, “the international environment will become more menacing to the 
United States and its values, but strong action can help increase global security and 
produce a better world.”126 In fact, the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, issued by 
the Pentagon, made clear a new U.S. strategic focus: 
[The U.S. strategic goal is] to ensure that no foreign power can dictate the 
terms of regional or global security. It will attempt to dissuade any military 
competitor from developing disruptive or other capabilities that could enable 
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regional hegemony or hostile action against the United States or other friendly 
countries.127 (Emphasis added) 
The Bush Doctrine and Nuclear Proliferation 
 In its new global strategic transformation, the Bush administration has put 
particular emphasis on the proliferation challenge and the threat from rogue regimes. 
The salience of framing in the policymaking process makes this emphasis significant 
across a broad range of foreign policy issues.128 A single objective reality can be 
interpreted in a myriad ways by different political actors, all with implications for 
subsequent policy behavior. Crucial in this regard are not just the specific terms 
political actors use (e.g., rogues, axis-of-evil, etc.), but “who has the ability to shape 
the international agenda and how they choose to shape it.” In the post-Cold War era, it 
is the United States that, as the sole superpower, has “the ability to put forward new 
ideas, to define (or redefine) international society, and to exclude those states that do 
not comply.”129 In this process, whether a particular regime actually has the 
wherewithal to inflict substantial costs on the United States becomes secondary. What 
matters instead is the type of regime the United States designates as a threat: regimes 
that are considered hostile to the United States and known to pursue weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD). 
 In its new focus on the threat of WMD, the Bush Doctrine places more 
emphasis on counterproliferation than on nonproliferation.130 The doctrine of 
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preemption,131 figured prominently in President Bush’s speeches and The 2002 
National Security Strategy, marks such a shift .132 Since its inception in 1968, the 
nonproliferation norm, the ideational backbone of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty 
(NPT) regime, has been successful in prohibiting the possession and proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. 
For more than three decades, the nonproliferation norm spread by the international 
nonproliferation regime has been relatively effective, with the notable exception of the 
South Asian cases of the late 1990s.133 
 Technically speaking, however, India and Pakistan are not in breach of the 
rules and regulations specified by the nonproliferation regime, since the two have 
never been signatories of the NPT. Nevertheless, they were not free from global 
condemnation as norm violators. Referring to the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests in 
1998, Spurgeon Keenly notes that both countries violated “the 30-year international 
norm against new nuclear-weapon states and the newly established taboo against 
nuclear testing.”134 Although critics questioned both the enforcement mechanism of 
the nonproliferation regime and the effectiveness of international sanctions against 
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proliferators, the effects of the nonproliferation norm in curbing the temptation to go 
nuclear were generally viewed in a positive light during the Cold War period. 
 The first sign of change emerged in the early years of the Clinton 
administration when the Pentagon began to use the term “counterproliferation.” With 
the specter of facing Saddam’s WMD retaliation in the First Gulf War still vivid in 
1993, then Secretary of Defense Les Aspin launched the Counterproliferation 
Initiative (CPI) to explore military options for dealing with WMD-armed 
adversaries.135 However, while the program was further developed through various 
counterproliferation plans and programs in subsequent years, the Clinton 
administration’s initiative remained “subordinate to a larger national strategy 
predicated primarily on traditional and more recent nonproliferation measures.”136 The 
term counterproliferation was carefully “embedded within a comprehensive non-
proliferation policy that included non-military instruments,” and thus was viewed as 
an effort to complement, rather than supplant, existing nonproliferation options.137 
Furthermore, the Clinton administration’s counterproliferation initiative did not 
include “nuclear first strikes or preventive war aimed at stopping a regime from 
acquiring WMD. Intra-war attacks on enemy WMD facilities were envisaged, but not 
starting a war itself— and certainly not a nuclear war.”138 
 The Bush administration added a whole new dimension to U.S. proliferation 
policy with the 2002 National Security Strategy. The report frames the new strategic 
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environment in a way that emphasizes WMD threats and requires proactive actions, 
including preemptive strikes. The basic assumption is that the post-Cold War threat 
environment is fundamentally different from that of the Cold War years: 
In the Cold War, weapons of mass destruction were considered weapons of last 
resort whose use risked the destruction of those who used them. Today, our 
enemies see weapons of mass destruction as weapons of choice.139 
While the nonproliferation norm, with its related policies, was “multilateral at its core” 
and “primarily a diplomatic strategy,” the 2002 National Security Strategy calls for 
proactive and, if necessary, unilateral actions.140 
 Parallel to the doctrinal change, a series of action plans included the use of 
nuclear weapons. While briefly mentioning the problem of “rogue states,” the previous 
Nuclear Posture Review submitted in 1994 concluded, “the threat they posed did not 
warrant significant changes in U.S. nuclear forces or policies.”141 However, the latest 
Nuclear Posture Review leaked in March 2002 called for, if necessary, specific 
nuclear options targeted at countries including North Korea.142 In December 2002, the 
U.S. Department of Defense also set out policy for combating the proliferation of 
NBC weapons in The National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction.143 
The report declared that the “primary objective of a response is to disrupt an imminent 
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attack or an attack in progress, and eliminate the threat of future attacks” (emphasis 
added).144 
 Overall, the Bush administration’s counterproliferation drive has two 
distinctive features that represent a sharp break from the nonproliferation campaign. 
First, as the above quote from The National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass 
Destruction shows, the new strategy makes no distinction between the threats of 
“imminent” and “future” attacks. Effectively conflating the terms preemption and 
prevention, the current proliferation drive is focused on the mere possibility, not the 
probability or imminence of enemy attacks. John Lewis Gaddis attributes the blending 
of the terms to the impact of 9/11: “In mounting its post-September 11 offensive, the 
Bush administration conflated these terms, using the word “pre-emption” to justify 
what turned out to be a ”preventive” war against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq.”145 Donald 
Rumsfeld himself admits that when he remarked at a congressional hearing, “the 
coalition did not act in Iraq because we had discovered dramatic new evidence of 
Iraq’s pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. We acted because we saw the evidence 
in a dramatic new light—through the prism of our experience on 9/11.”146 The bottom 
line is that now WMD threats have acquired an ever-present sense of urgency. 
 Secondly, the main targets of the Bush administration’s counterproliferation 
drive are not weapons, but regimes that seek such weapons. The main rationale for 
setting up the NPT system in the first place was a belief that the existence of nuclear 
weapons themselves was the main source of the problem.147 The emphasis on 
removing weapons, not regimes, continued in the Clinton administration, which 
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described the main security threat as the one “posed by the proliferation of nuclear, 
biological and chemical weapons and their means of delivery.”148 The Bush 
administration dramatically shifted focus in proliferation policy. As Bill Keller writes, 
from the Bush administration’s perspective, “the main problem is not nuclear weapons 
themselves, but bad regimes armed with nuclear weapons.”149 When Saddam’s regime 
collapsed, President Bush proclaimed: 
By a combination of creative strategies and advanced technology, we are 
redefining war on our terms. . . . In this new ear of warfare, we can target a 
regime, not a nation. 
Terrorists and tyrants have now been put on notice, they can no longer feel safe 
hiding behind innocent lives. (Emphasis added)150 
 Laying out the rationale for his new doctrine of preemption, President Bush 
went further by declaring that containment policy is of little use in the face of rogue 
states and dictators bent on using nuclear weapons. 
 . . . [N]ew threats also require new thinking . . . Containment is not possible 
when unbalanced dictators with weapons of mass destruction can deliver those 
weapons on missiles or secretly provide them to terrorist allies. 
We cannot put our faith in the word of tyrants, who solemnly sign non-
proliferation treaties, and then systemically break them. If we wait for threats 
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to fully materialize, we will have waited too long . . . In the world we have 
entered, the only path to safety is the path of action. And this nation will act.151 
(Emphasis added) 
The Bush Doctrine and the North Korean Challenge 
 The shifts in the U.S.’s broader strategic focus and proliferation policy directly 
affected America’s policy toward North Korea. Even before the doctrinal change, the 
Bush administration’s approach toward North Korea was confrontational. After its 
refusal to endorse South Korea’s sunshine policy and continue Clinton’s engagement 
policy toward North Korea, the Bush administration in June 2001 issued a long-
awaited policy review on North Korea. It proposed a “comprehensive approach” 
toward North Korea, including the issues of ballistic missiles, conventional forces, as 
well as the nuclear issues. While the Bush administration expressed an interest in 
addressing a wide variety of issues with North Korea, it called for North Korea’s 
compliance on all these aspects as a condition for U.S. counter-offer.152 As such, the 
expanded agenda itself amounted to “a marked stiffening of U.S. policy from that of 
the Clinton administration.” North Korea in turn reacted sharply by depicting the Bush 
administration’s approach as “an attempt to disarm [North Korea] through 
negotiations . . . hostile in its intention” and a major shift from the Clinton 
administration’s approach that, from a North Korean perspective, had been “in 
conformity with the interests of both sides.”153 
 A key point here is that behavior does not matter much in the Bush 
administration’s designation of threat. As Jae-Jung Suh observes, the change in the 
Bush administration’s perception of the North Korean threat came without significant 
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change in North Korea’s material capabilities or regime behavior. In the broader 
global campaign against proliferation, the Bush administration stressed the North 
Korean image as a major proliferation threat, while discounting its willingness to 
cooperate with the Clinton administration on a number of issues.154 As a matter of 
fact, North Korea’s reaction after 9/11 was anything but provocative. One day after the 
attacks in New York and Washington, the North Korean government issued a public 
statement denouncing all forms of terrorism, while conveying, through Swedish 
diplomats based in North Korea, a private message of condolence to the United States. 
Moreover, it signed a number of international protocols on terrorism.155 Some 
observers interpreted North Korea’s behavior as an expression of interest in renewing 
contacts with the United States.156 
 Nonetheless, nothing came of North Korea’s diplomatic initiatives toward the 
Bush administration. Instead, a few months later, President Bush opted to denounce 
North Korea as part of the axis of evil. Still, North Korea did not give up hopes of 
renewing talks with the United States. In September 2002, North Korea announced an 
indefinite extension of the moratorium on testing long-range missiles as long as 
dialogue continued with the United States. Again, positive North Korean behavior did 
not inspire similar reactions from the United States. The Bush administration simply 
responded with a White House statement that Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly 
would visit Pyongyang and “explain U.S. policy and seek progress on a range of 
issues of long-standing concern to the United States and the international 
community.”157 Regional expectations that the Bush administration would finally 
make progress on a variety of issues with North Korea were disappointed by Kelly’s 
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confrontation with his North Korean counterpart over North Korea’s alleged uranium 
enrichment program, which produced the second North Korean nuclear crisis.  
 What followed was the end of the Agreed Framework, which in turn sparked a 
chain of reactions North Korea, including the reprocessing of material from the 
Yongbyon reactor and withdrawal from the NPT. Despite similarities in early 
developments of the two crises, the different approaches of the Clinton and Bush 
administrations are emblematic of a broad contrast in their assumptions about how the 
North Korean challenge could be managed. Whereas the Clinton administration 
pursued a policy of “deepening engagement with North Korea,” the Bush 
administration sought a policy of “rigidity and toughness.”158 Secretary of Defense 
Donald Rumsfeld was adamantly opposed to U.S. engagement toward North Korea 
and argued in a series of memos that the United States should focus on the collapse of 
the North Korean regime, not on dialogue with Kim Jong Il.159 Prior to the recent 
about-face in U.S. North Korean policy, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice also 
maintained a similar position in regard to the North Korean regime. In an interview in 
May 2006, a reporter asked her whether North Korea was still part of the axis of evil. 
With little hesitation, she responded, “absolutely.”160 
 The different understandings of the North Korea challenge led to different 
means of addressing it. While the Clinton administration engaged in a series of direct 
talks with North Korea, the Bush administration, until 2007, did not allow its 
representatives at the Six Party Talks to have bilateral meetings with their North 
Korean counterparts. While the Clinton administration considered the use of force 
only as a last resort, the Bush administration did not hesitate to single out North Korea 
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as a potential target of U.S. attacks, even nuclear attacks as revealed in the 2001 
Nuclear Posture Review.161 This policy orientation stood in stark contrast to that of the 
Clinton administration, which in the Geneva Accord agreed to provide a “negative 
security assurance” of not using nuclear weapons against North Korea as long as it 
remained a member of the NPT.162 With extension of the NPT hanging in the balance, 
the Clinton administration was both determined to resolve the first North Korean 
nuclear crisis and willing to seize an opportunity to “conduct the first truly 
international diplomatic campaign to promote nonproliferation.”163 
 Although the Bush administration has used the multilateral Six Party 
framework, it did so mainly as a venue in which to put unified pressure on North 
Korea. Washington hardliners, including those in Vice President Dick Cheney’s office 
and Robert C. Joseph, the nonproliferation director at the National Security Council, 
prohibited direct talks between the U.S. delegation and North Koreans even on an 
informal basis. The chief U.S. delegate James Kelly’s talking points prepared by the 
State Department were often replaced with a harsher White House version.164 The 
hardliners viewed the Six Party talks mainly as site “for the United States to set out its 
nonnegotiable demands with the support of the other four partners.”165 As Lawrence 
Wilkerson, Colin Powell’s chief of staff, characterizes the attitude, Cheney ensured 
that U.S. negotiators in their meeting with North Korean counterparts would be able to 
“say little more than ‘welcome and good-bye.’”166 Again, this is a far cry from the 
Clinton administration’s stance. As U.S. negotiators at the time revealed in their 
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memoirs, the Clinton administration at times appeared to focus too much on 
multilateralism, “being too deferential to Seoul and Vienna.”167 
 Moreover, documents associated with the Bush Doctrine use preemption and 
counterproliferation “almost synonymously” in their discussion of military actions on 
WMD targets.168 This opened up the way for a stress on military means as a key 
proliferation strategy. The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review thus emphasizes “WMD 
elimination operations that locate, characterize, secure, disable and/or destroy a state 
or non-state actor’s WMD capabilities and programs in a hostile or uncertain 
environment.”169 Similarly, in September 2005, Secretary Rumsfeld urged a 
resumption of “studying the feasibility of an earth-penetrating nuclear warhead,” 
which can be used against underground targets.170 Amid this series of events, even 
some prominent members of the Republican Party began to question the validity of the 
post-9/11 U.S. global strategy. For instance, former State Department Middle East 
negotiator Dennis Ross expressed concern about the Bush administration’s “instinct 
toward regime change” rather than changing regime behavior.171 
 In a rare off-the-record interview in November 2002, a Bush administration 
official specifically linked the focus on regimes to the North Korean case. 
I think we need to stop thinking about what we’re going to give [North Korea]. 
Instead, we need to think about how we’re going to change this [Kim Jong Il] 
regime. How are we going to bring this government down? That’s the threat, 
the government. That’s what our President thinks. Our diplomats are uneasy 
with it but that’s what our President thinks. He’s very clear on that. He was 
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quoted in the Post and on Sixty Minutes saying that he loathed the leader, “the 
dear leader.” That’s our President. That’s what he thinks! There’s not much 
mystery in this. Change the regime.172 (emphasis added) 
 While acknowledging the need for diplomatic channels, President Bush did not 
rule out military options: “If they don’t work diplomatically, they will have to work 
militarily. And military option is our last choice.”173 Under Secretary of State John 
Bolton made the same point, “If rogue states are not willing to follow the logic of 
nonproliferation norms, they must be prepared to face the logic of adverse 
consequences. It is why we repeatedly caution that no option is off the table.”174 In 
another speech, Bolton went further in saying that “North Korea and Iran would be the 
next targets after the war with Iraq ended.”175 Secretary Rice also suggested that Kim 
Jong Il ruled “a wounded, isolated nation that can be enveloped by troops and unhappy 
neighbors, and squeezed until its bleeding economy shatters.”176 In fact, in early 2003, 
it was reported that there was a “planning for a possible military strike” on North 
Korea’s nuclear facilities. Although US officials downplayed them as “no more than 
contingency plans,” they include a host of military scenarios ranging from “surgical 
cruise missile strikes to sledgehammer bombing,” and “even talk of using tactical 
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nuclear weapons to neutralize hardened artillery positions aimed at Seoul.”177 
 Overall, the combination of 9/11 and America’s preponderance enabled the 
Bush administration to uphold a new strategic doctrine aimed at reshaping the world 
order. In this sense, Stephen Walt argues that the Bush Doctrine is not a policy of 
preemption, but “a war fought to forestall a shift in the balance of power, independent 
of whether or not the opponent was planning to attack.”178 In the long-term, he further 
argues, the strategy will fail since “the key is not power but persuasion” that U.S. 
primacy is in fact better than other scenarios for the rest of the world.179 To East Asian 
countries, the Bush administration’s global strategy in general and its applications to 
North Korea in particular were hardly persuasive.  
2-4. The East Asian Response to the Bush Doctrine 
Regional Understanding of the North Korean Challenge 
 Despite the U.S. perception of North Korea as an urgent global problem, East 
Asian countries are united in their view of the North Korean challenge as a regional 
problem and, thus, have sought to “regionalize” the issue. Instead of following the 
U.S. approach, one Japanese expert predicts, the North Korean problem could serve as 
a “basis for stabilizing the rest of East Asia.”180 With the vestiges of the Cold War 
years still lingering in the region (e.g., enmity over the history issue, divisions on the 
Korean Peninsula and around the Taiwan Straits, a plethora of territorial disputes, 
etc.), East Asian countries still harbor a traditional security mentality, emphasizing the 
importance of maintaining the regional status quo and avoiding regional rivalry. In this 
view, the North Korean challenge, which is intricately linked to the continuation of the 
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Cold War tensions surrounding the Korean Peninsula, is merely one of many sources 
of tension in the region, rather than an imminent and unpredictable danger to regional 
stability. As a consequence, the U.S. narrative of an urgent and unconventional threat 
has little resonance in East Asia. 
 In terms of the nature and magnitude of the North Korean challenge, East 
Asian states think less about the nuclear issue itself than the impact of the issue on 
broader regional security dynamics such as the China-Japan rivalry and anti-U.S. 
sentiment on the Korean Peninsula.181 For instance, many Chinese consider the 
greatest threats they face to be Taiwanese, not North Korean.182 The North Korean 
threat is seen primarily in the context of the potential to create a regional nuclear arms 
race that might result in a nuclear-armed Taiwan. Similarly, South Korean 
policymakers increasingly express concern about the impact of the North Korean 
factor on Japan’s path to a becoming a “normal state.”183 A former Japanese 
ambassador and high-ranking Foreign Ministry official puts it most succinctly: “the 
regional perception of North Korean threat is to a large degree a function of regional 
security dynamics.”184 
 Far from fitting into the category of a proliferation threat, the North Korean 
factor is construed in the region as a complex regional security issue that has “both 
profound historical origins and complicated realistic factors.”185 For instance, one 
Chinese expert contends that “the remaining shadow of the Cold War in the Korean 
Peninsula” and the lack of mutual trust between the U.S. and North Korea is the root 
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cause of the North Korean nuclear crisis.186 The U.S. description of the urgent nature 
of the challenge is replaced in East Asia with a demand that the United States consider 
North Korea’s security needs. For instance, one Chinese expert contends that North 
Korea’s nuclear ambitions derive from “its acute sense of insecurity and vulnerability 
and, hence, any resolution must address this issue.”187 In a November 2004 speech, 
South Korean President Roh Moo Hyun also remarked that he was sympathetic to the 
North Korean stance that its pursuit of nuclear weapons stemmed from its need to 
deter external threats.188 
 The Japanese, for their part, maintain that the North Korean issue represents 
the last chapter of Japan’s postwar settlements with its East Asian neighbors, a key 
factor that has motivated Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi’s stated goal of diplomatic 
normalization with North Korea.189 Despite the abduction scandal and the subsequent 
anti-North Korean sentiment in Japan, Prime Minister Koizumi in his last months as 
the leader of the nation repeated his willingness to normalize diplomatic relations with 
North Korea before the end of his term as prime minister in September 2006.190 
Regional Response to the Bush Administration’s Approach 
 When discussing the proper response to the North Korean challenge, both the 
Western media and policy makers tend to stress the need for coercive measures and 
backing from China’s for their use. Calling on China to use its leverage over North 
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Korea, for instance, Fareed Zakaria wrote, “Washington is right to urge [China] to act 
boldly.”191 Similarly, Thomas Friedman lamented that were China to put pressure on 
North Korea “the proliferation threat from Pyongyang would be over.”192 In the face 
of China’s resistance to the use of pressure tactics, then U.S. Undersecretary of State 
Robert Joseph even threatened that if China does not take more action “there possibly 
could be very significant consequences for U.S.-Chinese relations.”193 
 In this vein, the allegation of a North Korea-Libya link over uranium 
hexafluoride gas in February 2005 provides a unique window into the way the Bush 
administration used the Six Party forum as a platform for applying unified pressure on 
North Korea. Just as North Korea was expected to resume the Six Party Talks, Bush’s 
top Asian officials from the National Security Council visited China, Japan, and South 
Korea to brief their counterparts about the alleged link. Given that the allegation was 
first made almost a year earlier, David Albright, a prominent U.S. proliferation expert 
and a former UN inspector, said, “the timing has to make one suspicious that the 
information is being used to pressure allies to take a tougher line with North 
Korea.”194 It is in this context that some South Korean observers view the Six Party 
Talks primarily as “a unilateral offensive in the guise of a multilateral modality to 
strangulate North Korea.”195 
 Such pressure tactics, however, were not well received in East Asia. Despite 
the single-minded U.S. focus on disarming North Korea’s nuclear arsenal, East Asian 
countries “want above all to keep their neighborhood peaceful.”196 China’s active 
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diplomacy in the second North Korean nuclear crisis, a dramatic change from its 
passivity during the first crisis in 1993-1994, was not in response to North Korean 
nuclear provocations but because of a concern in China that the standoff between 
North Korea and the United States was “heading toward a certain clash that would be 
disastrous for China.”197 Put differently, it was not the imminent danger of the North 
Korean nuclear threat but “the clear and present danger of Pyongyang being next on 
the U.S. hit list” that partly drove China’s proactive role in the second crisis.198 
 A Chinese expert warned that if the Bush administration stuck to its position of 
“exercising pressure on North Korea and bringing about an eventual regime change,” 
U.S.-China cooperation could not be maintained.199 In the early weeks of the war in 
Iraq, a senior South Korean defense analyst even hoped for a lengthy operation there 
to avoid US preemptive strikes on North Korea.200 The Bush doctrine of a preemptive 
war also made a Japanese expert lament, “The United States had become a 
destabilizing factor in international affairs.”201 Warning of America’s “leanings 
toward the use of force and unilateralism” as a worrisome problem, another Japanese 
opinion piece even declared, “If Bush and company mean to peddle freedom in a 
package with missiles and artillery shells, I wish they would keep out of the global 
square.”202 
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 As a consequence, at the beginning of the crisis, Japan worked with South 
Korea “to nudge the Bush administration towards negotiations with North Korea.”203 
Another Japanese expert warned of the Bush administration’s “uncompromising 
stance toward Pyongyang, which involves the risk of pushing the North Korean 
leadership into a corner.” He suggested instead that through negotiations and 
diplomacy, Japan and South Korea would “take approaches toward Pyongyang that 
are different from that of the United States.”204 In fact, the Japanese government stated 
that its objective was not “to overturn the regime in North Korea but to gradually 
change the nature of its political and economic systems.”205 After his second trip to 
Pyongyang, Prime Minister Koizumi even conveyed to President Bush the North 
Korean concern about U.S. policy toward the North at the G-8 meeting in June 2004. 
Then in November 2004, he again suggested to Bush that the U.S. government 
consider direct negotiation with North Korea. With no response coming from Bush, 
the sides had to agree not to include this issue in their joint press briefing.206 
 China’s Foreign Ministry spokesman Kong Quan directly linked the Bush 
administration’s pressure tactics to regional instability: “we do not believe in resorting 
to sanctions or pressure. These measures would not solve problems but instead could 
complicate the situation.”207 South Korean President Roh also tied the call for regime 
change in North Korea by U.S. hardliners to the difficulty in resolving the North 
Korean nuclear issue.208 Similarly, expressing concern about the U.S. view of regime 
collapse in North Korea, then South Korean Minister of Unification, Chung Dong 
Young, made it clear that the South Korean government would play a leadership role 
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in managing the North Korean issue, rather than meekly embracing the U.S. 
approach.209 
 Furthermore, East Asian countries showed little interest in U.S.-led 
counterproliferation initiatives such as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Both 
China and South Korea still refuse to join the global drive that boasts of fourteen core 
members and more than forty states supportive of the initiative.210 Even Japan, the 
only East Asian member of the PSI, has expressed apprehensions about the possibility 
of the initiative provoking North Korea too much.211 Mentioning the North Korean 
fear that the Negative Security Assurance (NSA) included in the 1994 Agreed 
Framework is no longer valid in the wake of the newest U.S. nuclear posture review, a 
report submitted by the Foreign Ministry-sponsored Japan Institute of International 
Affairs called for providing North Korea with multilateral security assurances.212 With 
Japan’s plea for moderation and a negotiated solution added to those of other regional 
countries, the Bush administration “for the first time presented elements of a 
‘roadmap’ for settlement”213 at the third round of the Six Party Talks held in July 
2004. 
 All in all, what worried the regional countries most was not so much the 
nuclear issue per se as the possibility of U.S. military strikes on North Korea and a 
sudden collapse of the North Korean regime.214 Relating North Korean nuclear 
ambitions to China’s own experiences in the early Cold War years, a well-known 
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Chinese arms control expert expressed his understanding of North Korean motives for 
seeking nuclear weapons and even made a plea for “accepting a nuclear North 
Korea.”215 A former Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs official made a similar point 
that China might tolerate a nuclear North Korea if its impact on the regional security 
order were minimal.216 South Korean president Roh Moo Hyun’s envoys also shocked 
Bush advisers in Washington in early 2003 when they revealed that they “would rather 
have a nuclear North Korea than a chaotic collapse of the government there.”217 
 Throughout the second North Korean nuclear crisis, South Korean Presidents 
Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Moo Hyun and Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro 
have all sought to use quiet bargaining and the promise of economic assistance in 
dealing with North Korea. Along with its potential to disrupt the regional status quo, 
from an East Asian perspective, the Bush Doctrine was also seen as impeding the 
momentum toward regionalism. The Bush administration’s disregard of South Korea’s 
reconciliation policy toward North Korea is a case in point. Focused on the global and 
nuclear dimensions, the Bush administration gave short shrift to South Korea’s 
regional initiative centered on North Korea. Similarly, as one Japanese expert put it, 
the Bush administration never liked Koizumi’s visits to Pyongyang and intended to 
mitigate the impact of such visits.218 Soon, regional frustration drove a willingness to 
question U.S. strategic intentions in the region. 
Regional Concern about U.S. Intentions 
 As the stalemate at the Six Party Talks continued in the context of the Bush 
administration’s inflexible position toward North Korea, regional countries grew more 
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concerned about possible motivations behind the hard line stance. Instead of accepting 
the U.S. rationale for the post-9/11 strategic context, East Asian countries began to 
view the Bush Doctrine as a new U.S. regional strategy aimed at reshaping the 
regional order to its liking.219 For example, one South Korean analyst suspected the 
Bush administration was not forthcoming in its dealings with North Korea because it 
feared a loss of U.S. influence in the region and a negative impact on a planned 
missile defense scheme in East Asia.220 One Chinese expert of the Communist Party 
School seemed to agree when he observed that the crisis would “serve the U.S. goal of 
maintaining its predominant security posture in the region.”221 The overall assessment 
from the region is in a phrase used by one regional analyst: the United States may be 
interested in “sustaining the fight rather than resolving the issue.”222 
 While a crisis metaphor has been ever-present in the United States discussion 
of the North Korean challenge, many regional experts suspected that the Bush 
administration might not be interested in resolving the crisis anytime soon.223 From a 
regional perspective, resolution of the crisis hinges crucially on whether the United 
States and North Korea “can be reasonable in presenting their concerns and in 
appreciating the concerns of others.”224 Instead of taking a leadership role at the Six 
Party Talks, one regional expert objected, the United States delegated the job of 
resolving the crisis to East Asian countries.225 Some regional analysts also suggest that 
the Bush administration’s main goal in the Six Party Talks might be “to wreck the 
talks in order to pave the way for more coercive actions,” particularly given the 
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region-wide view that President Bush has expressed “less sensitivity and respect than 
Clinton toward the views and approaches of South Korea in dealing with the 
North.”226 
 Overall, there has been an acute sense in the region that the Six Party Talks 
have little prospect of success unless the United States shows greater willingness to 
negotiate.227 Even if the United States made some progress on the nuclear front, one 
Chinese expert predicts, there will be another stalemate since having “some levels of 
tension on the Korean Peninsula would be helpful for the Americans” in their regional 
strategic plans.228 By the same logic, had the U.S. acted properly in the region, not 
threatening the Kim regime, the situation would have been different and might have 
been resolved more quickly.229 One analyst at the State Council-sponsored Chinese 
Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) even suggested that if 
regional countries alone had participated in the talks, the situation would have already 
been resolved.230 It was in this context that a former South Korean unification minister 
complained that the United States has been finding fault with North Korea over the 
nuclear issue whenever a mood of reconciliation surfaced on the Korean Peninsula.231 
 The regional suspicion of the U.S. role at the Six Party Talks reveals a more 
alarming trend in the regional perception of long-term U.S. roles in the region. For 
instance, another analyst at the China Institute of Contemporary International 
Relations observed that the ultimate U.S. goal with regard to proliferation issues is not 
“the resolution of nuclear crises but securing a hegemonic position in various parts of 
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the world” in the Middle East (e.g., Iraq and Iran) and East Asia (e.g., North Korea).232 
From this vantage point, the U.S.-led counterproliferation drive is in fact a hegemonic 
means to interfere in the sovereignty of other states and to spread democratic 
regimes.233 In the East Asian context, such a campaign manifested itself as a hard line 
U.S. stance on North Korea, with a broader regional goal of developing “the all-round 
US-Japan and US-ROK alliance.”234 Seen in this light, the U.S. defense realignment 
scheme in East Asia (e.g., changes in the U.S.-Japanese alliance and shifting U.S. 
military deployments, etc.) is part of larger “U.S. efforts to hinder China’s rise in 
Asia.”235 With this, the Six Party Talks have become the focus of different narratives 
and strategic visions. As an analyst at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences 
suggests, while regional countries view the venue as a site for genuine regional 
institution building, the United States is “using it as a platform for strengthening its 
own alliance posture.”236 
The North Korean Challenge and Regional Order 
 More broadly, regional experts suggest that the fundamental question in 
addressing the North Korean challenge is how to perceive US-China relations in the 
region.237 Many Chinese analysts express their concern about “the uncertainties in 
United State’s unilateral attempt to remold the world and its impact on the Sino-
American relationship.”238 Among other questions, the Chinese ask about U.S. 
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hegemony, power politics, and unilateral behavior in international relations.239 
Focusing on different perceptions of the North Korean challenge, Liu Ming maintains 
that “China values the stability of the Korean Peninsula with lesser preconditions, 
while the United States may become more willing to intervene directly to alter the 
status quo.”240 This is problematic for the Chinese given China’s “deep-seated 
skepticism about the United States’ strategic designs in the region.”241 Some even 
suggest that it would be easier for the Bush administration to use the North Korean 
threat than the politically difficult China threat.242 Similarly Chinese analysts often 
link the Bush Doctrine to “the neoconservative agenda of building the “new empire,” 
aimed at both terrorism and the rise of China.243 
 Perhaps sensing the skewed US threat perception in Bush’s axis of evil speech, 
the Chinese government immediately issued a warning in a Foreign Ministry 
statement: “consequences will be very serious if [the United States] proceeds with this 
kind of logic.”244 As the crisis worsened, even high-ranking officials directly 
challenged the U.S. approach. In November 2004, for instance, the China Daily 
carried a controversial article by Chen Qichen, a highly influential former Chinese 
foreign minister, entitled “U.S. strategy to be banned.” In it, Chen offered a harsh 
rebuke of the Bush Doctrine: “The philosophy of the ‘Bush Doctrine’ is, in essence, 
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force. It advocates the United States should rule over the whole world with 
overwhelming force, military force in particular.”245 
 This is where the Global Posture Review (GPR) by the Bush administration 
comes in. Under the review, Japan is expected to play a greater regional role and to be 
“further integrated into the U.S. global strategy,” transforming the nature of a U.S.-
Japan alliance that had functioned mostly as a bilateral regional alliance.246 However, 
until the recent change of heart in the Bush administration over North Korea, Japan’s 
fear of entrapment in a U.S. military campaign seems to be far greater than its fear of 
abandonment.247 Pointing to a lack of public discussion on the implications of such a 
shift, a Japanese editorial called for “cautious and prudent behavior” in order to 
“reduce possible tensions and to foster mutual trust with neighbors.”248 Given Prime 
Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s close friendship with President Bush, a group of 
Japanese experts suggested that Koizumi might be “the best and only person who can 
persuade President Bush to have serious negotiations with the North Koreans.”249 
However, if Japan simply follows the Bush administration’s approach, another 
Japanese expert points out, Japan’s “channels for cooperation with South Korea and 
China will be narrowed.”250  
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 The response of East Asian countries to the Bush administration’s approach 
toward North Korea indicates that East Asian countries do not share the Bush 
administration’s understanding of the North Korean threat and, thus, have sought to 
weaken the US approach in various dimensions. In contrast to the U.S. discourse about 
the urgent nature of the North Korean challenge, the regional sense of urgency derives 
not from North Korean nuclear ambitions but from the global context where the focus 
on nonproliferation is being overshadowed by the counterproliferation drive of 
preemption and regime change.  
 As the outbreak of the second North Korean nuclear crisis coincided with a 
radical shift in global proliferation efforts, the U.S.-North Korean action-reaction 
dynamics reached a volatile point where East Asian countries, the bystanders in the 
first crisis, decided to actively take part in the six party process. Such activism stems 
from a shared regional view that regional stability rests more on a managed 
coexistence with their cumbersome neighbor than on coercion and preemption aimed 
at regime change in the North. 
 A comparison between the first and second North Korean nuclear crises 
illustrates this point. Absent the global rogue/counterproliferation frame, the first 
North Korean nuclear crisis coincided with a relatively small gap between the U.S. 
and regional understanding of the North Korean issue. Under these circumstances, 
regional actors felt no particular need to get involved in resolving the crisis, except by 
endorsing the Clinton administration’s position and offering support for the United 
States along the way. With the new global narrative about counterproliferation and 
regime change fully at work, the second crisis highlighted the gap between global and 
regional understanding of the North Korean challenge, prompting the regional actors 
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to resist the U.S. counterproliferation drive and its application to the North Korean 
case. 
 In the context of seeking effective ways to deal with rogue regimes, Nicholas 
Kristof contrasts “engagement and deal-making” during the Clinton presidency with 
“confrontation and isolation” by the Bush administration. While Clinton’s approach 
stopped North Korea from producing “a single ounce of plutonium during his eight 
years in office,” he judges, North Korea will be able to amass “enough plutonium for 
about 10 weapons” in Bush’s presidency.251 The nuclear dimension, however, is 
hardly the only area where the Bush administration failed miserably. With its 
exclusive focus on proliferation and regime change, the Bush administration found 
few supporters in East Asia. At a deeper level, the regional resistance stems from the 
Bush administration’s failure to grasp the East Asian understanding of what North 
Korean represents. Examining how the meanings of North Korea are linked to the 
regional strategies of China, Japan, and South Korea is the subject of the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER THREE: 
The North Korean Challenge and 
Regional Role Conceptions in East Asia 
3-1. Introduction 
 While the global frame of the North Korean challenge highlights the urgency 
and the unconventional nature of the North Korean threat in the post-9/11 context, the 
regional view in East Asia remains focused on the tradional dimension of managing 
regional strategic relationship in the post-Cold War context. This chapter probes 
deeper into the regional understanding of the North Korean challenge. In so doing, the 
chapter shows that despite their disparate, idiosyncratic bilateral issues with North 
Korea, East Asian countries converge on the importance of maintaining the current 
regime in the North and have been engaging it in hopes of enhancing their regional 
role and status and projecting new regional visions. 
 Despite the U.S.-led counterproliferation campaign and the U.S. call for 
putting concerted pressure on North Korea at the Six Party talks, East Asian countries 
were united in their opposition to the Bush Doctrine and in their efforts to redefine 
their relationship with their troublesome neighbor. Such efforts to enhance their 
regional roles (i.e., internally-shaped roles), however, have to be made in the broader 
context of U.S. power and influence in the region (i.e., U.S.-directed regional roles). If 
East Asian countries were to focus only on the U.S.-directed roles, they would side 
with the United States at the Six Party talks. For East Asian countries, however, North 
Korea is not just a short-term proliferation question. It is linked to their long-term 
strategic priorities and regional visions. 
 Hence, instead of unproblematically accepting the externally-shaped roles, 
they view the North Korean challenge as a unique opportunity to enhance their 
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regional status and overcome the problem of strategic dependence on the United 
States. In all three countries, political leaders sought to redefine their relationship with 
North Korea and link it to greater regional roles and broader regional visions. 
Specifically, from the expansion of the Kaesung industrial zone in North Korea to the 
second inter-Korean summit in October 2007, the Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun 
governments in Seoul have been persistent in seeking reconciliation with North Korea. 
China has also enhanced its strategic and economic ties with North Korea, while at the 
same time skillfully playing a mediating role between that nation and the United 
States. Finally, during his tenure, Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi not only 
visited Pyongyang twice but also maintained his willingness to normalize Japan’s 
troubled relationship with North Korea.252 
 As the crisis reached a stalemate in late 2004, the U.S. approach and rogue 
rhetoric also served to empower domestic political groups that raised questions about 
the ruling government’s regional visions anchored to the North Korean question. 
While similar tensions emerged between North Korea engagers and North Korea 
bashers in each East Asian country, the impact of domestic contestation was most 
pronounced in Japan. Exploiting the public uproar against North Korea concerning the 
abduction issue, the neo-conservatives made inroads into the national political scene. 
The ensuing dometic contestation reshaped domestic coalition dynamics in Japan 
where an alternative regional vision gained wide currency, making the earlier regional 
convergence on North Korea difficult to sustain. 
 The chapter is organized in the following manner. The next section discusses 
the main driver behind the search for new regional roles in East Asia and examines the 
nature of regional role conceptions and domestic contestation on the North Korean 
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question. The following three sections take a closer look at the link between regional 
role conceptions and North Korea in each of the three East Asian countries in turn. 
Here, I devote particular attention to the impact of the North Korea factor on the way 
East Asian countries perceive and articulate their regional roles and visions. The 
chapter ends with a brief section summarizing the findings. 
3-2. The Origins and the Nature of Regional Role Conceptions 
 Countries in East Asia share dissatisfaction with the regional system rooted in 
their strategic dependence on the United States during and after the Cold War period 
and, now, seek greater regional roles. While the demise of the Cold War in Europe 
brought about a dramatic makeover of a regional structure that now encompasses 
countries in Eastern Europe, similar changes in the regional strategic landscape in East 
Asia have not occurred. Instead, the region has seen a series of crises, such as the first 
North Korean nuclear crisis of 1993-94 and the Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995-1996. 
Despite initial concerns about the gradual withdrawal of the United States from the 
region, both crises were managed mainly by the United States. By the mid-1990s, all 
the regional talks about an impending shift in the regional order ended as the U.S. 
committed to the maintenance of 100,000 troops in the region and the strengthening of 
the U.S.-Japan alliance. As a result, post-Cold War East Asia has remained virtually 
the same as before, with the U.S.-centered hub-and-spokes system of alliance largely 
intact. 
 The continuation of the U.S.-centered regional order, however, did not prevent 
East Asian countries from seeking new regional roles and regional security visions. 
Indeed, incessant calls for a regional security framework in the past decade reflects a 
regional yearning to go beyond the Cold War-based regional security structure in 
which their roles had been marginal at best. More relevant, for the purposes of our 
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discussion, is the link between regional role conceptions and the North Korea factor. 
Despite their respective strategic concerns vis-à-vis North Korea and their strategic 
relationship with the United States, China, Japan and South Korea have all sought to 
redefine their relations with North Korea with the goal of enhancing their regional 
status. 
 More specifically, Japan, the world’s second largest economy, is a defeated 
nation which is permanently denied the right to use the military in external affairs. The 
postwar legacy still continues in the form of the pacifist constitution which limits 
Japan’s armed forces to a purely self-defense posture, thereby preventing it from 
assuming global and regional roles commensurate with its economic prowess. Its past 
roles as a colonizer in Korea and an invader in China make its regional status even 
more problematic. South Korea, the eleventh largest economy in the world and a 
global leader in information technology, is also a long-time client of an alliance that 
requires that its wartime operational control be surrendered to a U.S. commander. 
China, one of the world’s fastest growing economies and a member of the UN 
Security Council and the nuclear club, is a divided socialist nation in which the ruling 
Communist Party’s political legitimacy hinges critically on economic “catch-up” with 
the West and improving regional and international status. In short, all the East Asian 
countries have been eager to play greater and more assertive regional roles and, in the 
process, to expand their diplomatic space in the region. 
 Each effort to redefine and expand regional roles involves an effort to readjust 
troubled relations with North Korea. For the East Asian countries, that relationship is 
of great significance precisely because a new relationship with the North holds out the 
promise of enhanced diplomatic influence and regional status. Despite years of ups 
and downs, Japan’s efforts to normalize its diplomatic relationship with North Korea 
have been persistent since the first round of the normalization talks began in 1992. 
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Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s normalization efforts and the Pyongyang 
Declaration in 2002 are only the latest examples of Japan’s regional strategy that 
includes North Korea as a key part of Japan’s regional vision. South Korea’s 
engagement policy toward North Korea, known as the sunshine policy, is not just 
about promoting inter-Korean reconciliation but also about positioning the Korean 
Peninsula at the center of East Asian economic and political integration.253 While 
showing communist solidarity is no longer a strategic necessity for China’s fourth 
generation leaders, China’s relationship with North Korea has the potential for 
enhancing China’s influence on the Korean Peninsula, “a geostrategic focal point of 
East Asia.”254 
 While attempts were made in earlier periods, the current regional pursuit of 
engagement with North Korea began in earnest in 1998. With the adoption of the 
sunshine policy of engagement toward North Korea, the South Korean government set 
in motion a process of regional initiatives converging on the Korean Peninsula. With 
its new diplomatic campaign toward the North, the Kim Dae Jung government hoped 
to play a leading role on the regional scene. Concerned about the emergence of a 
regional order dictated by the United States and its alliances, the Chinese have also 
been intent on reshaping the regional order and expanding its own role in the 
process.255 The Chinese understanding is that should it fail to markedly enhancing its 
regional influence on the Korean Peninsula, the prospects of forging a new regional 
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order are slim.256 Its active mediating role in the Six Party processes is emblematic of 
larger efforts at enhancing its regional influence and status. 
 Japan’s positive response to the sunshine policy was also prompt and 
consistent. In his summit with then South Korean President Kim Dae Jung in 1998, 
then Japanese Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi suggested that Japan and Russia 
participate in “a six-party Northeast Asian security forum” which would address the 
issue of Korean Peninsula stability.257 Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori, Obuchi’s 
successor, also exchanged his views on North Korea with the South Korean President 
Kim Dae Jung and updated him on the status of the Japan-DPRK normalization 
talks,258 while his foreign minister expressed Japan’s support for the sunshine 
policy.259 Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s 2002 visit to Pyongyang also came with 
the realization that Japan was “left on the periphery” of the regional scene in the midst 
of the inter-Korean summit and Kim Jong Il’s visit to Beijing right before the Korean 
summit.260 Apart from bilateral issues with North Korea such as resolution of the 
colonial past and the abduction issue, Japan has broader “regional aspirations” 
concerning North Korea, “aiming to shape the future of the Korean peninsula, to 
expand Japan’s regional security role, and to channel the rise of China as a regional 
power.”261 
 Despite the region-wide search for new regional roles, there is also no denying 
that the regional countries still play their roles under the influence of the United States. 
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This is why the regional actors need to balance externally and internally shaped 
regional roles. Interestingly, East Asian countries’ efforts to ensure role congruence 
often take the form of double-talk. In a September 2003 speech at the UN General 
Assembly, for instance, Japanese Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi publicly called 
for the dismantling of North Korean nuclear programs and a speedy resolution of the 
abduction issue before Japan could proceed with the normalization of its diplomatic 
relations with North Korea. However, a few months later, a four-member Japanese 
official delegation made a secret trip to Pyongyang for negotiations. Similarly, when 
South Korean Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon made a speech at the UN General 
Assembly in September 2004, he both called for North Korea to immediately forgo all 
nuclear programs and declared that bilateral exchanges and cooperation between the 
two Koreas had reached “a point from which there is no turning back.”262 
 More broadly, East Asian nations search for greater regional roles in part 
because they need to escape from their dependence on the United States.263 For 
reasons of security and economic development, Japan and South Korea have been 
dependent on alliance relationship with the United States. However, as a former 
Japanese ambassador and high-ranking foreign ministry official puts it, the United 
States has “its own parochial national interests,” which may not always be in tune with 
those of its regional allies.264 China has also relied on friendly ties with the United 
States for continued economic growth and the maintenance of regional stability. What 
comes with this sense of dependency is a persistent feeling of compromised regional 
status and a lack of autonomy in foreign policy making. It is the imperative of 
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overcoming strategic dependency and enhancing their own regional status that has 
driven East Asian understandings of, and policy behavior toward, North Korea. The 
following sections explore each country case in greater detail. 
3-3. South Korea 
The Search for New Regional Roles 
 As the Cold War era was drawing to an end, the South Korean government for 
the first time in its modern history set out an independent regional policy initiative. In 
the early 1990s, the Roh Tae Woo government pursued a foreign policy initiative 
called “Nordpolitik,” seeking diplomatic rapprochement with the Soviet Union and 
China.265 Although the diplomatic charm offensive was aimed mainly at the two 
Communist neighbors, the key priority was “finding an opening with North Korea.”266 
In late 1991, the two Koreas signed the “Basic Agreement, which includes a 
nonaggression pact and allows for exchange programs.”267 Although the diplomatic 
initiative went no further in the aftermath of the first North Korean nuclear crisis, the 
whole process demonstrated South Korea’s willingness to play a larger regional role 
by taking an initiative vis-à-vis North Korea.  
 The first serious opportunity for South Korea to play such a regional role came 
in 1996 when President Clinton and South Korean President Kim Youngsam agreed to 
hold a “four party meeting,” involving the two Koreas, the United States, and China. 
A joint statement from the meeting stated, “South and North Korea should take the 
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lead in a renewed search for a permanent peace agreement.”268 For this new regional 
plan to succeed, South Korea had to persuade neighboring countries to join the 
regional exercise. This strategic consideration facilitated a bold initiative to improve 
relations with Japan and China.269 Former South Korean Foreign Minister Hong 
Soonyoung implied this logic when he declared that South Korea’s engagement policy 
was “not just aimed at North Korea.”270 
 The South Koreans also hoped to link inter-Korean engagement to a larger 
regional framework to ensure political and even financial support for a gradual 
reunification on the Korean Peninsula.271 In this regard, the South Koreans proposed 
holding a summit for the two Koreas and four regional powers “to focus international 
attention on Korea and to jump-start the Korean peace process.”272 They envisioned 
the summit not only as “a breakthrough in the Korean peace process,” but also as a 
platform for a broader regional security framework.273 Given that previous regional 
tragedies such as Japan’s colonization and the Korean War originated in the Korean 
Peninsula, a South Korean scholar writes, it would be only natural that the peninsula 
should serve as a platform for rebuilding a new regional order.274 
                                                
268 Eric V. Larson, Norman D. Levin with Seonhae Baik, Bogdan Savych, Ambivalent Allies?: A Study 
of South Korean Attitudes Toward the U.S. (Santa Monica, CA: the Rand Corporation, 2004), p. 24. 
269 Cheol Hee Park, “Japanese Strategic Thinking toward Korea,” in Gilbert Rozman, Kazuhiko Togo, 
and Joseph P. Ferguson, eds., Japanese Strategic Thought toward Asia (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2007), p. 190. 
270 Hong Soon-Young, “21segi tongsanjilseowa wooriui tongsangwoigyojeongchaek banghayng [The 
21st Century Trade Order and Our Trade and Foreign Policy Prospects],” Speech at the Korean Trade 
Association, August27, 1999, p. 143. 
271 John Feffer, “Grave Threats and Grand Bargains: The United States and Regional Order in Northeast 
Asia,” in John Feffer, ed., The Future of US-Korean Relations (New York: Routledge, 2006), p. 194. 
272 Byung-joon Ahn, “The Impact of the U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation Guidelines,” Institute on 
Global Conflict and Cooperation, IGCC Policy Papers, 1998, p. 13. 
273 Ibid. 
274 Younghee Lee, “Dongbuka jiyokui pyonghwa jilseo guchukul wihan jeon [A contribution toward the 
Formation of New International Order in Northeast Asia],” in Bansegiui Shinhwa [A Myth of the Past 
Half-Century,” (Seoul: Samin, 1999), pp. 245-46. 
 83 
The Sunshine Policy, the Hub of East Asia, and North Korea 
 Based on this long-standing regional vision, the Kim Dae Jung government 
proposed the sunshine policy of engagement toward North Korea. While seeking 
peaceful coexistence for the two Koreas in the short term, the central tenet of the 
sunshine policy was to gradually transform “the reclusive regime in North Korea into 
a cooperative partner in peace and prosperity.”275 The Kim Dae Jung government 
linked the prospect of regime survival in the North and the reduction of regional 
tensions to North Korea’s integration into the region.276 In the process, South Korea 
hoped to change both inter-Korean relations and regional security dynamics. Breaking 
away from the position of his predecessor, Kim Young Sam, who was opposed to the 
idea of improving U.S.-North Korean ties ahead of inter-Korean relations, the Kim 
Dae Jung government realized that better North Korean-U.S. relations were indeed 
conducive to enhanced inter-Korean relations. Hence, President Kim Dae Jung went 
extra miles to persuade the United States to improve relationship with North Korea. 
 South Korea’s efforts during the Perry Process illustrate this point. Despite a 
crisis situation in the wake of North Korea’s 1998 missile launch and suspicions about 
secret nuclear facilities in North Korea, the Kim Dae Jung government persuaded the 
United States to reach a negotiated deal with North Korea,277 while frequently sending 
officials to Washington to discuss the North Korean situation. Then Chinese President 
Jiang Zemin and Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto repeatedly expressed 
their support for the sunshine policy, which further strengthened South Korea’s efforts 
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to change the U.S. policy toward North Korea. In this way, one South Korean expert 
observes, the sunshine policy effectively regionalized the North Korean issue, which 
had initially arisen in a global frame.278  
 The engagement policy toward North Korea continued with the “Peace and 
Prosperity policy” of the Roh Moo-Hyun administration. While seeking its own 
reconciliation with the North, the Roh government actively encouraged other regional 
countries to engage North Korea. A senior official of South Korea’s Ministry of 
National Unification explained the rationale behind such a regional drive: depending 
on the way the North Korean situation is settled, he predicted, “China-Japan relations 
may change, as well as regional dynamics.”279 The South Korean government 
approved and encouraged Japan’s efforts to normalize diplomatic relations with North 
Korea as a useful way to dampen tension between North Korea and the United 
States.280 At the same time, the South Korean government made a series of efforts to 
improve its own ties with the North, including a 2004 decision to make the minister of 
national unification the head of South Korea’s National Security Council.281 
 South Korea’s regional drive aimed at North Korea also reflected and was 
reinforced by the general mood among the South Korean public, which has been 
moving in favor of inter-Korean relations. Against this backdrop, the two Koreas have 
engaged in the joint operation of an industrial park in the North Korean border city of 
Kaesong, which has been characterized by the governments “as an experiment with 
market reforms.”282 As of this writing, there are 150 companies in operation in the 
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complex.283 Encouraged by a series of exchanges with North Korea, the majority of 
South Koreans support the reconciliation effort. Now more than at any time since the 
end of the Korean War, there is a general consensus among the South Korean public 
that coexistence with North Korea accompanied by gradual change of the North aimed 
at unification is the only way to go.284 
 The spread of inter-Korean nationalism (minjok gongjo) has in turn affected 
South Korea’s regional policy and alliance relationship with the United States. Those 
who support the government position hold that North Korea is “part of the Korean 
ethnic community,” and thus “question the role of the United States and whether its 
policies are fully compatible with South Korea’s national interests.”285 Many South 
Koreans also maintain that inter-Korean relations and the future of the Korean 
peninsula should be controlled by Koreans themselves, including the North 
Koreans.286 This “pan-Korean nationalism” was increasingly on a collision course 
with the Bush administration’s hard line approach toward the North.287 A September 
2003 poll in South Korea shows that 35.4 percent of South Koreans in their 20s chose 
the U.S. as the least favored country while only 4.1 percent chose North Korea. 
Overall, over 40 percent of Koreans in their 20s thought that “inter-Korean 
cooperation should take precedence over South Korea’s cooperation with the United 
States.”288 Signs of South Korea’s changing view of North Korea are also evident in 
another poll conducted by a South Korean newspaper in May 2005. Asked which side 
they would support in case of a unilateral U.S. attack on North Korea, only 31 percent 
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of the respondents said they would support their ally, the U.S., while 47 percent say 
they would support North Korea.289 
 Of course, such public sentiments are subject to change. In fact, due in large 
part to North Korea’s missile launches and the nuclear test in 2006, recent surveys 
show a change in South Korea’s threat perception. According to a recent survey, South 
Koreans’ perception of a possible North Korean attack has increased from 43 percent 
in 2005 to 60 percent in 2007. At the same time, however, 78.4 percent of the 
respondents still maintain generally positive views toward North Korea (i.e., 56.6 
percent viewing North Korea as a partner for cooperation and 21.8 percent as a 
recipient of South Korean assistance).290 Another recent survey on North Korea shows 
that the majority of respondents (69.9%) support the continuation of the sunshine 
policy, while 80.7 percent stress the importance of national unification.291 
 Given this nationwide support for the engagement policy toward the North, it 
is not surprising that U.S. policy toward North Korea was seen as “driving North 
Korea into a corner, risking provocation and unnecessary harm to the policy of inter-
Korean reconciliation.”292 A former South Korean minister of unification even let it be 
known that the United States has found fault with North Korea over the nuclear issue 
whenever reconciliation moods surfaced on the Korean Peninsula.293 As a 
consequence, there has been “a shift in the popular image of the U.S. from a protector 
of South Korea’s security to a potential impediment to inter-Korean reconciliation.”294 
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The resulting gap between the U.S. and South Korean approaches toward the North 
also made coordination between the two allied nations all the more difficult. 
 Echoing South Korea’s sense of strategic dependency, inter-Korean 
nationalism (minjok gongjo)295 is also tied to the “anti-great power-ism” which 
denotes “the desire of Koreans to escape from the sort of Great Power exploitation and 
victimization” in its modern history.296 The majority of the South Korean public, 
mostly post-Korean War generations, is sympathetic to this interpretation of South 
Korea’s history. From this vantage point, the US approach toward the North is viewed 
as “hostile, and unaccommodating to South Korea’s interests.”297 Instead, the South 
Koreans are eager to realize their vision of “a Korea that is master of its own fate and 
destiny,” a vision premised on the gradual unification of the two Koreas.298 The 
salience of inter-Korean nationalism within South Korean society put the South 
Korean government in a difficult position in which it needed to strike a balance 
between inter-Korean relations and cooperation with its long-time ally, the United 
States.299 
The Tension between Inter-Korean Relations and Alliance Ties with the United States 
 As the crisis reached a stalemate, increasing tension between South Korea’s 
different regional roles gradually led to larger domestic contestation about South 
Korea’s regional security priorities. At a deeper level, South Korea’s domestic debate 
revolves around the two faces of the North Korean challenge: as the raison d’etre of 
the U.S.-South Korean alliance and as the ultimate partner for inter-Korean 
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reconciliation and unification.300 As a result, the main content of the South Korean 
domestic debate has been whether South Korea should focus more on strategic ties 
with the U.S. (hanmi gongjo), as proposed by conservatives, or on inter-Korean 
reconciliation (minjok gongjo), as maintained by liberals. A South Korean expert at 
the government-affiliated Korean Institute for National Unification put the South 
Korean debate in the context of a domestic political battle between liberals and 
conservatives over the issues of national identity and dominance in domestic 
politics.301 
 As the Roh government’s engagement policy made little progress in the face of 
the standoff between the United States and North Korea, South Korean conservatives 
began to challenge the government position. While sympathetic to inter-Korean 
nationalism, the conservative groups, including the Grand National Party, generally 
stresses the importance of maintaining a strong alliance relationship with the United 
States. From their viewpoint, South Korea’s policy of engagement with the North is a 
risky strategy, “endangering both U.S.-[South Korean] relations and South Korean 
security.”302 For example, one expert at the Foreign Ministry-affiliated Institute of 
Foreign Affairs and National Security observes that while other countries take into 
account broader regional issues, South Korea remains myopic in its exclusive focus on 
inter-Korean relations. He even wondered if South Korea would be able to catch up 
with the changing nature of U.S. alliances in a new global strategic context.303 
 However, owing in large part to broadening popular support for the 
engagement policy and widespread opposition to the Bush administration’s hard line 
approach, the conservative challenge failed to alter the government position. Instead, 
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President Roh forged ahead to propose South Korea’s balancer/mediator role 
(gyunhyungja-ron) in the region, an attempt to pursue “a more independent foreign 
policy that would avoid alignment with the United States in containing China or North 
Korea.”304 In this regional vision, North Korea amounts to a key anchor for South 
Korea’s “assertive and constructive role for Korea throughout Asia.”305 It was based 
on this strategic assumption that President Roh raised questions about Washington’s 
hard line approach toward North Korea. Instead, President Roh continued to maintain 
that he was willing to offer more concessions to North Korea to achieve reconciliation 
with the North.306 
 Lee Jong Seok, then the head of South Korea’s National Security Council and 
national nnification minister, portrayed President Roh’s renewed overture toward 
North Korea as showing “his determination that our government must play a more 
active role to break the current stalemate.”307 Such efforts finally came to fruition in 
2007 as the Bush administration changed its approach toward North Korea and the 
second inter-Korean summit took place in October 2007. While initially denouncing 
prior North Korea policy as “unconditional support” that failed to secure reciprocity 
form the North, the new Lee Myongbak government has also backtracked from his 
earlier stance on North Korea. Changing its previous position, the conservative 
government recently announced that it would be willing to provide 50,000 tons of 
corn.308 Its unification minister, Kim Hajoong, also attended a ceremony 
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commemorating the anniversary of the first inter-Korean summit, while stressing the 
Lee government’s emphasis on the Kaesong industrial complex in North Korea.309  
3-4. China 
China’s Search for Greater Regional Roles 
 Like South Korea, China began its quest for greater regional roles in 1989, 
when China began to focus on surrounding area (zhoubian) diplomacy as a coherent 
regional strategy.310 A key driver behind the strategic shift was the need to “project 
China’s national identity as “an up-and-coming superpower in the Asia-Pacific region 
so as to make up for the domestic legitimization and security deficits.”311 Unlike 
revolutionary nationalism in the past, Chinese nationalism has recently become 
“moderate and conservative, placing a premium on stability and a peaceful 
international context.”312 With this new strategic focus and foreign policy outlook, 
Chinese leaders hoped to rejuvenate China’s image from “a revolutionary country that 
rejected the existing international regime to a responsible power within the system.”313 
As a result, there has been “a shift of the gravity of its diplomacy from the Third 
World to major powers.”314 
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 In this sense, China’s constructive role at the Six Party talks is also part of 
larger efforts to demonstrate “how important China is in international affairs.”315 For 
the current fourth generation leadership led by President Hu Jintao, the adoption of 
China’s “peaceful rise” (heping jueqi) strategy is not only an effective means to 
alleviate the “China threat” thesis but also a strong signal to the world that China is 
willing to play a constructive role in the international system.316 In fact, the Chinese 
began to highlight China’s active mediating role in the wake of the second North 
Korean nuclear crisis as a prime example of China’s embrace of constructive 
international roles.317 
 At a deeper level, however, the change in strategic and foreign policy direction 
is rooted in China’s need to address its “dual national identity”: the image of a great 
nation in both historical (due to its long history and rich cultural traditions) and 
contemporary senses (given its nuclear power status and its veto power at the United 
Nation Security Council) on the one hand, and the image of a developing socialist 
nation that still lags far behind the level of the West on the other.318 The problem of 
the dual national image is further compounded by the U.S. support of Taiwan, a 
quintessential symbol of a divided nation. Despite Chinese leaders’ initial expectations 
for the emergence of a multipolar system in the post-Cold War era, by the mid-1990s 
it became abundantly clear to the Chinese leadership that a prolonged American 
unipolarity would be the order of the day, and China should readjust to this new 
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strategic reality by actively pursuing multilateral diplomacy in the region and 
beyond.319 
 Given “China’s outlier status vis-à-vis the U.S.-centered great power group,” 
especially in the wake of the Tiananmen incident, a stable relationship with the United 
States has become even more important.320 Hence, no serious Chinese analyst denies 
the fact that the United States is the most important country for China’s 
modernization.321 Despite concerns about China’s new strategy of “peaceful rise 
(heping jueqi),” the rationale behind the strategy is to “enhance cooperation and 
minimize conflicts with the US.”322 At the same time, however, many Chinese suspect 
that the hard line U.S. approach to China is an attempt to “prevent it from achieving 
great-power status.”323 In this view, instead of cooperating with the United States, 
China should strive to encourage multipolarization primarily as a counterweight to 
U.S. hegemony. 
 The competing interpretations of China’s proper regional strategies reflect a 
strategic dilemma for China: how to navigate between cooperating with the United 
States and guarding against U.S. interference with China’s core national interests. In 
other words, Chinese foreign policy orientation is essentially a balancing act between 
the conflicting demands of integrating with the international system and unifying the 
divided nation.324 Although China’s rapid economic growth has thus far satisfied the 
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needs of both modernization and integration with the world, an understanding of how 
best to maintain national unity and territorial integrity has remained elusive, especially 
in the context of Taiwan’s move toward de jure independence. The situation is 
complicated all the more by the double reality that the United States, while publicly 
acknowledging a “one China” policy, is still bound by the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act 
to intervene in a Taiwan contingency. Given the rising nationalistic sentiment among 
the Chinese public, particularly on the issues of Taiwan and Japan, Chinese leaders 
need to be as assertive in their foreign policy as possible without disrupting their 
modernization drive or endangering regional stability.325 
Cooperative Security, the New Security Concept (NSC) and North Korea 
 It is against this strategic backdrop that China has been seeking greater 
regional roles and a new regional vision. More specifically, China has sought to 
enhance its regional influence under the rubric of “cooperative security,” a broad 
diplomatic initiative proposed as a “counterweight to traditional military alliances and 
other forms of the “Cold War mentality.”326 Specifically, since the late 1990s, the 
Chinese government has set out a new foreign policy vision premised on “the new 
concept of security.”327 Officially introduced at the 1997 ASEAN Regional Forum, the 
new security concept (NSC) was offered as “an alternative vision of how nations 
should pursue national security in the post-Cold War world order.”328 While stressing 
the importance of “mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and cooperation, it also called 
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for “safeguarding the global and regional strategic balance and stability” and 
upholding “the principle of non-interference in each other’s internal affairs.”329 The 
NSC also reflected Beijing’s desire to circumvent Washington’s well-established 
alliance networks in East Asia by associating those structures with a “Cold War 
mentality” (lengzhan siwei) ill-suited to the contemporary period.330 More importantly, 
the NSC regarded the Asia-Pacific region as “China’s geopolitical priority and 
expressed China’s support for more actively pursuing its national interests through 
multilateral international organizations.”331 
 Within this broader strategic formulation, the Korean Peninsula has a particular 
meaning for the Chinese: the “core problem” (hexin wenti) of Northeast Asia.332 
Throughout history, the Korean Peninsula has been the site of various events that 
altered China’s national fate. During the Pacific War, Japanese troops used the Korean 
Peninsula as a launch pad for attacks into the Chinese territory.333 More importantly, 
the peninsula is inescapably tied to painful historical memories such as the Sino-
Japanese war over Korea in 1894, which led to the cession of Taiwan, and the 
outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, which deprived the Chinese of an opportunity to 
regain control over Taiwan, resulting in national disunity ever since.334 
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 As a consequence, the Korean Peninsula was, and remains, China’s primary 
arena for achieving expanded regional roles.335 In this vein, Beijing’s desire to 
increase influence on the Korean Peninsula can be seen as “the starting point for a 
return to Pax Sinica in the region,”336 or, as one Chinese policy advisor put it, “a ‘test 
stone’ for rising China.”337 Another Chinese analyst even suggested that it is on the 
peninsula that Beijing’s chances of becoming a major global power and a regional 
“hegemon” will be tested.338 More broadly, political dynamics surrounding the Korean 
peninsula and regional responses will help redefine Sino-American relations as well as 
“the security architecture” of the region in the 21st century.339 Hence, China’s active 
role during the second North Korean crisis can be understood in this broader context 
of changing strategic calculation in China. From the outset, China’s response to the 
second nuclear crisis was very different from its lukewarm attitude during the first 
crisis. As the second crisis escalated in March 2003, the Chinese government 
established a Small Leadership Group on the North Korean Problem (chaoxian wenti 
lingdao xiaozu) headed by President Hu Jintao himself.340 
North Korea: Liability versus Buffer 
 As the second crisis intensified, however, a group of Chinese called “the 
liability school” began to highlight the negative side of the crisis. From their 
perspective, as China pursues continued economic development and seeks regional 
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stability, North Korean provocations on its border increasingly become a burden to 
both China’s regional strategy of cooperative security and its relations with the United 
States.341 The longer the current stalemate in the Six-Party Talks continues, so the 
reasoning goes, the more China will lose, especially in the context of a worsening 
relationship with the United States.342 In retrospect, early signs of the liability school 
came even before the outbreak of the current crisis. Speaking in 1997, then Premier Li 
Peng reportedly told a group of Americans, “North Korea is neither an ally of the PRC 
nor an enemy, but merely a neighboring country.”343 What is new in the latest 
manifestation of China’s worry about North Korea, however, is the direct link made 
between North Korea’s provocations and China’s relations with the United States. 
 Recognizing China’s limited options in an era of American hegemony, for 
instance, a prominent Chinese security expert and frequent foreign policy 
commentators at People’s University pointed out that cooperation with the United 
States on the North Korean crisis was in China’s national interest and even suggested 
“a policy of bandwagon, which means that China should accept and participate in the 
U.S.-led global regimes.”344 Similarly, pointing to the new global situation facing 
China, another expert at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences called for deleting 
the military alliance clause (junsi dongmeng) in China’s half-century-long bilateral 
treaty with North Korea.345 In a controversial article published in 2004, a Chinese 
expert at the Tianjin Academy of Social Sciences even went so far as to openly 
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criticize Kim Jong Il’s domestic policy and nuclear ambitions and described North 
Korea as a key obstacle to Sino-American ties, resulting in a temporary suspension of 
publication of the journal Strategy and Management [Zhanrue yu Guanli].346 Zhang 
Liangui of the Central Party School said even more bluntly, “North Korea is China’s 
biggest foreign policy failure of the past 50 years.”347 
 The Chinese tendency to view the North Korean question through the prism of 
the US-China relationship348 is also found in the difference in approach toward North 
Korea between the International Liaison Department of the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party (Zhonglianbu) and the Chinese Foreign Ministry. A senior Chinese 
arms control expert noted that while Zhonglianbu promotes various exchanges with its 
North Korean counterpart, the Foreign Ministry tends to be “more sympathetic” to the 
global frame pushed by the United States.349After the North Korean nuclear test, for 
instance, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Liu Jianchao made a rare rebuke of 
North Korea, saying, “the test was carried out “flagrantly” and “will undoubtedly exert 
a negative impact on our relations.”350 
 Interestingly, however, the Chinese coverage of Liu’s remark on the same day 
in China Daily, a Communist Party-controlled, state-run English newspaper, was 
different in tone. With the headline of “Developing friendly ties with DPRK 
unchanged,” the report quoted Liu as saying that “China will continue to develop 
good-neighborly and friendly cooperation with the DPRK and this policy is 
unshakable.”351 This episode illustrates both the marginal status of the liability camp 
in China and the continuing significance of North Korea in China’s regional strategy. 
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In fact, the majority of Chinese experts subscribe to the so-called “buffer zone” 
school,352 which values the strategic importance of North Korea in China’s regional 
vision.353 
 For both the “liability” and the “buffer zone” camps, the first and foremost 
priority for China is maintaining regional stability.354 The main difference, however, 
lies in the connection between the North Korean crisis and regional instability. While 
the liability camp tends to emphasize the danger of North Korean provocations to 
regional stability, the buffer zone camp views the crisis as largely manageable and 
maintains that China can benefit from properly managing the crisis.355 What is more 
alarming, from the perspective of the buffer zone camp, is the U.S. approach aimed at 
regime change and preemption.356 
 More broadly, many Chinese maintain that North Korea can be a base on 
which China rebuilds a regional security structure.357 In fact, back in 2003 when the 
Six-Party mechanism was established as the first multilateral security framework 
including all the major powers in the region, the Chinese hoped that the framework 
could develop into a permanent multilateral security framework.358 In doing so, they 
hope to go beyond the Washington-centered hub-and-spokes system centered on the 
U.S. alliances with Japan and South Korea.359 For instance, in the same volume of the 
journal that published the article on deleting the military alliance clause, another 
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Chinese expert stressed the need to help North Korea to move out of the Cold War 
structure.360 Considering the historical and practical complexities of the North Korean 
problem, the author contends, it would be crucial for regional countries to build a web 
of multilateral security systems that includes a U.S.-North Korea channel, the four 
party system of U.S., China, and the two Koreas for transforming the armistice into a 
permanent peace mechanism, and a six party system with Japan and Russia for 
establishing a nuclear-free Northeast Asia.361 
 As the nuclear crisis endured in the face of the standoff between North Korea 
and the United States, the Chinese began to question the regional role of the United 
States. Traditionally, the majority view in China was that China has benefited from the 
U.S.’s balancer role in the region, especially between China and Japan, where it has 
prevented the latter from becoming more militaristic.362 With its uncompromising 
approach to North Korea, however, the United States was seen in China as using the 
North Korea crisis to strengthen its alliance posture (e.g., building a missile defense 
system with Japan and expanding the regional scope of the U.S.-Japan alliance).363 
While the Chinese acknowledged the U.S. need to seek alliance support in the war on 
terror, they increasingly view the ongoing restructuring of U.S. military alliance, 
centered on Japan’s expanded cooperation with the United States as a means to “guard 
against” and “pin down” China.364 With that, the debate came full circle: those who 
pointed out the burden of the North Korean problems have been largely sidelined, and 
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a People’s Daily column even warns against “sacrificing relations with other countries 
for the sake of stable Sino-U.S. ties.”365  
3-5. Japan 
The Search for Greater Regional Roles 
 Japan’s post-World War Two security strategy has centered on two pillars: The 
U.S.-Japan alliance and the Peace Constitution. What is striking about this security 
mechanism is the asymmetric nature of alliance commitments, where Japan’s 
commitment to its share of the collective defense is abrogated to maintain the war-
renouncing constitution. As a result, there has been an inevitable discrepancy between 
Japan’s desire for more active, greater roles in regional and global affairs and the legal 
constraints of Article 9 of the peace constitution, which prevents Japan from playing 
such roles. Moreover, Japan’s status as an economic powerhouse is often “contrasted 
with its low visibility in global military and political affairs,” prompting a debate 
about its proper role in the changing global and regional context.366 Consequently, the 
central focus of the domestic security debate in Japan has been how to adjust the 
abnormal state of its security posture to respond to the post-Cold War strategic 
context. 
 More specifically, the debate has revolved around the goal of “establishing 
[Japan’s] own identity” in the region and beyond and the types of roles Japan should 
play in the post-Cold War era.367 Japanese conservatives, on the one hand, have 
pushed for becoming “an independent state with a monopoly of force,” thereby 
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restoring “lost or suppressed identity.”368 For Japanese moderates, on the other hand, 
Japan’s move toward the “normal state” is considered problematic in the region 
because its neighbors harbor suspicions of Japan due to its past and uncertain future 
roles in the region. Hence, while the conservatives tend to brush aside the regional 
concern about Japan’s move toward a “normal” state, many others, most notably 
regionalists and pacifists, have been reluctant to alter Japan‘s defense posture in haste. 
The central task for Japan is then how to improve its regional roles and national status 
without provoking its neighbors. In short, the debate on Japan’s regional roles has 
been about navigating between becoming a “normal” state with strengthened alliance 
ties with the U.S. and becoming an autonomous East Asian player within an integrated 
regional security framework. 
 The first signs of Japan’s search for regional and international roles surfaced in 
the immediate aftermath of the Cold War. In the new strategic context, Japanese elites 
began to reconsider the rationale for maintaining security ties with the United 
States.369 Finding a new security role in the region gained added urgency in the wake 
of the “checkbook diplomacy” during the First Gulf War, when the Japanese 
government, constrained by its constitution, was criticized for providing only financial 
support.370 In the first post-cold war challenge, Japan’s support was viewed as “too 
little and too late” and widely considered a “defeat for Japan,”371 provoking “a sense 
of national humiliation.”372 
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 After years of searching a new strategic vision, a special advisory committee 
commissioned by the prime ministerial office prepared a strategic report concerning 
Japan’s post-Cold War security blueprints. The committee released its final report in 
August 1994 under the title of “The Modality of the Security and Defense Capability 
of Japan: The Outlook for the 21st Century.”373 Citing the uncertain post-Cold War 
security context, the report, more commonly known as the “Higuchi report,” called for 
utilizing not only the U.S.-Japan alliance but also other mechanisms such as the 
United Nations and various regional frameworks for security cooperation, envisaging 
“a two-pronged approach on multilateral security frameworks and the U.S.-Japanese 
bilateral alliance at the same time.”374 The report marked a strategic shift from a “cold 
war defense strategy,” locating the alliance within the broader framework of a 
multilateral regional security structure.375 
 The efforts at diversifying Japan’s security mechanism and Japan’s search for a 
new regional role, however, appeared to be losing momentum in the mid-1990s as the 
U.S.-Japan alliance was bolstered with the passage of the U.S.-Japan Defense 
Cooperation Guidelines. In February 1995, the U.S. Department of Defense released 
the East Asian Strategy Report (EASR), widely known as “Nye Initiative,” reaffirming 
the maintenance of U.S. troops in East Asia and bolstering U.S.-Japan security 
cooperation.376 In the following year, the Clinton administration and the Hashimoto 
government announced the revised U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation Guidelines.377 
Nevertheless, Japan’s balancing act between the U.S.-Japan alliance and regional 
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security frameworks continued, and the Japanese increasingly believed that Japan 
should strive to establish a multilateral security framework in East Asia.378 These 
“regionalists“ were concerned about Japan’s strategic dependence on the U.S. and 
hoped that regional economic integration would facilitate a regional security 
framework to supplement the U.S.-Japan alliance.379 
Re-entering Asia, Normalization, and North Korea 
 The regional initiatives in the early years of the post-Cold War period, 
however, lacked an overarching strategic vision of the regional order (e.g., a 
continuation of alliance-centered balancing, forging a multilateral regional 
mechanism) and discussion of Japan’s role within the regional order.380 Japan was 
caught between the conflicting expectations of the U.S., pushing for a larger Japanese 
military role, and regional actors concerned about Japan’s future regional roles.381 Its 
identity as an Asian nation called for an identity as an autonomous regional player, 
while the United States asked Japan to take a proactive role as a major partner in 
global security issues.382 Over time, however, Japanese have increasingly called for 
improved ties with regional neighbors and a search for regional cooperation.383 In fact, 
a senior analyst at the Defense Agency-affiliated National Institute of Defense Studies 
observed that by early 2004 the majority view was that it was problematic for Japan to 
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“rely solely on the United States” and, therefore, many Japanese elites endorsed 
efforts toward regional cooperation with Japan’s neighbors.384 
 Government officials began to echo such views. For instance, Ichita 
Yamamoto, Parliamentary Vice Foreign Minister, observed in 2000 that while the 
alliance with the U.S. was important, it has also restricted Japan’s efforts toward 
multipolar diplomacy: “Now, Japan’s homework is to find ways to pursue its own 
diplomacy without hurting its ties with the U.S.”385 One Japanese expert even 
proposed redesigning Japan’s U.S. alliance-based foreign policy from the perspective 
of a “middle-power” regional actor.386 Sakakibara Eisuke, the influential former 
finance minister widely known as Mr. Yen, seemed to agree when he said that 
“standing on its own feet while maintaining an alliance is not incompatible.” Hence, 
he called for closer ties with Asia without harming U.S. alliance relationship.387 
 Japan’s persistent efforts to normalize its diplomatic relations with North 
Korea are part of the search for independent regional roles. For reasons of history and 
geographical proximity, Japan’s regional strategy has also centered on the Korean 
Peninsula. Yamagata Aritomo, the grand old man of the Meiji government, once 
famously declared, “The Korean Peninsula is a dagger pointed at the heart of 
Japan.”388 Throughout history, the peninsula represented “the gateway” to Asia, and a 
century after its period of ill-fated regional dominance, the Japanese are seeking “to 
secure a new, if different, foothold there in order to solidify a longstanding role in the 
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emergent Northeast Asian regionalism.”389 Given the strategic importance of the 
Korean Peninsula, Japan was determined not to foreclose the possibility of forging 
relationship with North Korea, consistently refusing to accept the South Korean 
demand that it recognize South Korea as the only legitimate government for the entire 
Peninsula.390 
 Japan’s first initiative toward North Korea came from Prime Minister Noboru 
Takeshita in his statement made at the Diet in 1989. In his statement, Takeshita 
expressed “deep remorse and apology (ikan) to all people in this area” for Japan’s 
colonial rule. Given Japan’s unspoken tradition of offering formal apologies only to 
South Korea, not to the North, such a move signaled that he was not only addressing 
both South and North Korea but was specifically interested in enhancing Japan’s 
relations with North Korea.391 In 1990, then Liberal Democratic Party heavy weight 
Shin Kanemaru made a visit to Pyongyang, beginning a long process of pursuing 
normalization with North Korea.392 Eight rounds of normalization talks were held 
between January 1991 and February 1992, only to be stalled in 1993 amid the first 
North Korean nuclear crisis. The normalization effort, however, was quickly resumed 
after the signing of the Agreed Framework, which defused the first crisis. In March 
1995, a delegation led by a key LDP leader Michio Watanabe visited Pyongyang and 
agreed that “there wasn’t any precondition to resume the negotiations for the 
normalization of the relationship.”393 
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 Japan took a more direct role as a player in Korean peninsula affairs via its 
vital financial backing for the KEDO framework and enhanced status in trilateral 
consultations.394 In 1998, Japan also proposed a six-party security forum consisting of 
the two Koreas, Japan, and China, Russia, and the United States.395 As one senior 
foreign ministry official argued, “Japan must have its own place for negotiating with 
North Korea” and must “engage actively in the problems of the Korean Peninsula.”396 
Even after the 1998 Taepodong missile launch, Japanese attempts at normalization 
continued when Prime Minister Obuchi announced his determination to reopen 
diplomacy with the North in his January 1999 speech at the Japanese Diet. 
 In December 1999, as the Perry Process reduced tensions, former Prime 
Minister Tomiichi Murayama led a sixteen-member multi-party Diet delegation to 
Pyongyang to lay the groundwork for the ninth through 11th rounds of normalization 
talks in 2000.397 Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori also showed a similar determination. 
While stressing the importance of the U.S. ties, he said it is “vital that we make even 
further diplomatic efforts toward the realization of peace in Asia, centered particularly 
in Northeast Asia.”398 He linked his plea for pursuing a “rebirth of foreign policy” to 
the situation on the Korean Peninsula: given “the historical North-South Summit, I 
will channel all my efforts into achieving the advent of a new era in Northeast Asia. I 
will continue to make the maximum endeavor towards the resolution of pending 
issues, including the normalization of relations with North Korea.”399 
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 Despite repeated interruptions in the face of various regional contingencies in 
the 1990s, the fact that successive Japanese governments have persistently sought 
diplomatic normalization with North Korea is a testimony to Japan’s eagerness to alter 
that troubled relationship. A former Japanese diplomat even locates Japan-North 
Korea relations in the historical context of the Japanese colonization of the Korean 
Peninsula. To fully “overcome this past,”400 he argues, normalization and diplomatic 
relationships with the North must be established.401 Not only is North Korea the last 
chapter of Japan’s postwar settlement since World War II,402 it has the potential to 
serve as a useful channel to enhance Japan’s regional status amid regional controversy 
over the history issue.403 
 Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s drive to normalize Japan’s diplomatic ties 
with North Korea was one effort to improve Japan’s regional status.404 A senior 
analyst at the National Institute of Defense Studies notes that Koizumi’s 2002 visit to 
Pyongyang and his second visit in May 2004 came from the assumption that Japan 
should play a greater role in the region.405 In addition to the issue of resolving the 
history issue once and for all, Koizumi maintained that the normalization would 
strengthen Japan’s geopolitical status and give it “greater diplomatic leverage” in the 
region.406 While dealing with the issue of abducted Japanese, Koizumi “sought to 
establish Japan as a major actor in the jockeying over North Korea’s evolution.”407 An 
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expert at the Japan Institute of International Affairs believes that Koizumi’s 
normalization drive came even at the risk of cooperation with the United States.408 
 Koizumi’s first visit to Pyongyang in 2002 was particularly remarkable given 
the fact that Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials had been “quietly exploring [the 
possibility of a visit] for more than nine months without telling the United States.” 
Even after U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage revealed Washington’s 
suspicions about a secret North Korean uranium program, Koizumi did not cancel the 
trip.409 More striking, in the 2002 visit was that a key role was played by a foreign 
ministry official--Tanaka Hitoshi, Director General of the Asian and Oceanian 
Bureau--rather than by influential political figures.410 As the public mood turned 
negative on North Korea due, in large part, to the 1997 revelation of the abduction of 
Japanese nationals by North Korean agents and the 1998 Taepo-dong launch, secrecy 
was a key to success in realizing a summit in Pyongyang. Tanaka limited updates on 
the preparations to a handful of government figures, including Koizumi and Chief 
Cabinet Secretary Fukuda Yasuo, and bypassed the usual chain of command, 
including then Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi and Deputy Chief Cabinet 
Secretary Shinzo Abe, who was known for his hawkish attitude toward North 
Korea.411 Coming on the heels of the 2000 summit between the two Koreas, the 
Koizumi trip furthered “a regional momentum toward engagement that was very 
difficult for even hawks in the Bush administration to oppose for the time being.”412 
Even as the second North Korean nuclear crisis broke out, Koizumi’s normalization 
drive did not falter. 
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 Overall, Japan’s role in the Second Crisis was a far cry from the part in played 
during the first North Korean crisis. Moving away from passivity, Japan took a more 
proactive approach in the wake of the second crisis.413 This shift in Japans’ role is 
rooted in the view that through its participation in the Six Party processes “Japan 
might be able to strengthen her relations with each of the member countries,” paving 
the way for Japan’s “new strategic position in the region for many years to come.”414 
Observing that the outcome of the Korean situation has “the potential to reshape the 
regional order,” Kenneth Pyle predicted that Japans’ role in the process may be 
decisive in “an enduring settlement on the peninsula and achieving a stable new order 
in Northeast Asia.”415 Keizo Nabeshima also calls for the remedying the “abnormal” 
relations with North Korea with “a sense of mission, a determination to build a new 
order in Asia and a political capacity to conduct diplomacy under a long-term 
strategy.”416 Through its approach toward North Korea, the Japanese government 
aimed at “establishing Japan’s regional policy, particularly centered on the Korean 
Peninsula.”417 
 The Japanese public in turn assessed Koizumi’s efforts and the two summits 
with Kim Jong Il positively. In the immediate aftermath of Koizumi’s visit to 
Pyongyang in 2002, despite Kim Jong Il’s unexpected admission of the abductions of 
Japanese by North Korean agents during the 1970s, the Japanese public in general 
responded positively to Koizumi’s visit. Koizumi’s job rating saw a dramatic increase 
from 45.7 percent in August to 66.1 percent in September 2002,418 attesting to 
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Japanese support for normalization with the North. The visit also represented “a 
different direction for Japanese foreign policy than that preferred by the Bush 
administration.”419 
 Most Japanese experts have praised the normalization effort as a regional 
roadmap in the right direction.420 Masao Okonogi, a noted Korea specialist in Japan, 
portrayed Koizumi’s trip to Pyongyang as a bold step that “skillfully blended two 
stances, one of cooperating with Washington and the other of acting independently of 
it.”421 Makoto Taniguchi, a former Japanese ambassador and high-ranking foreign 
ministry official, agreed when he evaluated the summit as “the first positive, 
independent and multilateral diplomatic initiative to be taken in recent years.” He 
further predicted that in the long run, Japan’s initiative would result in “security 
benefits, not only to North-East Asia but to the world as a whole.”422 The general tenor 
of Japanese views at the time was that Koizumi’s 2002 visit was a path breaking 
regional initiative, with the potential for “revolutionizing East Asian security 
dynamics,” 423 comparable in significance to Nixon’s visit to China in 1972.424 
Koizumi himself reiterated the importance of the normalization “for both countries, 
for the Korean Peninsula, for Asia and the world.”425 
 What is particularly significant is the link, made explicitly by some Japanese 
experts, between Japan’s normalization with the North and the formation of a regional 
security framework. In fact, in the Pyongyang Declaration signed between Koizumi 
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and Kim Jong Il, the term “Northeast Asia” appeared for the first time since 1945 in a 
Japanese diplomatic document.426 This development was the embodiment of a 
recommendation by several Japanese experts to “take concrete steps to apply 
normalization principles to a broader, more multilateral framework”427 and to “create a 
‘community of nations’ in the region,” on the basis of reconciliation between Japan 
and North Korea.428 In this vein, one prominent Japanese expert referred to the Japan-
North Korean summit and the Pyongyang Declaration as “the first occasion for Japan 
to raise the banner of a new regionalism since the tragic years of the Great East Asian 
Co-prosperity during World War II.”429 Japanese regional neighbors in turn welcomed 
the Japanese government’s effort to find a turning point on North Korea.430 
Regionalists soon formed the National Movement for Normalization of Japan-DPRK 
Relations (Nitcho Kokko Sokushin Kokumin Kyokai) headed by former Prime Minister 
Tomiichi Murayama, with the following declaration: 
Normalization of Japan-DPRK relations and economic assistance to the DPRK 
from Japan, linked with North-South cooperation in the Korean Peninsula, 
should build the basis for peace in Northeast Asia, and is in the interest of all 
the countries and people of our region.431 
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The North Korean Threat and the Rise of Conservatives 
 As the crisis reached a stalemate, Koizumi’s diplomatic initiative toward North 
Korea was increasingly hamstrung by growing anti-North Korea sentiments caused by 
Pyongyang’s admission of its abduction of Japanese citizens.432 After the 
normalization drive stalled in the face of anti-North Korean sentiments, “a new 
generation of revisionists” rose to power by “[utilizing] the changing regional 
dynamics.433 Chief Cabinet Secretary Shinzo Abe led the conservative group. Since 
2003, Abe has successfully capitalized on the abduction issue, first to secure an LDP 
victory in the parliamentary election in November 2003, and “in the process became a 
formidable political actor on the national stage.”434 As conservative forces dominated 
the domestic political scene, North Korea engagers were increasingly 
marginalized.”435 
 Against this backdrop, the North Korean threat has given the Japanese 
conservatives a focus on which to build.436 What followed was a surge of North Korea 
bashing throughout Japan and increasingly anti-North Korean media coverage in 
Japan.437 A senior Japanese defense analyst in a government-affiliated defense think 
tank even went so far as to say that North Korea single-handedly made Japan more 
realistic about national security.438 Japan’s Self Defense Forces now structure their 
planning against the North Korean threat.439 A senior Japanese expert and policy 
advisor for the government also pointed out that without North Korean provocations it 
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would have been difficult for Japanese politicians to talk publicly about the Taiwan 
issue and the rise of China. According to him, discussions of all of these things 
became possible all because of North Korea.440 
 More broadly, the North Korean threat serves as “a convenient excuse to 
justify the abandonment of the Peace Constitution” and Japan‘s move toward 
becoming a “normal” state.441 Interestingly, the National Association for the Rescue of 
Japanese Kidnapped by North Korea, the main organization addressing the abduction 
issue, expanded its role within Japanese society. As the abduction issue continues to 
occupy Japanese domestic debate, many of the association’s regional leaders have 
become active members of Nippon Kaigi, “Japan’s largest nationalist organization, 
which rejects postwar pacifism, embraces the imperial system and defends Japan’s 
past wars in Asia.”442 Moreover, the abduction scandal gave the conservatives “a new 
opportunity to highlight how Japan has been ill-prepared” in security and to persuade 
the public about “the need for change.”443 One Japanese expert has linked the 
conservative efforts at North Korea bashing to a right-wing campaign to beef up 
Japan’s defense posture.444 
 Under this changing domestic political context, Shinzo Abe, having assumed 
the premiership, made a strong push for constitutional revision. In May 2007, the 60th 
anniversary of the Peace Constitution, Abe’s comments were markedly different from 
the 1997 statement by then Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto. While Hashimoto 
promised Japan would make “contributions to the peace and prosperity of the 
international community under the philosophy of the Constitution,” Abe proposed that 
“[a] bold review of Japan’s postwar regime and an in-depth discussion of the 
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Constitution toward realizing a ‘new Japan’ would create a spirit for laying a new path 
to a new era.”445 Similarly, the long-time conservative goal of upgrading the Japan 
Defense Agency to a full-fledged defense department was finalized realized in January 
2007. 
 Lost in the domestic whirlwind of North Korea bashing was Japan’s search for 
an independent regional role. In fact, the strategic focus has been shifted to the U.S.-
Japan alliance. For instance, the 2005 East Asian Strategic Review, issued by Defense 
Agency’s National Institute for Defense Studies, characterizes Japan’s regional role as 
“the pivot of the United States’ alliances” so that the United States will be able to 
“deploy its forces in a “more agile and more flexible” manner.”446 After the 2006 
North Korean nuclear test, the Abe government, bypassing a regional route, 
coordinated directly with the United States and other UN Security Council members to 
pass UNSC Resolution 1718, levying new sanctions on North Korea. 447 
 Although the conservative dominance continued until the downfall of Abe in 
September 2007 amid a series of domestic political scandals, Japanese experts began 
to suggest that Japan’s preoccupation with the abduction issue was 
“counterproductive, arguing the Japanese public and government are allowing it to 
interfere with its broader diplomatic goals with respect to North Korea.”448 While the 
conservatives generally welcomed the move toward a global pact primarily because it 
would speed up the move toward a “normal” state, others expressed their concern by 
warning that Japan, under the new plan, “will be further integrated into the U.S. global 
strategy.”449 In fact, there have recently been signs of change in both Japanese politics 
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and the domestic security debate. For instance, Ichiro Ozawa, the head of the 
opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), renewed emphasis on engaging Asia. In 
explaining his diplomatic vision, Ozawa even stresses the role of Japan as “the bridge 
between China and the United States.”450 Following in Koizumi’s footsteps regarding 
North Korea, the current Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda has also decided to “seek a 
resolution to the North’s nuclear programs, missile threats and the abductions in a 
‘comprehensive’ manner.”451 As positive developments emerged in the Six Party 
process, in June 2008 Japan resumed its negotiation with North Korea.452 
3-6. Conclusion 
 What the preceding analysis reveals is the extent to which countries in East 
Asia view the North Korean challenge in a much broader sense than the nuclear issue. 
Far from eliciting a converging debate as to how to grapple with the nuclear challenge, 
the North Korean crisis has sparked a divergent and highly contested set of domestic 
debates concerning the North Korean challenge. The central focus of the domestic 
contestation over the North Korean question has been not its nuclear problem per se 
but the complex interaction between the externally-shaped and internally-shaped 
regional roles, which in turn influences each country’s respective responses to the U.S. 
approach toward North Korea. 
 In each of the country cases, the main focus of regional actors was anchored to 
North Korea, while they cautiously navigated between their respective relations with 
the United States and North Korea. Despite U.S. influence and pressure, countries in 
East Asia have consistently been seeking to alter the traditional relationship with 
                                                
450 “Editorial: Ozawa’s visit to China,” Asahi Shimbun, July 6, 2006; “Editorial: Mr. Ozawa makes the 
right moves,” Japan Times, July 13, 2006. 
451 Kaho Shimizu, “Lee gives Japan hope for united front against North,” Japan Times, February 8, 
2008. 
452 Blaine Harden, “N. Korea Agrees to Reexamine Abductions,” Washington Post, June 14, 2008. 
 116 
North Korea with an eye toward greater regional status, which would help them go 
beyond the confines of dual national identity and strategic dependency. Throughout 
the process, the regional countries pursued a new regional vision that would 
supplement, if not supplant, the U.S.-centered regional order of the hub-and-spokes 
system. 
 To be sure, the emerging regional security order is far from clear, especially 
given the context of the still unfolding crisis and the Six Party process. However, by 
focusing only on the nuclear issues and, thus, neglecting the regional dynamics 
surrounding North Korea, the United States risks both overlooking a gradual shift in 
the regional security landscape and losing its traditional influence as a regional 
stabilizer in East Asia. In the following chapters, I investigate the broader implications 
for the regional order of the competing regional role conceptions surrounding North 
Korea. I do so by comparing alliance politics and regionalism during the 1998 Missile 




The Perry Process and the East Asian Security Order, 1998-2000 
The beauty of the Perry process was that we formulated with South Korea and 
Japan a common strategy with an agreed set of goals, and then an allocation of 
responsibilities as to how we could achieve those goals through our individual 
dialogues or negotiating processes with North Korea. And that indeed is what we 
need now. 
—Stephen Bosworth, former U.S. Ambassador to South Korea.453 
4-1. Introduction 
 On August 31, 1998 North Korea reignited a full-blown regional crisis by test-
launching an intermediate-level ballistic missile, which flew over Japanese territory 
and landed in the Pacific Ocean. The missile crisis set in motion a year-long process of 
comprehensive policy review and consultation, dubbed the Perry Process because it 
was led by former U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry. In this chapter, I argue that 
compatibility between U.S.-directed and internally-shaped regional role conceptions 
was crucial to the success of the Perry Process. Unlike the first North Korean crisis, 
the 1998 missile crisis coincided with region-wide efforts to seek new regional roles 
through redefined ties with North Korea. Unlike the Bush administration’s 
understanding and policy behavior vis-à-vis North Korea, the Clinton administration 
approached the North Korean question in a way that both reflected and reinforced such 
regional initiatives in East Asia. As a result, the Perry Process yielded a new, positive 
pattern of alliance coordination between the U.S. and its Asian allies, Japan and South 
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Korea, while helping facilitate a new regional pattern of cooperation and consultation 
among China, Japan, and South Korea.454 
 A mutually reinforcing mechanism between the Clinton administration’s 
approach toward North Korea and the regional initiatives vis-à-vis North Korea 
reshaped the structure of the regional order into trilateral alliance cooperation and 
broadened regionalism. This regional order was also cooperative in nature, opening 
new avenues for regional rivals to work together. From a U.S. perspective, the Perry 
Process was also emblematic of positive multilateral initiatives that engage countries 
in East Asia to deal with “regional security affairs without undermining the hegemonic 
strategy.”455 The Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG) among the 
United States, Japan, and South Korea was a prime example of successful alliance 
cooperation. Cooperation among East Asian countries via a variety of multilateral 
regional venues also multiplied in scope and number. Regional frameworks such as 
the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) meetings demonstrated the viability of a broader, more 
open regional security mechanism, paving the way for the trilateral cooperation among 
China, Japan, and South Korea and the formation of a new regional forum called the 
East Asia Summit. 
 This chapter proceeds in the following manner. The first section provides the 
background and key features of the Perry Process. I pay particular attention to how 
external and internal regional role conceptions in East Asia became effectively 
congruent in this period. The following two sections, in turn, assess the impact of the 
Perry Process on the regional order by exploring alliance politics and regionalism in 
East Asia. I demonstrate patterns of alliance coordination by examining the workings 
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of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) and the Trilateral 
Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG). I then explore developments in 
regionalism by discussing several regional security frameworks and a region-wide 
search for a multi-layered regional order. The final section concludes with a summary 
of findings and a brief discussion of policy lessons. 
4-2. Regional Role Conceptions and the Emergence of the Perry Process 
 The signing of the Agreed Framework between the United States and North 
Korea in Geneva, Switzerland in October 1994 formally ended the first North Korean 
nuclear crisis. In its aftermath, various multilateral venues emerged to address the 
North Korean question. These included the Korean Peninsula Energy Development 
Organization (KEDO), a mechanism for the implementation of the Agreed Framework 
and the Four Party Talks to establish a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula. 
Through the workings of these new multilateral frameworks, regional actors, who had 
remained largely passive bystanders during the first North Korean nuclear crisis, 
began to express willingness to play greater roles in regional security aspects. 
 In South Korea, the Kim Young Sam government was determined to play “a 
legitimate and equal role in any further discussions on the Korean questions and to 
find a way to resume direct official contact with North Korea.”456 In 1996, the South 
Korean government, in consultation with the Clinton administration, proposed a four 
party regional forum among the United States, the two Koreas, and China with a goal 
of turning the Korean Armistice into a permanent peace treaty consisting of all the 
signatories of the 1953 armistice that ended the Korean War. Fresh from its own crisis 
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situation in the Taiwan Strait in 1995-1996,457 the Chinese, for their part, were eager 
to play a greater regional role by joining the four party talks. 
 In December 1997, after holding three preparatory meetings, the four countries 
held the first formal session of the Four Party Talks in Geneva. However, the talks 
were not smooth sailing, and North Korea repeated its usual demand for the United 
States to change its military posture in the region. Although the talks yielded several 
rounds of formal meetings458 and agreements on working groups to discuss specific 
issues, no tangible results ensued.459 Moreover, South Korean President Kim Young-
sam was more concerned with taking a leading role in Korean Peninsula issues than 
with reaching out to North Korea with a broader regional role in mind. 
 As the Kim Dae-jung government assumed power in South Korea in 1998, the 
momentum slowly changed. The “sunshine” policy of engagement and reconciliation 
toward North Korea began in earnest a process of widening inter-Korean ties. Kim did 
so by linking inter-Korean relations to a broader regional framework and seeking a 
greater regional role for South Korea in that context. This is why President Kim 
showed a particular interest in expanding the Four Party talks into a larger regional 
framework. The Kim government’s proposal for a “Two Plus Four formula and the 
establishment of a Northeast Asian security cooperation regime” were designed 
                                                
457 Warning against Taiwan’s growing independence movement led by then President Lee Deng-hui, the 
People’s Republic of China fired a series of missiles to the close vicinity of Taiwan, sparking the so-
called Taiwan Strait Crisis. The Clinton administration dispatched two aircraft carrier battle groups to 
the Taiwan Strait. On the Taiwan Strait Crisis, see James R. Lilley and Chuck Downs eds., Crisis in the 
Taiwan Strait (Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1996); Robert Ross, “The 1996 
Taiwan Strait Confrontation: Coercion, Credibility and Use of Force,” International Security, Vol. 25, 
No. 2 (Fall 2000), pp. 87-123; Denny Roy, “Tensions in the Taiwan Strait, Survival, Vol. 42, No. 1 
(Spring 2000), pp. 76-96.  
458 The sixth and final session of the Four Party Talks was held in Geneva, Switzerland in August 1999. 
459 Tae-Hwan Kwak, “Inter-Korean Relations and Northeast Asian Security,” Christopher M. Dent and 
David W.F. Huang, eds., Northeast Asian Regionalism: Learning from the European Experience 
(London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002), pp. 206-225. 
 121 
specifically to shape the regional security environment in a way that would facilitate 
inter-Korean relations.460 
 More importantly, unlike his predecessors, President Kim did not insist on the 
traditional South Korean position of putting inter-Korean ties ahead of US-North 
Korean relations. Instead, he urged both the United States and Japan to speed up the 
process of normalization with North Korea.461 In this sense, President Kim’s sunshine 
policy marked “a radical departure from previous policies toward North Korea,” 
demonstrating that South Korea’s foreign policy can be “proactive and assertive rather 
than reactive and defensive.”462 
 Such South Korean efforts could not have been more timely, as both the 
United States and other regional countries expressed growing interest in new regional 
frameworks. From the vantage point of U.S. policy makers, such regional frameworks 
could serve to reduce Chinese uncertainty about the future role of the U.S.-Japan 
alliance.463 The Chinese, for their part, began to assess multilateral regional 
frameworks positively and utilize such regional venues in part in hopes of dampening 
fears of the “China threat,” which was voiced around the region and beyond after that 
nation’s remarkable economic growth and military modernization.464 
 China’s interest in regional security frameworks stems from its desire to play a 
greater regional role. Breaking away from its previous passivity in regional diplomacy, 
China began to take a more active role in a broad array of regional affairs. Determined 
to play a new regional role as “a more responsible and cooperative player,” the 
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Chinese embraced various multilateral venues in a more systematic manner, including 
those designed to deal with the North Korean nuclear issue.465 China’s active 
participation in the Four Party Talks in the late 1990s was a key example of such 
efforts. 
 As in the Chinese case, Japan’s pursuit of a greater regional role in multilateral 
frameworks began with an instrumental reason in mind: In this case, the purpose was 
to mollify regional concerns rooted in Japan’s role as a colonizer and invader in the 
early 20th century. In fact, due to regional suspicions of Japan’s renewed militarism, 
some scholars have proposed the U.S.-Britain or U.S.-German model as future 
scenarios for the U.S.-Japan alliance. According to John Ikenberry and Takashi 
Inoguchi, Germany is a model for playing an active regional role, while 
simultaneously being bound to various regional multilateral frameworks, “thereby 
providing stabilizing reassurances to neighboring countries.”466 Another regional 
expert maintains that rather than relying solely on the United States, Japan should 
consider the roles of Britain and Germany in Europe, the former as a model for 
effectively balancing strategic ties with the United States and its regional role in 
Europe and the latter as a model for redeeming its past with its neighbors.467 In this 
vein, one Japanese expert pointed to the Japanese contribution to the KEDO and its 
participation in regional institutions including the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) as 
examples of Japan playing a role as a “global civilian power” as an evolution of its 
constructive regional roles.468 
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 However, the main driver behind Japan’s interest in regional frameworks was a 
desire to expand its regional role by normalizing ties with North Korea and gaining 
diplomatic leverage on the Korean Peninsula. Despite a widely-accepted scholarly 
view of Japan as a “reactive” state,469 Japanese search for greater regional roles took 
great strides in the late 1990s. Instead of remaining a passive participant in alliance-
based regional venues, the Japanese became more proactive and assertive in their 
regional initiatives. In addition to alliance-based institutions, such as the KEDO, the 
TCOG and the Japan-U.S. security treaty, Japan promoted the idea of a Six-Party 
forum, involving the United States, China, and Japan and Russia, on the assumption 
“that resolving the North Korean problem must be approached in a broader 
framework.”470 In August 1997, the Japanese government resumed meeting with the 
North Koreans to prepare for the long-mothballed negotiations over diplomatic 
normalization.471 Later in November 1997, a Japanese Diet delegation, representing 
the ruling coalition parties, Liberal Democratic Party, the Social Democratic Party, 
and Sakigake, and headed by a high-ranking LDP official and future Prime Minister 
Yoshiro Mori, visited Pyongyang. In December the same year, then Foreign Minister 
Keizo Obuchi expressed his enthusiasm toward the regional initiative by declaring that 
“negotiations for diplomatic normalization will be reopened as soon as possible.”472 
 Against this backdrop of a region-wide yearning for greater regional roles and 
East Asian countries’ efforts to redefine their relations with North Korea, in mid-1998 
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the situation surrounding the Korean Peninsula was moving toward a new crisis 
provoked by North Korea’s launch of Taepo-dong missile. As the crisis forced the 
Clinton administration to make adjustments in its policy toward North Korea, East 
Asian countries’ pursuit of greater regional roles seemed in danger of being put on 
hold. However, rather than forcing its own view of the situation and policy stance, 
however, the Clinton administration from the start sought to coordinate closely with its 
regional counterparts in dealing with the mounting crisis. The Clinton administration’s 
close consultation with regional countries not only ensured that the U.S. approach was 
in accord with that of East Asian countries but also allowed the regional countries to 
continue with their respective initiatives toward North Korea. The positive 
developments in turn helped improve the regional order, both in alliance mechanism 
and regionalism. 
The North Korean Missile Crisis and the Perry Process 
 In the second term of the Clinton administration, the Republican-dominated 
U.S. Congress voiced increasing concerns about North Korea and the validity of the 
Geneva Accord that resolved the first North Korean nuclear crisis. As the 
implementation of the Agreed Framework did not proceed as scheduled, the North 
Koreans also began to question U.S. intentions and decided to ratchet up pressure on 
the United States to lift all the sanctions levied against them.473 Against this backdrop, 
in July 1998, a congressionally mandated commission headed by Donald Rumsfeld 
issued a bipartisan report warning of growing missile threats from rogue states, 
including North Korea.474 A month later in August 1998, a front-page New York 
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Times article also ran a story about a suspected secret underground nuclear facility 
near Kumchangri, North Korea.475 Amid increasing U.S. suspicions about North 
Korea’s intentions, North Korea heightened the tension level further by test-launching 
the Taeopo-dong missile on August 31, 1998. 
 The combination of North Korea’s long-range ballistic missiles and its 
potential to produce nuclear bombs immediately conjured up an image of impending 
danger from the Korean Peninsula.476 It is under these circumstances that the U.S. 
Congress called for a comprehensive review of U.S. policy toward North Korea.477 In 
October 1998, the U.S. Congress issued “a new provision in the “Omnibus 
Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Act” (Public Law 105-277), ” which 
mandated that “not later than January 1, 1999, the President shall name a North Korea 
Policy Coordinator, who shall conduct a full and complete interagency review of US 
policy toward North Korea, shall provide policy direction for negotiations with North 
Korea related to nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and other security related issues, 
and shall also provide leadership for US participation in KEDO.”478 
 In response, the Clinton administration appointed former defense secretary 
William Perry as North Korea Policy Coordinator. In October 1998, the United States 
and North Korea started negotiations, formally setting in motion a yearlong process. 
After a series of meetings,479 North Korea, in May 1999, agreed to allow an on-site 
inspection of the suspected nuclear site by the United States. Upon confirming that the 
suspected site was not nuclear-related, the Clinton administration continued 
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negotiations over North Korea’s missile issue. On May 25, 1999, William Perry 
himself visited Pyongyang. After several months of negotiations with North Korea and 
extensive consultations with regional countries, in September 1999 the United States 
and North Korea signed the Berlin Agreement. With the signing of the agreement, 
North Korea announced that as long as talks between the United States and North 
Korea continued, it would put a moratorium on missile testing. In return, the Clinton 
administration lifted some of the economic sanctions levied against North Korea. 
Role Congruence during the Perry Process 
 According to Ambassador Wendy Sherman, who was Perry’s advisor and later 
successor as U.S. policy coordinator on North Korea, Perry initially thought that he 
would spend only two or three months working on the review. Instead, he ended up 
spending nearly a year to engage in “a very wide range of consultations with 
Congress, experts on all sides, allies, almost everyone in government, other interested 
parties.”480 More importantly, his team made numerous trips to Seoul, Tokyo, and 
Beijing for coordination and consultation, not to mention his Pyongyang visit in May 
1999.481 Stanley Roth, then Assistant Secretary of State For East Asian and Pacific 
Affairs, attributed the success of the Perry process to “repeated consultations with the 
Japanese and Korean governments.” Perry’s recommendations were crucial precisely 
because “they reflect the thinking of leaders in Tokyo and Seoul as well as 
Washington.”482 
 For instance, in a ten-month period following the nomination of Perry as U.S. 
North Korean policy coordinator, Lim Dongwon, South Korean President Kim Dae 
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Jung’s special adviser and later unification minister, met Perry eight times for policy 
consultation.483 Through these meetings, the South Korean government proposed to 
Perry a package deal with North Korea, linking North Korea’s dismantling of WMD 
programs to economic assistance, which eventually became the mainstay of the 1999 
Perry Report.484 The U.S. endorsement of South Korea’s engagement policy toward 
North Korea and Perry’s efforts to “synchronize U.S. policy with that of South Korea” 
promoted “a sense of compatibility” in the policies of the two countries.485 As Perry 
himself later recalled, such close consultation among allies, including six tripartite 
meetings, contributed significantly to the success of the Perry Process. He not only 
discussed the recommendations in his final report with President Clinton, South 
Korean President Kim Dae-jung, and Japanese Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi, but also 
briefed the Chinese and the Russians and sought their support as well.486 
 On September 15, 1999, William Perry submitted a completed report to 
President Clinton and the U.S. Congress. In contrast to the Bush administration’s view 
of the North Korean regime as an irrational and unpredictable rogue state, the central 
premise of the Perry Report was that deterrence against North Korea was working and, 
therefore, the United States “must deal with the DPRK regime as it is, not as [the U.S.] 
would wish it to be.”487 In essence, the report recommended a two-path strategy. First, 
if North Korea is “willing to forgo its long-range missile program as well as its nuclear 
weapons program, [the United States] should be willing to move step-by-step on a 
path to a comprehensive normalization of relations, including the establishment of a 
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permanent peace.” But, if not, “[the United States] must take actions to contain that 
threat.”488 In an attempt not to provoke North Korea, the unclassified version of the 
Perry Report did not specify the type of measures the United States and its allies 
would take in the second scenario.489 Afterwards, the Clinton administration pursued a 
comprehensive engagement policy toward North Korea. 
 As the relationship between the United States and North Korea took a positive 
turn, regional countries were able to continue their initiatives toward North Korea. 
Shortly after the publication of the Perry Report, China did not waste time in repairing 
its somewhat estranged relationship with North Korea. China’s Foreign Minister Tang 
Jiaxuan’s “good will” visit to Pyongyang in October1999 was the first high-ranking 
official visit since 1996.490 In a new sign of improvement in inter-Korean ties, in 
South Korea a government-sanctioned tour to North Korea’s Mount Keumkang began 
to expand. President Kim Dae-jung viewed the Perry Report and the Clinton 
administration’s approach toward North Korea “as vindicating his efforts to dismantle 
a decades-long threat-driven policy on the peninsula.”491 
 As the U.S. and South Korea sought their own paths to enhanced relations with 
North Korea during this period, there was an implicit understanding among the ruling 
Liberal Democratic Party leadership that Japan could not afford to be sidelined in the 
regional pursuit of political reconciliations with the North.492 In December 1999, a 
parliamentary delegation led by former Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama made a 
three-day visit to North Korea. During this visit, both sides agreed to resume talks for 
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diplomatic normalization that had been stalled since 1992. Prime Minister Keizo 
Obuchi was also eager to forge ahead with normalization efforts. Working closely 
with Hiromu Nonaka, deputy secretary general of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) 
with broad connections with the North Koreans, Prime Minister Obuchi sought a 
breakthrough with the North Koreans.493 Trilateral coordination with the United States 
and South Korea, in turn, enabled Japan to play a greater role in Korean Peninsula 
issues.494 Instead of blocking Japan’s proactive approach toward North Korea, both the 
United States and South Korea welcomed the Murayama mission.495 In short, trilateral 
coordination ensured role congruence, which in turn resulted in enhanced alliance 
cooperation and support for the 1999 Berlin Agreement. In the process, there existed 
“a great deal of optimism when Japan, in consultation with South Korea and the 
United States, reenergized its normalization diplomacy toward North Korea in 
2000.”496 
 It was in this favorable regional atmosphere that the historic inter-Korean 
summit took place in Pyongyang in June 2000. However, the focus of the summit was 
not just on inter-Korean relations but also on the region.497 From a South Korean 
perspective, permanent peace would require the end of the Cold War rivalry on the 
peninsula and a dramatic transformation of inter-Korean relations with a full 
endorsement by the great powers in the region. To that end, the Kim Dae-jung 
government strongly encouraged the United States and Japan to normalize their ties 
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with the North.498 By making South Korea’s external and internal regional role 
conceptions congruent, the Clinton administration, in turn, facilitated South Korea’s 
expanded role in the region. Under this permissive regional context, President Kim 
was able to forge ahead with inter-Korean reconciliation. 
 As the two Kims shook hands smiling, the prolonged Cold War tension 
appeared to slowly dissipate on the Korean Peninsula. Regional leaders echoed the 
initial expectation of hope. Japanese Prime Minister Yoshino Mori, for instance, 
regarded the summit as an East Asian equivalent of “the fall of the Berlin Wall.”499 
Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs called it “a major event of historic 
significance.”500 U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright was equally optimistic 
when she said, “The United States strongly supports South Korea’s policy of 
engagement, and we will do all we can to encourage further reconciliation . . . so the 
full promise of the summit can be achieved.”501 The United States, the guarantor of 
Cold War peace in the region, was finally approaching a major turning point in its 
relationship with a long-time enemy against which it fought the very first war of the 
Cold War era. 
US-North Korean Reconciliation and the End of the Perry Process 
 In July 2000, only a month after the inter-Korean summit, U.S. Secretary of 
State Madeleine Albright and North Korean Foreign Minister Baek Namsoon had their 
first high-level meeting between the two countries at the annual ASEAN Research 
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Forum (ARF) meeting in Bangkok. In return for Perry’s 1999 visit to Pyongyang, they 
discussed the possibility of a Washington visit by a high-level North Korean envoy.502 
In October 2000, Kim Jong Il sent Vice Marshal Jo Myong Rok, the second man in 
charge of the North Korean military, as his special envoy to President Clinton. During 
his visit to Washington, Vice Marshall Jo singled out the Perry Process as “important 
contributions” and spoke highly of the recommendations made by the Perry Report.503 
Both sides also issued the U.S.-DPRK Joint Communiqué. As shown in Table 4-1, the 
Joint Communiqué not only addressed specific U.S. concerns about North Korea’s 
WMD capability but also covered inter-Korean and regional dimensions.504 
 In his meeting with President Clinton, Vice Marshall Jo invited the President 
to visit Pyongyang. Jo even went so far as to say that through the visit by President 
Clinton, “[the United States and North Korea] will be able to find the solution to all 
problems.” In return, President Clinton asked Secretary Albright to “go first to prepare 
the ground.” 505 Before her visit to Pyongyang, Albright consulted South Korean 
President Kim Dae-jung who strongly endorsed the visit. Secretary Albright made her 
official visit to Pyongyang in October 23-24, 2000. She was, and remains, the highest 
U.S. official to visit the North in the history of U.S.-North Korean relations. In 
Pyongyang, while not scheduled in preparatory meetings for the trip, Kim Jong Il 
himself joined Albright in a series of meetings and events that lasted more than six 
hours. Secretary Albright characterized her meetings with Kim Jong Il as “serious, 
constructive, and in-depth.”506 As quoted below, Albright’s speech in a reception 
hosted by Kim Jong Il was upbeat and promising. 
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Mr. Chairman, the process in which we are now engaged . . . can lead to 
reconciliation and reunification of the Peninsula and to more normal and 
prosperous relations between your government and others in the region and 
the world. 
We each must strive to open new avenues of communication, commerce and 
contacts. We must each do our part if the Cold War is truly to end and along 
with it the divisions that have caused such suffering to the people of Korea. 
(Emphasis added)507 
 Through the Perry Process, North Korea finally showed willingness to get out 
of its siege mentality. Sensing Kim Jong Il’s determination to make a deal with the 
United States, South Korean President Kim Dae-jung strongly urged President Clinton 
to visit Pyongyang.508 According to Albright, the Clinton administration at the time 
was “reasonably confident that North Korea would agree to a deal ending the potential 
threat posed to [the United States] by long-range missiles and nuclear arms.”509 
William Perry himself later revealed that based on his judgment “the United States 
was within a few months of getting the desired agreement from North Korea.”510 Yet 
the White House could not make a final decision due in large part to “the scheduling 
chaos” caused by ongoing negotiations in the Middle East.511 The unforeseen and 
prolonged controversy over the result of the 2000 U.S. presidential election at the time 
did not help either. President Clinton himself lamented his decision not to visit 
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Pyongyang: “I hated to give up on ending the North Korean missile program but I 
simply couldn’t risk being halfway around the world when we were so close to peace 
in the Middle East.”512 President Clinton later said to William Perry that “it was his 
“biggest regret” that he did not visit North Korea.”513 
Table 4-1. The U.S.-DPRK Joint Communiqué (excerpt) 
Dimension Content 
Regional  • “the United States and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 
have decided to take steps to fundamentally improve their bilateral 
relations in the interests of enhancing peace and security in the Asia-
Pacific region.” 
• “the two sides agreed there are a variety of available means, including 
Four Party talks, to reduce tension on the Korean Peninsula and 
formally end the Korean War by replacing the 1953 Armistice 
Agreement with permanent peace arrangements.”  
US-North 
Korean 
• “the two sides stated that neither government would have hostile 
intent toward the other and confirmed the commitment of both 
governments to make every effort in the future to build a new 
relationship free from past enmity.” 
• “the two sides reaffirmed that their relations should be based on the 
principles of respect for each other’s sovereignty and non-
interference in each other’s internal affairs, and noted the value of 
regular diplomatic contacts” 
Inter-Korean  • “Special Envoy Jo Myong Rok explained to the US side 
developments in the inter-Korean dialogue in recent months, 
including the results of the historic North-South summit. 
• “The U.S. side expressed its firm commitment to assist in all 
appropriate ways the continued progress and success of ongoing 
North-South dialogue and initiatives for reconciliation and greater 
cooperation, including increased security dialogue.”  
WMD • “the D.P.R.K. informed the U.S. that it will not launch long-range 
missiles of any kind while talks on the missile issue continue.” 
• “the US and the D.P.R.K. strongly affirmed its importance to 
achieving peace and security on a nuclear weapons free Korean 
Peninsula.” 
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4-3. Alliance Politics during the Perry Process 
 While the Perry Process could not bring a permanent solution to the tension on 
the Korean Peninsula, it elevated alliance coordination to a new high, opening up a 
new pattern of trilateral cooperation among the U.S. allies. The consultation process 
not only institutionalized a new alliance coordination mechanism but also 
strengthened existing ones such as the Korean Peninsula Energy Development 
Organization (KEDO), a key regional mechanism for addressing the North Korean 
issue prior to the Perry Process. In exchange for North Korea’s forgoing of nuclear 
programs, the United States promised in the 1994 Agreed Framework an annual 
provision of 500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil and the building of two light water 
reactors, which cannot be used for producing nuclear weapons. Launched in 1995, 
KEDO was an institutional mechanism to execute the provisions. Along with the U.S., 
and its East Asian allies, Japan and South Korea, even European countries joined the 
organization. By 2002, KEDO’s membership had expanded to thirteen countries, with 
sixteen countries making financial contributions to the implementation project.514 
The Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) 
 As an issue-specific, ad hoc multilateral framework, KEDO became a main 
venue for alliance coordination on the North Korean issue. One scholar even 
considered KEDO to be “the most important multilateral security institution” in the 
region.515 Its importance, however, rests not just with its stated goal of implementing 
the Agreed Framework. It soon played a larger role in alliance politics by serving as 
“an important mechanism to give South Korea and Japan a ‘seat at the table’ in 
dealing with a critical regional security issue” and offering a regional forum for 
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trilateral cooperation among U.S. allies.516 As the Japanese deputy director to KEDO 
observed, the organization was not only crucial to stopping North Korea’s nuclear 
programs but also served “as a model for U.S.-ROK-Japan cooperation.”517 
 Such practices in alliance cooperation proved to be very useful during the 
Perry Process. It was under this institutional foundation that the United States and 
South Korea were able to maintain trilateral cooperation after the Taepodong launch 
by North Korea. Flying directly over the Japanese archipelago, North Korea’s missiles 
caused outrage among the Japanese public. Many Japanese experts agree that the 
launch made the strongest impact on the Japanese perception of security in the postwar 
period. One former Japanese diplomat even compared the missile launch to a 
hypothetical Cuban missile launch over Florida.518 After the launch, the Japanese 
government initially threatened to suspend its commitment to KEDO. A withdrawal of 
the up to $1 billion Japanese contribution to KEDO would have both risked the 
collapse of the multi-year project and undermined the engagement policies pursued by 
the Clinton administration and the South Korean government.519 It was the Perry 
Process that helped Japan to return to KEDO and narrowed the perception gap 
between the United States and South Korea on the one hand and Japan on the other.520 
 While the Perry Process achieved its immediate goal of resolving suspicion 
concerning North Korea’s nuclear facilities and stopping North Korea’s missile 
launches, its greater benefit was broader and longer-term. This was evident in the 
agreement to replace the Armistice Treaty in the U.S.-North Korean joint 
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communiqué. While previous U.S. policies were geared toward short-term goals such 
as resolving the nuclear and missile issues, the Perry Process expanded Korean 
peninsula issues to include a larger and long-term goal of achieving a permanent peace 
regime in the region.521 From a South Korean perspective, the key to such alliance 
cooperation lay in the fact that the Perry Report fit nicely with “the operating 
principles of the Sunshine policy.”522 Around the inter-Korean summit in 2000, South 
Korean Minister of Unification Park Jae Kyu frequently met U.S. Ambassador 
Thomas Hubbard to review the progress of inter-Korean contacts and negotiations. 
After the summit, President Kim also dispatched his senior secretary for foreign affairs 
and national security to brief President Clinton on the summit. In this way, the inter-
Korean summit meeting also “justified and buttressed Clinton’s own engagement 
policy toward North Korea.”523 
 As one senior South Korean official at the Ministry of Unification recalled, 
there existed “a virtuous circle or a mutually reinforcing dynamic between inter-
Korean ties and US-Korean alliance ties, and the Perry report was the best illustration 
of such a link.”524 One long-time watcher of U.S.-Korean relations also notes that the 
Clinton administration’s support for the sunshine policy and the inter-Korean summit 
were such that it opened “the best period in U.S.-South Korean relations.”525 The 
enhanced alliance coordination between the United States and South Korea led to the 
establishment of a broader, trilateral institutional mechanism for alliance coordination 
that included Japan. 
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The Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG) 
 For alliance coordination, Japan’s ultimately abandoned decision to withdraw 
from KEDO was a blessing in disguise. Japan’s threat compelled the United States and 
South Korea to conclude that to deal effectively with North Korea a high-level 
trilateral coordinating mechanism was necessary.526 In April 1999, the United States, 
Japan, and South Korea established the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group 
(TCOG) for the specific purpose of discussing and coordinating the implementation 
strategy of the Perry Process among the three Asian allies. 
 As a regular consultation mechanism among allies, the TCOG was further 
institutionalized in several ways. First, it held numerous meetings by senior-level 
government officials to coordinate their specific policies on North Korea. At the 
ministerial-level, foreign ministers of the three allies also held separate meetings on 
the North Korean question and other regional security issues. Finally, Presidents 
Clinton, Kim Dae-jung, and Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi held a trilateral summit 
meeting in September in Auckland, New Zealand in 1999.527 Rather than merely 
reflecting a particular U.S. policy on North Korea, the Perry report grew out of the 
burgeoning institutional mechanisms and practices of trilateral coordination.528 As a 
result, the institutionalization of the TCOG was remarkably swift. In the first eighteen 
months after its establishment, the group held fourteen meetings.529 Through the 
process, the TCOG significantly improved alliance coordination. 
 Aside from policy coordination among U.S. allies, the TCOG promoted 
alliance cooperation in a way that went beyond the traditional pattern of parallel 
bilateral channels between the U.S.-Japan and the U.S.-South Korean alliances, with 
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the United States serving as the hub. As one Japanese expert assessed it, the trilateral 
cooperation on the North Korean question at the time was “the most commendable 
achievement” precisely because traditionally the long-held enmity between Japan and 
South Korea prevented such a close working relationship among the three allies.530 
Due in large part to persistent anti-Japanese sentiments, South Korean leaders had 
traditionally kept a certain distance from Japan hroughout the Cold War period. 
Hence, cooperation between the two U.S. allies had been lukewarm at best, leaving the 
U.S. to deal bilaterally with each alliance partner, rather than seeking a NATO-like 
region-wide alliance mechanism covering all three. 
 During this period, however, South Korea’s bilateral ties with Japan were 
improving rapidly, as evidenced in President Kim’s decision to allow the imports of 
previously restricted Japanese cultural products to South Korea.531 At the 1998 summit 
between Prime Minister Obuchi and South Korean President Kim Dae-jung, the two 
leaders announced the “Japan-Republic of Korea Partnership Toward the 21st Century 
Declaration.” The declaration aimed to “formalize security consultative meetings, 
acknowledge greater defense-official exchanges, and sanction bilateral security 
dialogues expressly, as a way to create a more stable security relationship.”532 As the 
Perry Process yielded positive outcomes in October 1999, Japan and South Korea 
agreed to have a regular dialogue on regional security at their ministerial talks.533 In 
his April 2000 summit in Tokyo, President Kim conveyed to Japanese Prime Minister 
Yasuhiro Mori that cooperation with Japan was conducive to peace on the Korean 
Peninsula and expressed his strong support for Japan’s normalization efforts with 
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North Korea.534 The TCOG heralded a new pattern of alliance cooperation by enabling 
“the extension and deepening of security dialogue beyond the relatively narrow 
purview of the respective bilateral alliance networks.” In this way, some expected that 
the TCOG would serve as a mechanism to “[transform] the current system of bilateral 
arrangements into a more open web of security relations.”535 
 Overall, trilateral alliance cooperation during the Perry Process “harmonized 
the U.S.’s proliferation concern, South Korea’s sunshine policy and Japan’s wary 
stance toward North Korea”536 in a synergistic way. For the first time since the 
formation of U.S. alliance system, the Perry Process enabled Japan and South Korea to 
play “an enhanced role as security contributors, rather than security consumers, under 
the respective bilateral alliances.”537 While jointly helping defuse the crisis on the 
peninsula, the Perry Process opened room for alliance members to pursue their own 
regional roles. Through the process of close coordination, South Korea’s efforts 
toward inter-Korean reconciliation came to fruition in the form of the first inter-
Korean summit in 2000, while Japan restarted its own initiative to normalize its 
diplomatic ties with North Korea. The compatibility between the U.S. approach 
toward North Korea and the regional initiatives in turn contributed significantly to 
alliance coordination during the Perry Process. 
4-4. East Asian Regionalism during the Perry Process 
 Along with alliance cooperation in the region, the Clinton administration’s 
approach toward the North Korean issue facilitated greater regional cooperation. 
Compared to Europe, regionalism in East Asia has traditionally been characterized as 
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underinstitutionalized and underperforming.538 Asia’s open regionalism in the 
economic realm was also widely attributed to the prevalent role of the United States in 
the region.539 During the Perry Process, however, a new pattern of expanded 
regionalism emerged in security aspects as well. As the Perry Process ensured regional 
consultation and promoted regional attempts to engage North Korea, externally-
shaped regional roles, as U.S. allies or partners, for instance, did not conflict with 
internally-shaped role conceptions as major regional players sought to redefine their 
relationship with North Korea. In other words, a region-wide pursuit of greater 
regional roles in multilateral regional settings coexisted comfortably with the renewed 
U.S. attention to East Asia in general and the North Korean question in particular. As 
a result, unlike earlier calls for exclusive Asian regionalism such as the East Asian 
Economic Caucus,540 regionalism in this period took a more expansive form, 
simultaneously benefiting alliance coordination and broader regional cooperation 
among East Asian countries. 
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The ASEAN Plus Three (APT) and Other Regional Frameworks 
 More specifically, in November 1998, at the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) 
summit in Vietnam, South Korean President Kim Dae-jung proposed a plan to 
establish the East Asian Vision Group (EAVG) to facilitate regionalism in economic 
and security aspects. A year later in October 1999 in Seoul, China, Japan, and South 
Korea, along with members of the Association of Southeast Asian nations (ASEAN), 
formally launched EAVG. It was through EAVG that the idea of the East Asia Summit 
was first developed and extended.541 The group held five meetings between 1999 and 
2001 and delivered its report to the 2001 ASEAN Plus Three (APT) meeting in 
Brunei. The Report “envisions East Asia moving from a region of nations to a bona 
fide regional community where collective efforts are made for peace, prosperity and 
progress.”542 As an institutional mechanism, the report also recommended the 
development of the annual summit of ASEAN Plus Three (APT) into the East Asian 
Summit and the establishment of an East Asian Forum, including Track I and II 
mechanisms, with the goal of providing an institutional channel for broad exchanges 
and cooperation.543 
 Coupled with South Korea’s efforts for EAVG activities, the 2000 inter-
Korean summit facilitated regional cooperation in a more systematic fashion. At the 
November 2000 APT meeting in Singapore, for instance, leaders of China, Japan, and 
South Korea “agreed to make 2002 the year of people’s exchanges and to hold annual 
trilateral summits.”544 Along with its normalization efforts, in July 2000, Japan added 
a regional dimension to inter-Korean relations by persuading ASEAN members to 
invite North Korea into the activities of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).545 
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During these positive regional developments, the United States and China were able to 
adopt “reinforcing policies in support of further Korean cooperation.”546 The 
transformation of inter-Korean relations also provided an opening for a new regional 
security structure in which U.S. alliances continued to flourish, “but in a way that 
China can live with.”547 
 This regional trend was particularly beneficial for the Chinese leadership, 
given the widely-shared view in Beijing that China’s regional status was contingent on 
the state of Sino-American relations and that the key factor behind the relationship is 
the “compatibility of strategic interests with” the United States.548 If the United States 
prevailed in a military contingency on the Korean Peninsula with China on the 
sidelines, it would expose “China’s inability to parry U.S. post-cold war international 
dominance even in Beijing’s own front yard.”549 Similarly, China’s regional influence 
would be seriously tested if the United States transformed its relations with North 
Korea without China’s active participation in the process. In this context, the Perry 
Process served as a useful channel for the Chinese to coordinate their approach with 
the United States on North Korea. As one U.S. Asia expert noted at the time, it was 
remarkable that the Chinese government was able to maintain “working level U.S.-
PRC consultations” amid rising tensions between the United States and China and the 
widespread anti-American sentiments among the Chinese public in the wake of the 
NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade550 and the publication of the Cox 
Report accusing China of espionage on military technologies in 1999. 
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 The compatibility between the U.S. and China on the question of North Korea 
led to China’s reevaluation of the regional security environment. In his August 2000 
speech, China’s U.N. ambassador, Sha Zhu Kang, observed, “The overall situation in 
the Asia-Pacific region is moving towards relaxation. [North Korea] is improving its 
relations with the United States, Japan and other Western countries. It remains the 
main trend in the region to enhance dialogue and mutual understanding, build 
confidence and to solve problems through consultation.”551 In his 2000 visit to Japan, 
Prime Minister Zhu Rongji changed China’s traditional position and agreed to have a 
friendly exchange of naval vessels between the Chinese People Liberation Army and 
Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Forces.552 Speaking in 2001, Chinese Foreign Minister 
Tang Jiaxuan also declared that the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), which includes 
not only East Asian countries but also the United States, was “the most important 
venue in the Asia Pacific region for the discussion of regional security issues.” 
 With growing confidence in their regional role, Chinese leaders began to offer 
various proposals for regional framework at the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) meetings. 
At the 2000 APT meetings in Singapore, Chinese premier Zhu Rongji suggested that 
the ASEAN Plus Three be turned into a key channel of East Asia regional cooperation, 
and Japanese Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori and South Korean President Kim Dae Jung 
agreed to enhance trilateral cooperation on a variety of issues.553 From that point on, 
the leaders of China, Japan, and South Korea have met separately at the APT annual 
meetings, setting a new pattern of trilateral regional consultation. The Japanese also 
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grew more confident in its regional role and participated more actively in multilateral 
regional frameworks. 
 As regional cooperation deepened, North Korean diplomats were also very 
actively engaging that country’s neighbors in East Asia. According to South Korea’s 
National Intelligence Service (NIS) report, in 1999 North Korean officials made 222 
overseas visits, a sharp increase from 99 visits in 1997, including several high profile 
visits to Beijing. In June 1999, for instance, a delegation headed by North Korea’s 
nominal head of state Kim Young Nam made an official visit to China, the first of this 
kind since Kim Jong Il’s rise to power in 1994.554 During this visit, Chinese President 
Jiang Zemin reportedly extended “China’s blessing to [North Korea] to improve 
relations with the United States, Japan and the European Union (EU),” which the 
North Koreans pursued through multiple dialogues with those countries.555 In May 
2000, a month before the inter-Korean summit, Kim Jong Il himself made his first 
visit to Beijing since the end of the Cold War. This trip rebuilt China’s estranged 
relations with North Korea during the early 1990s, after China opened diplomatic 
relationship with South Korea. 
Broadening Regionalism and a Multi-layered Regional Order 
 What was significant during this period was that a region-wide search for 
greater regional roles was in line with the U.S. willingness to utilize multilateral 
security dialogues. Given U.S. power and influence in the region, this regional pursuit 
did not represent a wholesale dismantling of the traditional U.S.-centered hub-and-
spokes regional security structure. As the three East Asian countries expressed greater 
interest in broadened regionalism, the United States also showed a growing acceptance 
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of East Asian regionalism and efforts to expand the bilateral alliance mechanism into 
broader multilateral regional frameworks. For instance, Kurt Campbell, then deputy 
assistant secretary of defense in the Clinton administration, promoted the concept of 
“mini-lateralism,” issue-specific, ad-hoc small multilateral security mechanisms (e.g., 
KEDO and the TCOG), as a steppingstone toward a more institutionalized 
multilateralism.556  
 U.S. interest in multilateral regional frameworks permitted the regional 
countries to go beyond the traditional bilateral focus anchored to alliance ties or 
special partnerships with the United States. As a result, the regional countries 
envisioned a broadened, multi-layered regional order encompassing both existing 
institutional arrangements and new ones. In Japan, the multi-tiered regional order had 
four components. While the core of the order remained the U.S.-Japan alliance, other 
arrangements expanded outward to include case-by-case, ad hoc groupings for specific 
regional issues such as KEDO and the TCOG (second tier), broader regional 
frameworks for security dialogue (third tier), and similar frameworks for non-security 
issues such as economic cooperation (fourth tier) .557 A Japanese ministry of foreign 
affairs official characterized the concept of multi-layered order as “something beyond 
the hitherto hub-and-spoke,” and later, Japan’s 2002 Diplomatic Bluebook specifically 
referred to the “promotion of multi-layered regional cooperation in the Asia-Pacific” 
as a major agenda for Japanese foreign policy.558 
 While differing on specifics, the Chinese were also thinking about a new 
regional security architecture that had several dimensions. Guarding against the 
strengthened U.S.-Japan alliance, the Chinese government called for a new security 
arrangement based on several pillars, which included “a concert of major powers” in 
                                                
556 Chung, “Solving the Security Puzzle in Northeast Asia,” p. 401. 
557 Kuniko Ashizawa, “Japan’s approach toward Asian regional security: from ‘hub-and-spoke’ 
bilateralism to ‘multi-tiered,” The Pacific Review, Vol. 16, No. 3, 2003, p. 364. 
558 Ibid., p. 376. 
 146 
the region (e.g., the United States, China, Japan, and Russia), “ad hoc coalitions on 
specific issues” (e.g., the North Korean nuclear issue), “existing security alliances,” 
(e.g., U.S. regional alliances), and “regional or subregional mechanisms” (e.g., the 
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the ASEAN Plus Three (APT)).559 From a 
Chinese perspective, as long as the U.S. alliance system focused more on engagement 
than on containment vis-à-vis China, Beijing would be willing to “live with it and 
even work with it on certain issues of common interest” such as peace and stability on 
the Korean Peninsula.560 Similarly in South Korea, scholars observed that “a 
multilayered, multi-dimensional forum of bilateral, trilateral, quadrilateral, and 
multilateral security dialogues” would play a useful supplementary role for the 
traditional bilateral security structure.561 
 All in all, a new pattern of expanded regionalism grew out of the Perry Process 
in the form of broadened regional security frameworks and the gradual embrace of a 
multi-layered regional order. This outcome was possible because the Clinton 
administration’s approach during the Perry Process did not force regional actors to 
choose between U.S.-centered roles and internally-shaped roles. Instead, both external 
and internal regional roles were made largely congruent and mutually reinforcing. 
This was particularly beneficial for the Japanese who were keen on maintaining the 
combination of U.S.-Japan relations on the one hand and regional cooperation on the 
other.562 The Perry Process enabled and promoted Japan’s dual role as alliance partner 
and regional player active in various multilateral regional venues. 
 In South Korea, the Kim Dae-jung government was able to actively reach out 
to its neighbors. Along with South Korea’s aforementioned diplomatic overture to 
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Japan, in July 1999, for instance, South Korean Defense Minister Cho Sung-tae visited 
Beijing for the first time as South Korean defense chief and launched the first defense 
ministerial meeting with his Chinese counterpart. In January 2000, Chinese Defense 
Minister Chi Haotian made a return visit to Seoul, a symbolically significant chain of 
events given that China not only fought the Korean War against South Korea but still 
remains the only military ally of North Korea.563 All along, however, South Korea’s 
alliance ties with the United States remained strong. 
 For the Chinese as well, the Perry Process was conducive to a greater regional 
role, while at the same time helping it to improve its ties with the United States. 
Although emphasizing multipolarity to overcome the U.S.-centered order, the real 
focus for the Chinese was on “a strategic partnership or condominium with the United 
States in which it is one of two co-managers of Asian security.”564 Chinese experts 
have generally confirmed this view with their hope for the United States to actively 
participate in regional frameworks.565 In this regard, the Perry Process closely 
approximated their preferred regional roadmap, with a greater potential for promoting 
regional cooperation and enhancing regional stability. Echoing China’s expectations, 
William Perry, in his collaborative work with Ashton Carter, calls for cooperative 
relations between the U.S. and China based on what they term “preventive defense.” 
Contrary to a containment policy, which would prevent China from playing a greater 
role on the global scene, in this view, preventive defense “encourages Chinese 
participation and influence,” in a region where Sino-U.S. cooperation on the Korean 
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issue can serve as a model for cooperation on broader East Asian security issues in the 
future.566 
4-5. Conclusion 
 As the East Asian countries sought to enhance their regional roles by changing 
their terms of engagement with North Korea, the renewed crisis on the Korean 
Peninsula in 1998 was particularly alarming. Mounting tension from North Korea had 
serious implications for neighbors who prized regional stability. On the surface, the 
growing threat from North Korea and its regional consequences seemed to preoccupy 
the minds of regional leaders. In the midst of a nation-wide crisis after the 1997 
financial crisis, the Kim Dae-jung government in Seoul was deeply concerned about 
the emerging crisis on its borders. The same was true for Beijing’s third generation 
leaders, who above all needed a stable regional environment conducive to its 
economic growth. In fact, this is why, after the first North Korean nuclear crisis, the 
Chinese deemed the U.S.-led Agreed Framework “essential to peace and stability on 
the Korean peninsula and therefore vital to China’s national security interests.”567 
However, the 1998 missile crisis had the biggest impact on Japan, intensifying a 
heightened sense of threat from North Korea. 
 If increased threat perception vis-à-vis North Korea was the sole determinant 
of regional behavior, we would expect the rise of alliance and/or regional mechanisms 
tailored specifically to reduce tension on the Korean Peninsula. Until the perceived 
threat from North Korea subsided, region-wide efforts to enhance regional roles by 
engaging North Korea would be put on hold. Despite an increase in the perceived 
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threat and the domestic uproar against North Korea, however, the Japanese 
government soon resumed contacts with North Korea for negotiations. Even before the 
North Koreans announced their decision on the missile moratorium, Prime Minister 
Keizo Obuchi reaffirmed his willingness to improve ties with North Korea.568 Rather 
than building an ad hoc regional framework to address the North Korean threat, 
regional countries called for broader regional frameworks that would include North 
Korea. Throughout the 1998 missile crisis, China’s participation in the Four Party 
Talks continued because of its desire “to play a positive and even-handed role in 
diplomatic activities relevant to the Korean Peninsula.”569 South Korea’s engagement 
policy toward North Korea persisted. 
 As evidenced in this chapter, regional initiatives toward North Korea continued 
and made progress due in no small measure to constructive U.S. leadership under the 
Perry Process, which enabled the regional countries to pursue their internally-shaped 
regional roles without damaging externally-shaped regional roles. As the Perry 
Process ensured congruence between external and internal role conceptions, alliance 
ties expanded and regional cooperation proliferated. This regional development in turn 
reinforced the regional efforts to engage North Korea. The virtuous circle between the 
U.S. and regional approaches not only helped to reduce the tension on the Korean 
Peninsula but also shaped a cooperative regional order in East Asia. 
 Ezra Vogel, a long-time watcher of Asian politics, names KEDO and the Perry 
Process models for regional cooperation. He singles out the Perry Process as an 
epitome of “what [the U.S.] can do when [the U.S. administration has] high high-level 
leadership that goes about Asian policy on a very systematic basis.”570 In his analysis 
of North Korean behavior, Victor Cha also points to the Perry Process as a successful 
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example of getting “North Korea out of the domain of losses and into a situation 
where it had a stake in the status quo.”571 Instead of boxing North Korea into corner 
through coercive rhetoric and hostile policies, the Perry recommendations offered 
North Korea an incentive to work with the United States and eventually helped the 
North to agree on the Joint Communiqué between the United States and North Korea 
and a missile moratorium. However, a larger benefit from the Perry Process was its 
contribution to the regional order. The United States began the process by 
regionalizing the North Korean question through alliance coordination at the TCOG 
on the one hand and consultation with regional actors including China on the other. 
 Writing in the wake of the inter-Korean summit, Kent Calder predicted that the 
combination of broader regional cooperation on the Korean Peninsula and the 
formalized trilateral alliance coordination via the Perry process would serve as “an 
institutional basis for the new geopolitics.”572 Moreover, the fact that China had been 
supportive of trilateral coordination on North Korea represented a new development in 
the region, with implications for the regional security order centered mainly on U.S. 
alliances.573 One regional expert even predicted at the time that it would be virtually 
impossible for the new U.S. administration to go against the wishes of the regional 
countries as long as the U.S. hoped to maintain regional leadership and influence.574 
William Perry himself maintained that the approach recommended in his report “must 
be sustained into the future, beyond the term of this Administration.”575 
 Unfortunately, his recommendation was not realized. In 1999, expressing 
concerns about tough measures by a Republican administration, a North Korean 
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Foreign Ministry spokesman lamented the situation where North Korea was about to 
“make a momentous decision on its missile program when the present U.S. 
administration has only one year left.”576 With George W. Bush in the Oval Office, the 
North Korean concern proved to be prescient and things changed dramatically. Bush’s 
unstated policy of “anything but Clinton’s” on North Korea stalled the regional 
momentum and upset South Korean President Kim Dae-jung who had helped open the 
way for the process of regional coordination and consultation as part of his sunshine 
policy. His 2001 summit with President Bush was regarded in South Korea as a 
diplomatic disaster, portending a difficult period ahead between the two allies. 
 At a private meeting with Secretary Albright in November 2002, when the 
second North Korean crisis began to intensify on the Korean peninsula, President Kim 
Dae-jung expressed to Albright his frustration indirectly: “We had our best chance for 
a breakthrough in the last days of your administration. You understood the situation 
here and how much was at stake. You devoted your full energy. I will always be 
grateful to you and President Clinton for the support you gave.”577 In her own 
interview, Albright also bemoaned the consequences of the Bush policy toward North 
Korea: 
Just imagine what would have happened if the Bush administration had picked 
up the hand of cards that we left on the table six year ago. In these six years, 
the North Koreans have been able to develop enough material to have eight to 
ten nuclear weapons whereas when we left it was one or two.578 
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 This is a particularly unfortunate development, given recent reports about the 
possibility of intelligence hype on North Korea’s enriched uranium program,579 which 
sparked the second crisis. A more ominous consequence of the Bush administration’s 
approach toward North Korea, however, is regional: a worsened regional order and 
weakened U.S. influence in East Asia. The next chapter examines the nature of the 
East Asian order during the Bush presidency. 
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Effort,” New York Times, March 1, 2007. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: 
The Bush Doctrine and the East Asian Security Order, 2001-2006 
5-1. Introduction 
 With its doctrine of preemption and regime change applied to the ongoing War 
in Iraq, the Bush administration has transformed the regional security structure in the 
Middle East, including a dramatic change in the balance of power between Arab 
countries and Iran on the one hand and between the Sunnis and the Shiites on the 
other. While not to an equal extent, that doctrine has reshaped the regional order in 
East Asia as well. In predicting the regional impact of the Bush Doctrine in East Asia, 
Michael Mastanduno observed that the U.S. global strategy, coupled with “other 
developments,” may result in “the transformation of the East Asian security 
architecture” underpinning regional stability throughout and in the aftermath of the 
Cold War era.580 As Jonathan Pollack writes, the dramatic change in U.S. policy 
toward North Korea had “larger policy consequences that have redefined the East 
Asian political and security landscape.”581 
 Exploring how the Bush administration’s approach has transformed the East 
Asian order is the main objective of this chapter. As with Chapter Four, I do so by 
looking closely at two regional dimensions: alliance politics and regionalism. 
Compared to the Clinton administration during the Perry Process, the Bush 
administration has shown little respect for a region-wide yearning for expanding 
regional roles by redefining relations with North Korea. The global priority of 
countering proliferation was implemented without due consideration of such role 
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conceptions. As a result, there existed no mutually reinforcing mechanism between 
externally-shaped and internally-shaped regional roles. The hard line U.S. approach 
during this period also affected domestic debates about proper regional roles in each 
country, especially in Japan where the emergence of revisionists served to worsen the 
regional environment. By intensifying role conflict and helping domestic groups “re-
nationalize” the North Korean challenge, the Bush administration transformed the 
regional order in two ways: a narrowed, exclusive alliance structure and weakened 
regionalism. 
 The chapter proceeds in the following way. The next section examines how the 
Bush administration’s approach toward North Korea has interacted with regional role 
conceptions in China, Japan, and South Korea to intensify role conflict. The 
subsequent two sections explore the impact of the role conflict prompted by the Bush 
Doctrine on alliance politics and regionalism in East Asia. In brief, during the second 
North Korean nuclear crisis, America’s alliance mechanisms in East Asia have been 
strained, as the United States and South Korea struggled over the North Korean 
question and South Korea’s relations with China markedly improved. As a 
consequence, the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG) among the 
United States, Japan, and South Korea ceased to function and disappeared altogether. 
The presence of role conflict also made regional cooperation among East Asian 
countries more difficult. As different domestic groups tried to “re-nationalize” the 
North Korean issue, the initially cooperative regionalism was difficult to sustain. The 
final section concludes with a brief summary of findings. 
5-2. Regional Role Conceptions during the Bush Presidency 
 The prolonged controversy of and the ultimate victory of George W. Bush in 
the 2000 presidential election dashed the last hope of President Clinton’s Pyongyang 
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visit. With his well-known objection to the Clinton administration’s foreign policy 
agenda,582 President Bush was in no mood to continue the momentum toward U.S.-
North Korean reconciliation. Sensing a wind of change in the U.S. approach toward 
North Korea, South Korean President Kim Dae-Jung wasted little time in his efforts to 
persuade his U.S. counterpart to endorse the sunshine policy of engagement and 
continue regional reconciliation. In March 2001, President Kim became the first Asian 
leader to meet President Bush when he made a hurried visit to Washington.583 
President Kim’s personal plea for a speedy U.S.-North Korean deal, however, failed to 
change Bush’s thinking, and he expressed deep skepticism toward Kim Jong Il and 
strong reservations about negotiation with North Korea. 
 The Bush administration’s dramatic about-face on North Korea is vividly 
captured in a rare diplomatic flip-flop involving U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell. 
As President Kim was arriving in Washington for the summit, Powell initially 
expressed his willingness to “pick up where President Clinton and administration left 
off” on the North Korean question. As soon as Powell’s view was reported in the news 
media, conservative members of the Bush administration, most notably Vice President 
Dick Cheney and National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, immediately took 
issue with Powell’s assessment and forced Powell to correct his earlier remark with 
the following statement: 
we are undertaking a full review of our relationship with North Korea, coming 
up with policies that build on the past, coming up with policies unique to the 
administration, the other things we want to see put on the table . . .  
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583 Lee, A Troubled Peace, p. 212. 
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[Despite the expectation that] imminent negotiations are about to begin, that is 
not the case.584 
With this public rejection of early dialogue with North Korea, President Kim’s 
attempts at persuading President Bush to join the regional drive to engage North Korea 
failed, in what the South Korean media called “a diplomatic disaster.” 
 Even prior to the second North Korean nuclear crisis, the Bush 
administration’s policy toward North Korea was on a collision course with the 
regional current surrounding the Korean Peninsula. A few months after the summit 
between South Korean President Kim Dae-Jung and President Bush, a much-
anticipated U.S. policy review, issued in June 2001, set the tone for a difficult time 
ahead. It laid out a set of new conditions for political reconciliation between the 
United States and North Korea. While the Clinton administration’s policy on North 
Korea complemented and reinforced South Korea’s sunshine policy of engagement, 
the Bush administration’s policy review was “the anti-thesis of the Clinton policy,” 
creating friction between the two allies.585 While the review stressed the importance of 
close cooperation with South Korea and Japan, references to the Perry Report or the 
U.S.-North Korea Joint Communiqué were nowhere to be found.586 Then in his 2002 
State of the Union address, President Bush went further and included North Korea in 
the “axis of evil,” effectively sealing off any road to reconciliation between the United 
States and North Korea. 
 The speech stirred up anger among South Koreans. They viewed it as a U.S. 
tactic of “dragging them into unnecessary conflict with Pyongyang and sabotaging 
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President Kim Dae-jung’s efforts to engage Pyongyang.”587 South Korea’s 
ambassador to the United States, Yang Sung Chul, publicly questioned the validity of 
the speech in an interview: “as a result of the persistent pursuit of the sunshine policy, 
the tension level on the Korean Peninsula is at an all time low.” Referring to President 
Bush’s scheduled visit to Seoul in February 2002, he further demanded, “we expect he 
will clear up this lack of clarity on the issue.”588 Reactions from the South Korean 
public were equally negative. A Gallup poll surveyed in February 2002 revealed that 
in a radical shift from previous surveys, only one-third of respondents expressed 
favorable views of the United States, while 60 percent of respondents viewed the 
United States unfavorably. Moreover, 62 percent deemed the axis of evil speech “an 
excessive statement to escalate tensions in the Korean peninsula.”589 
 In Japan, even as Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s support for the U.S. in 
Afghanistan and Iraq dramatically enhanced Japan’s alliance ties with the United 
States, others called for an “Asian diplomacy as a base and South Korea as the entry 
point.”590 Given South Korea’s reconciliation policy toward North Korea and its calls 
for others to follow suit, Japan’s own efforts to engage North Korea were thought to 
have the potential to elevate Japan’s regional status. In this regard, Koizumi’s plan of 
direct diplomatic negotiations with North Korea was widely perceived as “a break out 
from the old security arrangement” with the United States.591 
 Even after U.S. Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly briefed South Korea 
and Japan about North Korea’s alleged enriched uranium program, the two 
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governments did not slow down their efforts to engage North Korea. While the Kim 
Dae-Jung government in South Korea proceeded with its planned ministerial talks 
with the North, the Koizumi government in Japan forged ahead with a resumption of 
normalization talks.592 Taken aback by the Japan-North Korean summit, the Bush 
administration proceeded with the much-delayed official visit to North Korea by an 
official delegation led by Kelly less than a month later. Instead of discussing issues of 
political reconciliation and exchanges, however, Kelly, under the instruction of 
hawkish officials in Washington, confronted his North Korean counterpart with the 
accusation that North Korea was pursuing an enriched uranium program. The first 
official meeting between Bush administration officials and their North Korean 
counterparts was turned into a cause of rapidly developing tension between the United 
States and North Korea. After a few weeks of delay, the revelation of North Korea’s 
violation of the Agreed Framework was made public in November 2002, putting the 
Korean Peninsula at the center of another nuclear crisis. 
 By the end of 2002, the crisis intensified in a dangerous action-reaction 
dynamic between the United States and North Korea. In November 2002, the Bush 
administration suspended delivery of heavy fuel oil to North Korea and soon 
effectively ended the implementation of the Agreed Framework. Undeterred, the 
North Koreans opted to worsen the situation by expelling U.N. inspectors from North 
Korea and resuming the processing of spent fuel rods. As the year 2003 dawned, the 
situation became even tenser. In April 2003, North Korea became the first country 
ever to withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). While launching 
the War in Iraq in March 2003, the Bush administration also dispatched military 
reinforcements to the vicinity of the Korean Peninsula and made it clear that the 
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United States, if necessary, would be willing to deal simultaneously with two different 
regional contingencies. 
The Bush Doctrine and Role Conflict in East Asia 
 Given the region-wide yearning for greater regional roles and the salience of 
North Korea in each nation’s regional vision, the Bush administration’s approach in 
the wake of the second crisis was problematic for the regional actors. Faced with the 
possibility of a military confrontation between the United States and North Korea, 
countries in East Asia quickly moved to dampen the mounting tension on the Korean 
Peninsula. After hosting the unsuccessful three party talks in April 2003, the Chinese 
government engaged in an unprecedented level of shuttle diplomacy across the region 
and played a vital role in realizing the Six Party talks, participated in by all the 
regional players. Long aspiring to join such a regional mechanism on the Korean 
Peninsula, Japan soon became an active participant and “worked with South Korea to 
nudge the Bush administration towards negotiations with North Korea.”593 As 
discussed later in the chapter, the common understanding of North Korea as a regional 
platform and the collective regional response to the Bush administration initially 
helped facilitate regionalism. 
 The regional efforts failed to cohere, however, as the Bush administration’s 
approach affected East Asian domestic politics. Despite the regional call for greater 
flexibility toward North Korea, the United States continued to insist on the complete, 
verifiable, and irreversible dismantling (CVID) of North Korea’s nuclear programs 
prior to any discussion on various bilateral issues between the United States and North 
Korea. The inflexible U.S. position prompted an equally hostile reaction from North 
Korea, with the Six Party processes arriving at stalemate by the end of 2004. 
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 One of the most decisive and immediate consequences of the unfolding crisis 
and the Bush administration’s approach toward North Korea was a loss of the regional 
momentum generated since the Perry Process. As the Bush administration moved to 
turn the Six Party Talks into a unified front against North Korea, efforts to enhance 
internally-shaped regional roles such as Koizumi’s normalization drive and South 
Korea’s engagement policy could not continue. The situation seriously undermined 
South Korean President Roh Moo Hyun’s plan to expand Kim Dae-Jung’s sunshine 
policy and turn South Korea into a “hub” of regional cooperation in East Asia.594 To 
change the tide of the emerging crisis on its borders, the South Korean government 
proposed a gradual and reciprocal approach aimed at achieving North Korea’s 
denuclearization in exchange for security assurances and economic assistance by the 
regional actors.595 
 As President Roh himself described them, South Korean efforts at crisis 
resolution were rooted in South Korea’s broader regional vision of establishing “a 
Northeast Asian community through a new regional order of cooperation and 
integration that transcends old antagonisms and conflicts among countries in this 
region” and “[linking] the resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue to the 
establishment of a peace regime” on the Korean Peninsula and regional cooperation.596 
The South Korean regional vision, however, was difficult to realize in the face of 
President Bush’s constant warnings about North Korea’s nuclear ambitions and 
“prison camps the size of whole cities” in North Korea. Still, the Roh government 
continued with its joint industrial project with North Korea in the North Korean city of 
Kaesung. President Roh even made an analogy between South Korea’s policy toward 
North Korea and Abraham Lincoln’s policy on slavery by suggesting that Lincoln was 
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“slow in liberating the slaves” because he put the unity of the nation ahead of all other 
priorities.597 
 Along with the call for national unity, the Roh government also sought “to 
move the center stage of Korean diplomacy to Northeast Asia”598 and, in the process, 
to redefine South Korea’s role in the region. On the day of his inauguration, President 
Roh met with Secretary of State Powell to make a strong plea for a multilateral 
approach on the North Korean issue. Roh also urged Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi 
to continue his efforts to normalize diplomatic relations with North Korea, while 
encouraging China’s constructive role at the UN Security Council over the North 
Korean issue.599 However, the Bush administration was determined to push for U.S.-
directed regional roles for East Asian countries, calling for concerted pressures to 
isolate North Korea. This put an added difficulty on the South Koreans already torn 
between “the nationalistic bond between the two Koreas and the alliance security bond 
between the United States and South Korea.”600 
 The Bush administration’s push for U.S.-directed roles was more blunt in 
Japan. US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, in his meeting with then 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) Secretary General Abe Shinzo, declared, “the 
Japanese-American alliance is going after North Korea.”601 The U.S. framing of Japan 
as a regional ally jointly targeting North Korea put the Japanese in a difficult position 
since they wanted to maintain a degree of autonomy in their alliance relationship and 
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wished not to be held hostage to U.S. global strategy.602 Morimoto Satoshi, a Japanese 
adviser to the government on foreign policy and security affairs, described Japan’s 
dilemma in the following observation: 
[There is] the clear emergence of the United States’ unilateralism as the sole 
superpower and the increasing domination and hegemony in its interaction 
with other countries . . . We are faced with a difficult challenge: to incorporate 
U.S. unilateralism into broader trends of multilateralism and regionalism, and 
persuade it to act in harmony with them.603 
 Another Japanese expert even went so far as to state that the Bush 
administration was “able to halt the normalization negotiations between Japan and 
[North Korea] and restore US dominance in the resolution of issues on the Korean 
Peninsula.”604 At the outset of the second crisis, Japan’s concern stemmed in part from 
the fear that “a closer alliance relationship would draw them, as the junior partner, into 
supporting a U.S. agenda that would deprive them of their autonomous approach and 
complicate the independent pursuit of their own interests, particularly in Asia.”605 
Instead of following the Bush administration’s approach of refusing to deal with North 
Korea, another Japanese expert has argued for “preserving a framework for 
normalization talks and spearheading a breakthrough in Northeast Asian politics.”606  
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 In China, the Bush administration’s counterproliferation policy and its 
approach toward North Korea was viewed as part of a hegemonic strategy of using 
“military power to impose U.S. interests.”607 The Bush administration’s inflexible 
position toward North Korea and calls for forging an anti-rogue coalition were also 
problematic for the Chinese, since the Six Party talks could serve as “a regional 
framework to prevent China and others from challenging US hegemony.”608 Although 
the immediate post-9/11 period witnessed better Sino-US relations, especially over 
cooperation in fighting terrorism, the Chinese did not conceal their concerns about the 
United States. For instance, Chu Shulong, a senior Chinese expert known for his 
relatively moderate view of U.S.-China relations, points to Chinese worries over a 
wide range of U.S. global and regional policies: among others, U.S. hegemony and 
unilateral behavior, U.S. policy toward North Korea, a leaked US Nuclear Posture 
Review which named China and North Korea, along with five other countries, as 
potential targets against which the United States may use nuclear weapons.609 As such, 
from a Chinese perspective, the Bush administration’s call for China to play the role of 
a responsible stakeholder in dealing with North Korea was difficult to accept. 
 Over time, China’s search for a greater regional role turned to efforts to forge a 
new regional order, one that differs from what the Bush administration had in mind 
with the adoption of the Bush Doctrine. In a marked departure from Deng Xiaoping’s 
motto of “tao guang yang hui” (hide its ambitions and disguise its claws), the Chinese 
began to openly seek the role of “a more substantial player in a region where the 
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United States traditionally holds far more sway.”610 In the face of a unilateral approach 
by the Bush administration, the Chinese also considered regionalism as a tool to 
counterbalance the United States, albeit in a way that is “a more-charming and less-
threatening form of exercising China’s influence.”611 As one Chinese expert bluntly 
puts it, “increasing regionalism is an important way to restrain American 
hegemonism.”612 
 This is an unexpected development because the Chinese, at the outset of the 
second crisis, were more interested in turning the Six Party Talks into a viable regional 
security mechanism. In fact, since the second round of the Six Party Talks in early 
2004, the Chinese delegation at the talks have pushed for the construction of a 
permanent regional security mechanism.613 More broadly, this effort was rooted in a 
region-wide assumption that integrating the U.S. alliances with a broader regional 
mechanism is critical to long-term regional stability. This is why Japan and South 
Korea have sought to balance alliance ties and participation in broader regional 
forums.614 China, for its part, has been seeking a multi-tiered regional order, including 
a concert of major powers, ad hoc coalitions aimed at addressing specific concerns 
such as the Six Party processes over North Korea, existing security alliances, such as 
the U.S.-Japanese alliance, and regional security mechanisms.615 To the extent that the 
U.S.-Japan alliance pursues a policy of engagement and supports regional integration, 
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China would likely be “willing to live with it and even work with it” on various 
regional issues of common interest such as the North Korean challenge.616 
 As the Bush administration forced regional actors to follow its hard line 
approach toward North Korea, they found themselves in a strategic quandary where 
internally-shaped regional roles were to be sacrificed in favor of U.S.-directed roles. 
By insisting on its own stance over North Korea and intensifying role conflict in East 
Asia, the Bush administration made regional efforts to balance relationship with the 
United States and regionalism very difficult. Moreover, by emboldening North Korea 
bashers in each country and influencing domestic coalition dynamics, the Bush 
administration reshaped the regional order in East Asia, especially in alliance politics 
and security regionalism among the regional actors. 
5-3. The Bush Doctrine and Alliance Politics  
 For more than half a century, the United States has served as the backbone of 
regional stability in East Asia. The so-called hub-and-spokes system of its alliances 
with Japan and South Korea have not only maintained the regional status quo but also 
lessened the security dilemma among regional actors. By producing the doctrine of 
preemption and the global posture review (GPR), the Bush administration has charted 
a new course in alliance politics. As demonstrated in various U.S.-led multilateral 
security measures, such as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), more than ever 
before, the United States utilizes ad hoc, fluid coalitions, rather than a permanent, 
fixed alliance mechanism. At the same time, the Bush administration has been eager to 
transform its traditional alliances into a global military pact to address various global 
challenges. This trend stands in a stark contrast to the close alliance coordination 
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between the United States and its two Asian allies in the implementation of the Agreed 
Framework and North Korea’s missile moratorium during the Perry Process.617 
 When the second North Korean crisis erupted, however, there was an 
expectation that the crisis would serve as a useful opportunity for enhancing security 
cooperation between Japan and South Korea and consolidating trilateral alliance 
relationship between the U.S. and its East Asian allies.618 As the Bush Doctrine 
conflicted with the regional approach toward North Korea, such initial expectations 
did not come to fruition. Instead, the crisis has altered the contours of the U.S. East 
Asian alliance system. Overall, the U.S. alliance in East Asia have been losing 
regional focus, with the U.S.-South Korean alliance, until recently, strained over the 
North Korean issue and the U.S.-Japan alliance focusing more on global dimensions. 
In the process, the trilateral cooperation mechanism among the U.S., Japan, and South 
Korea, established under the banner of the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight 
Group (TCOG), faced mounting difficulties and ceased to exist. The task of alliance 
management grew even more difficult as Sino-South Korean security ties increased 
dramatically and South Korea’s Roh Moo Hyun government talked of the role of 
regional balancer. 
 As the Bush administration pushed for putting concerted pressures on North 
Korea and dashed regional efforts to redefine relations with North Korea, South 
Korea’s reactions to the Bush administration’s approach toward North Korea were 
most prompt and decidedly negative. The U.S.-South Korean alliance has been 
“unraveling due to diverging perceptions of the principal threat, coordination problems 
regarding policies toward North Korea,” and what Michael Armacost calls “a 
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significant erosion of public support for the alliance among elites in both countries.”619 
South Korean concern was first and foremost directed at the impact of the Bush 
administration’s approach on inter-Korean relations. Most South Koreans felt that the 
U.S. was “sabotaging North-South interactions.”620 
 The South Koreans in general have deemed President Bush’s policy toward 
North Korea as “aggressive, even hostile, and unaccommodating to South Korea’s 
interests,” sparking anti-U.S. sentiment among the South Korean public. Instead of 
respecting the regional approach, from a South Korean perspective, the Bush 
administration was “trying to project and impose its own understanding and approach 
on others.”621 Similarly, the South Koreans tended to view the Pentagon’s decision to 
reposition and reduce U.S. forces on the Korean peninsula as “punishment” for anti-
American sentiments, further worsening South Korea’s resentment of “the whims of 
U.S. policymakers.”622 In his 2003 meeting with Secretary of State Colin Powell, then 
South Korean Foreign Minister Yoon Young Kwan even warned that if the United 
States were not more forthcoming at the Six Party Talks, the South Korean 
government might not send troops to Iraq.623 Expressing his displeasure, Powell shot 
back, “That is not how allies deal with each other.”624 
 In the immediate aftermath of the second North Korean nuclear crisis, Japan 
played a crucial “mediating role between South Korea and the United States” over the 
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North Korean issue.625 The South Korean government positively assessed Japan’s role 
in “inducing peaceful negotiations between the U.S. and North Korea.”626 For 
instance, during respective bilateral summits with President Bush and South Korean 
President Roh in May and June 2003, Prime Minister Koizumi attempted to “bridge 
the gap between South Korea and the United States,” while using its participation in 
the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG) as a chance to harmonize 
“the disparate views and attitudes of South Korea and the United States.”627 In this 
way, at the beginning of the second crisis, the TCOG offered U.S. Asian allies an 
additional benefit of ensuring that “the United States will not move unilaterally on 
policy toward [North Korea].”628 
The Collapse of the Trilateral Cooperation at the TCOG 
 From its inception in 1999 to September 2004, there were 35 TCOG meetings 
among the three allies.629 The frequency of meetings attests to the level of 
commitment to maintaining intra-alliance dialogue among the Asian allies. As the 
second crisis deepened, however, the TCOG was transformed into an “informal caucus 
among allies” within the broader Six-Party process.630 Despite its significance as the 
first attempt at multilateralism among U.S. allies in the region, especially in the wake 
of the second crisis, growing signs of tension emerged among the three allies in the 
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TCOG meetings. For instance, Lee Soo Hyuck, former South Korean representative at 
the TCOG and the Six Party talks, admitted that there were disagreements on specific 
issues at the TCOG meetings that required the use of “indirect and implicative” 
language in an attempt to paper over the differences.631 
 Even before the outbreak of the second crisis, signs of trouble emerged over 
the apparent inconsistency in U.S. policy toward North Korea. At the January 2002 
TCOG meeting, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly expressed his 
willingness to meet North Korean officials “any time, any place without 
preconditions.” But only four days later, President Bush delivered his axis-of-evil 
speech, effectively nullifying Kelly’s remark and further delaying Kelly’s visit to 
Pyongyang. The three countries also used subsequent meetings in April and 
September 2002 mainly as venues for post-hoc management of South Korea’s special 
envoy’s visit to Pyongyang and Koizumi’s North Korea visit and not as opportunities 
for formulating a coordinated policy toward North Korea. In particular, the 
announcement of Koizumi’s planned Pyongyang trip “took almost everyone by 
surprise, and it underscored how the TCOG was not a forum for discussing such 
sensitive information.”632 
 Soon, the TCOG began to “take on characteristics more of a trilateral 
negotiation process than of a means to coordinate their respective North Korean 
policies.”633 Most importantly, some South Koreans argued that the trilateral meeting 
could be better used to “help soften the Bush team’s harder line.”634 One Japanese 
analyst seemed to agree when he maintained that President Roh Moo Hyun’s emphasis 
on South Korea’s “leadership role” in dealing with the North might be “an attempt to 
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restrain the United States from launching a Bush-style preemptive strike.”635 Not 
surprisingly, the meetings were soon relegated to a channel for covering the gap 
between the allies, particularly between the U.S. call for suspension of the Agreed 
Framework and South Korea’s push for a U.S. nonaggression pledge to North Korea. 
It is in this changing context that the three countries decided to make the trilateral 
meetings informal, dropping the name TCOG altogether. The U.S. State Department 
soon started downplaying the importance of the meetings, simply stating that they are 
“just informal consultations between allies.”636 
South Korea’s Growing Ties with China 
 Another source of concern for alliance management has been an improving 
relationship between South Korea and China. Since the normalization of diplomatic 
ties in 1992, the Chinese and South Korean governments have substantially expanded 
their cooperation in various areas, particularly in economic affairs. Faced with a 
unilateralist U.S. approach toward North Korea, some Koreans have been calling for 
“closer relations with China as providing an attractive counterweight to possible U.S. 
unilateralism on the Korean Peninsula.”637 Trapped between its alliance ties with the 
United States and its efforts to improve relations with North Korea, South Korea may 
indeed find that its best option is to combine “its leverage and influence on North 
Korea with that of China in pursuit of a diplomatic breakthrough.”638 In this way, the 
North Korea crisis has served to shape “a new alignment in East Asia, with China and 
                                                
635 Kurata, “North Korea’s Renewed Nuclear Challenge,” p. 96.  
636 Coordinating regional strategies, pp. 18-19. 
637 Geun Lee, “The Rise of China and Korea’s China Policy,” in Tae-Hyo Kim and Brad Glosserman, 
eds., The Future of U.S.-Korea-Japan Relations: Balancing Values and Interests (Washington, D.C.: 
The CSIS Press, 2004), p. 198. 
638 Scott Snyder, “South Korea’s Squeeze Play,” The Washington Quarterly, 28(4), Autumn 2005, p. 
94. 
 171 
South Korea moving closer toward each other on one side and the United States on the 
other.”639 
 Early signs of South Korea’s deference to China on regional security issues 
date back to March 1994. During the first North Korean nuclear crisis, then South 
Korea’s ambassador to China, Hwang Byung-Tae, caused a stir by saying, 
South Korea-China cooperation over the issue of North Korea’s nuclear 
program should go beyond the current level of simply notifying Beijing what 
has already been decided between Seoul and Washington . . . South Korea’s 
diplomacy should break out of its heavy reliance exclusively on the United 
States.640  
While the South Korean government immediately dismissed his view and the 
ambassador retracted his remark, South Korea’s consideration of China’s regional 
position was clearly on display.641 In the late 1990s, Chinese-South Korean ties further 
improved with regular defense ministerial meetings occurring since August 1999 and 
mutual naval port calls in October 2001 and in May 2002.642 
 After the second North Korean nuclear crisis, China’s proactive role in the Six 
Party processes elevated the relationship between China and South Korea to a new 
level. With the North Korean challenge driving them in a similar direction, both 
governments increasingly “defer to each other’s preferences,” along the way making 
their policies toward North Korea “nearly identical.”643 In fact, many South Korean 
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and Chinese officials observed that “no discernible differences existed between 
themselves as far as the North Korean nuclear issue was concerned.”644 Most of 
Chinese officials and experts I interviewed subscribed to this view.645 The Chinese 
maintain that the ending of the Cold War on the Korean peninsula is “the key to the 
peace of the peninsula” and that a comprehensive partnership between China and 
South Korea is critical to the ending of such cold war tension on the peninsula.646 In a 
November 2005 summit, President Roh Moo Hyun and Chinese President Hu Jintao 
declared that cooperation between the two neighbors had entered “a new stage.” Some 
of the joint agreements at the time included the setting-up of a hotline between their 
foreign ministries, the establishment of a regular discussion channel between vice 
foreign ministers, expansion of military cooperation, and the doubling of bilateral 
trade to $200 billion by 2012.647 
 The positive view of Sino-South Korean relations is widely shared by the 
Chinese policy elites. From a Chinese perspective, the bilateral ties not only prevent 
formation of the “cold war mentality” in the region but also open the way for regional 
cooperation in security and economic areas. In this view, the comprehensive 
partnership between China and South Korea has also “upgraded [South Korea]’s 
political status and influence in the Northeast Asian region immensely,” along the way 
contributing to the summit and the subsequent reconciliation drive between the two 
Koreas.648Amid these developments, a recent report by South Korea’s Presidential 
Commission on Policy Planning called for establishing “an ‘Asian Union’ that would 
include North Korea,” and transforming the status of South Korea “from a [South] 
Korea that is focused on the United States to one focused on Asia, inclusive of both 
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China and North Korea.”649 According to an April 2004 survey of the 204 newly 
elected members of the South Korean National Assembly, 50 percent of the ruling Uri 
party members listed China as South Korea’s most important ally, whereas 42 percent 
chose the United States.650 
 Enhanced China-South Korean ties also meant that South Korea would be “a 
reluctant participant at best in any possible U.S.-led effort to pressure or constrain 
China and that the U.S. ability to establish a future order on the Korean peninsula 
contrary to Chinese interests also will be curbed.”651 In fact, China’s preferred policy 
outcome is inter-Korean reconciliation without unification, or what can be called the 
“status quo plus” outcome: a peaceful coexistence between the two Koreas, ensuring 
not only a stable North Korean regime but “the peninsula being drawn into a Chinese 
sphere of influence.”652 As such, improving inter-Korean reconciliation also puts 
China in an enviable position since China can fully cooperate with South Korea on a 
wide-range of issues while, at the same time, keeping its traditional ties with North 
Korea largely intact.653 All in all, China has taken advantage of difficulties in U.S.-
South Korean relations and moved even closer to Seoul both politically and 
diplomatically, with the potential “to influence the security environment to its 
advantage in a post-unification Korea.”654 
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South Korea’s Regional Balancer Role 
 Alliance tension with South Korea also has implications for broader U.S. 
regional strategy. At a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing, then U.S. 
Commander of the Pacific Command, William Fallon, argued that the U.S.-South 
Korean alliance must adapt to “the changing security environment” represented by 
“China’s military modernization.” By cooperating more closely with the U.S. and 
Japan, he reasoned, South Korea would be able to shift its strategic focus from a North 
Korean contingency to “a more regional view of security and stability.”655 The U.S. 
call for a South Korean regional role based on the U.S. regional strategic blueprint, 
however, did not produce any meaningful results. Instead of joining the U.S. regional 
campaign to balance against China, the South Korean government proposed a new role 
of regional balancer. 
 In March 2005 President Roh publicly declared: “we will not be embroiled in 
any conflict in Northeast Asia against our will. This is an absolutely firm principle we 
cannot yield under any circumstances.”656 With this remark, President Roh Moo-hyun 
essentially declared that South Korea would not join the United States and Japan to 
counter China. Instead, he expressed his willingness to seek a multiparty security 
regime that would include China. His view is well reflected in his interview with a 
South Korean newspaper: 
Some suggest that South Korea should remain in ‘camp diplomacy’ to defend 
itself and have a deterrent to a war on or around the peninsula . . . but my 
administration’s policy is that we should overcome the Cold War confrontation 
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and march along with our neighbors toward a multilateral security regime on 
the basis of expanding economic cooperation in the region. 
If the U.S. manages the strategic structure based on confrontation with the U.S. 
and Japan on one side and China and Russia on the other, tensions would hang 
over the region and something miserable could take place. 657 
 In a March 2005 speech delivered at a graduation ceremony of a South Korean 
military academy, President Roh formally declared South Korea’s “balancer role” 
(gyunhyungja-ron): “Korea will play the role of a balancer, not only on the Korean 
peninsula, but throughout Northeast Asia.”658 The speech immediately stirred up 
controversy both in Washington and Seoul, complicating further alliance management 
between the United States and South Korea.659 Meanwhile, a senior Chinese security 
expert at Renda positively assesses Roh’s recent manifestation of South Korea’s 
regional policy by commenting that his speech “could mark a significant change” for 
the region.660 A South Korean opinion piece also attributes Roh’s speech not only to 
South Korea’s concern about the U.S. strategic plan in East Asia but also to its 
growing resentment at Japan’s lackluster support for South Korea’s engagement 
policy after the abduction scandal.661 
The U.S.-Japan Alliance and Global Focus 
 Before North Korea bashers gained prominence in Japan’s domestic politics, 
the mainstream view in Japan was that Japan should engage more fully in regional 
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security cooperation.662 In a 2002 policy recommendation, prepared by the Japan 
Forum on International Relations (JFIR) and presented to Prime Minister Koizumi, for 
instance, a group of prominent Japanese policy elites and experts called for “going 
beyond the current alliance system and building a web of multilateral cooperation over 
various issues from military to non-traditional security issues.”663 In striking similarity 
to the aforementioned Chinese version of building a multi-tiered regional order, the 
Japanese experts also recommend the establishment of a “multi-layered network” of 
East Asian security including the U.S.-Japan alliance and regional security 
frameworks.664 
 The prolonged second crisis and the rise of conservatives in Japan dashed 
those initial hopes. As the prevalent conservative group rejected the regionalist vision 
and embraced the U.S. threat perception of North Korea, what followed was “a de 
facto globalization” of the US-Japan alliance.665 Already in the Japanese parliamentary 
election held in November 2003, for instance, the key foreign policy agenda was not 
East Asia, but the strengthening of the US-Japan alliance, which contrasted sharply 
with South Korea’s emphasis on the age of Northeast Asian cooperation.666 The most 
worrisome development, writes Gavan McCormack, was “the 2005/06 agreement to 
the fusion of command and intelligence between Japanese and U.S. forces.” This 
agreement effectively subordinates Japan to U.S. strategic leadership and commits it to 
collective defense, one of the remaining security taboos that Washington has been 
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eager to eliminate.667 While Japan’s latest New Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) 
made a passing reference to cooperation toward “the realization of an East Asian 
Community,” the central focus is placed clearly on the U.S.-Japan alliance.668 
 Over time, Japan and the United States reaffirmed their commitment to 
pressing North Korea to take steps toward denuclearization and to call on China to 
increase transparency with regard to its military. The two nations also maintained that 
the alliance is “consistent and complementary” with NATO in contributing to world 
peace and stability, and Japan will work to achieve “broader” cooperation with the 
alliance.669 When fully implemented, the NDPG could also lead to a weakening of the 
Self Defense Forces’ traditional role in favor of other security responsibilities, 
including a contribution to “the maintenance of global order.”670 In a 2006 joint 
statement, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and U.S. President George W. Bush 
formally proposed the expansion of the bilateral alliance to a so-called global scale, 
based on “common values and interests,” including areas outside of traditional 
security cooperation. Demonstrating the downfall of the regionalist vision, they simply 
reaffirmed that strong bilateral cooperation would contribute to maintaining peace and 
stability in the region.671 
 As the beacon of Japan’s North Korea bashers, Prime Minster, Shinzo Abe, 
went even further by declaring, “the changing security environment for Japan and the 
world calls on Japan to contribute to global challenges.”672 To this end, he proposed to 
establish what he called the “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity,” including the United 
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States and other democratic countries.673 In a more concrete move, in January 2006, 
Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Aso met with U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza 
Rice and the Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs Alexander Downer for the first 
ministerial-level security talks between the three countries. At this meeting, they 
discussed not only concerns over the Taiwan Strait but also possible joint military 
exercises between the three allied countries.674 As the U.S.-Japan alliance increasingly 
focusing on concerns beyond the region, the traditional U.S. regional alliance aimed at 
deterring the Soviet Union was “being replaced by a nascent anti-China US-dominated 
multilateral alliance system.”675 However, given the fact that South Korea has refused 
to join this new regional arrangement, writes Richard Tanter, the “new tripartite 
security architecture is decidedly wobbly.”676 
5-4. The Bush Doctrine and East Asian Regionalism 
 The gradual shift in Japan’s strategic focus from East Asia to the globe did not 
follow the trajectory of Japan’s strategic evolution in the earlier periods. There were 
signs of broadening regionalism, often proposed by senior Japanese government 
officials. For instance, at the 2002 Asia Security Conference, also known as the 
Shangri-la Dialogue,677 then Japan’s Defense Agency Director Gen Nakatani 
suggested that the Conference be developed into “a formal Asia-Pacific Defense 
Ministerial Meeting to complement the largely foreign ministry-centered [ASEAN 
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Regional Forum].”678 More importantly, he also proposed a new security framework 
that would include China, the two Koreas, and the United States and, in his official 
visit to Seoul in April 2002, put forward joint research with South Korea on a regional 
security framework.679 Even in the immediate aftermath of the second crisis, at a 
trilateral summit in November 2002, Japan joined China and South Korea in 
promoting regional cooperation in a wide range of areas, while exchanging views on 
the situation on the Korean peninsula.680 
 The strained alliance ties between the United States and South Korea also had 
broader implications for nascent regionalism in East Asia. Writing about the prospects 
for regionalism in East Asia, Gilbert Rozman envisioned a “Korean peninsula 
becoming the center of an entire region in search of a community that the United 
States may not easily accept.”681 In fact, in response to the U.S. plea to forge a unified 
front against North Korea, President Roh attempted to build an alternative regional 
coalition with China and Japan against the United States. At the ASEAN Plus Three 
(APT) meeting in October 2003, for example, President Roh met with Chinese 
Premier Wen Jiabao and Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, and they issued, 
for the first time, a joint statement calling on the parties to seek “a peaceful resolution 
of the North Korean nuclear issue and to cooperate for the second round of the Six-
Party Talks.”682 More importantly, the statement, entitled “Joint Declaration on the 
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Promotion of Tripartite Cooperation among China, Japan, and South Korea,” called 
for a strengthening security dialogue among the three countries.683 
The Rise of the ASEAN Plus Three (APT), 2001-2004 
 The idea of having the APT meetings first emerged in the early 1990s with 
Malaysian Prime Minister Mohammed Mahathir’s proposal for forming an East Asian 
Economic Grouping (EAEG) and later an East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC). 
These suggestions failed to materialize owing much to U.S. opposition and the 
emergence of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) as a larger regional 
alternative. The idea later resurfaced in December 1997 when leaders of ASEAN and 
China, Japan and South Korea convened an informal meeting on the sidelines of the 
Second ASEAN Informal Summit in Malaysia. The APT process was formally 
institutionalized at the Third Summit in 1999 with a Joint Statement on East Asia 
Cooperation.684 During this early period, however, cooperation among East Asian 
countries remained marginal and limited. In November 2000, at the ASEAN Plus 
Three (APT) meetings in Singapore, Japanese Prime Minister Mori Yoshiro, Chinese 
Premier Zhu Rongji and South Korean President Kim Dae-jung agreed to enhance 
trilateral cooperation on a variety of issues. The first joint statement by the three 
countries features “[t]he five-point agreement on environmental, economic, cultural, 
and information technology (IT) cooperation, and transnational efforts at combating 
crime and piracy.”685 What is significant in this list of agreements is the absence of 
security related issues other than transnational crimes. 
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 As examined in Chapter Four, East Asian regionalism in security matters 
gathered momentum as the Perry Process facilitated regional cooperation over the 
North Korean issue. In 2000, then Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji suggested that the 
APT “could become the main channel of East Asia regional cooperation.” In 2001, 
Zhu expanded China’s vision for the APT to include “dialogue and cooperation to 
political and security fields.”686 For its part, Japan also contributed to the regional 
effort by hosting the first trilateral foreign minister-level meeting in July 2002. At the 
APT meeting in Cambodia in November 2002, the three countries held a trilateral 
summit, agreeing to deepen China-Japan-ROK trilateral cooperation in various issue 
areas and exchanging their views on the North Korean situation.687 The Japanese also 
stressed the importance of the joint statement on North Korea at the 2003 APT 
meetings, with a Foreign Ministry website highlighting that the three East Asian 
countries “reaffirm their commitment to a peaceful solution of the nuclear issue facing 
the Korean Peninsula through dialogue and to the denuclearization of the Korean 
Peninsula, while addressing all the concerns of the parties and working together to 
maintain peace and stability on the Peninsula.”688 Later in November 2003, Chinese 
Vice Foreign Minister Dai Bingguo visited Japan and said that “China intended to 
cooperate closely with Japan” for peaceful resolution of the North Korean situation.689 
 Overall, compared with the dismal failure of the Trilateral Coordination and 
Oversight Group (TCOG) among America’s Asian allies, the ASEAN Plus Three 
meetings (APT) seemed to be evolving into a useful regional site for security 
cooperation. Even after the second North Korean nuclear crisis broke out, a new 
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pattern of regionalism among China, Japan and South Korea continued. At their 
tripartite meetings, discussion began to cover sensitive security issues and mutual 
concerns. Among them, the North Korean nuclear issue was at the top of the list. More 
specifically, on October 7, 2003, at the APT Summit in Bali, China, Japan and South 
Korea issued the Joint Declaration on the Promotion of Tripartite Cooperation stating, 
“the three countries reaffirm their commitment to a peaceful solution of the nuclear 
issue facing the Korean Peninsula through dialogue and to the denuclearization of the 
Korean Peninsula.”690 In July 2004, foreign ministers of China, South Korea and Japan 
also held a trilateral meeting during another APT session in Jakarta, Indonesia, 
discussing East Asian regional cooperation and North Korea’s nuclear crisis.691 As late 
as the November 2004 APT summit in Laos, the three countries reiterated their 
commitment to a peaceful solution of the nuclear issue through dialogue.692 
 Although facilitated in part by the need to consult over the North Korean issue, 
regional cooperation goes beyond Korean Peninsula issues. In fact, even at the height 
of the second North Korean nuclear crisis, many South Koreans, including President 
Kim Dae-jung, believed that the Six Party framework should go beyond the nuclear 
issue to become a permanent regional organization.693 Early signs were promising as 
the three East Asian countries discussed regional security issues with a broader 
regional security system in their minds. On June 18, 2003, for instance, the foreign 
ministers of China, Japan, and South Korea held a trilateral meeting in Cambodia. 
During the meeting, South Korean Foreign Minister Youn Youngkwan and Japanese 
Foreign Minister Yoriko Gawaguchi explained to Chinese Foreign Minister Li 
Zhaoxing the results of the June 2003 TCOG meeting and discussed the prospect of 
                                                
690 Text of the Joint Declaration on the Promotion of Tripartite Cooperation among Japan, the People’s 
Republic of China and the Republic of Korea, October 7, 2003. 
691 Munwha Ilbo, July 1, 2004. 
692 Japan Times, November 30, 2004. 
693 Kim Dae-jung, “Regionalism in the Age of Asia,” Global Asia, p.12. 
 183 
expanding the three party talks involving China and the U.S., to a five party system 
including South Korea and Japan.694 
 Soon, various foreign ministry director-general level meetings and 
consultations became a regular feature of regional security.695 For instance, the three 
countries’ foreign ministry officials in charge of Asian affairs held a tripartite meeting 
in Seoul and Beijing in November 26-28 and a “Japan-ROK-China Director-General-
level Meeting” was held in Seoul in December 29, 2003.696 Along with official 
meetings, the three East Asian countries facilitated a flurry of semi-governmental 
Track II and nongovernmental meetings. Table 5-1 illustrates this new regional 
development, as manifested in several key governmental and Track II activities among 
the three countries. 
The Decline of Regionalism after 2005 
 Unfortunately, early positive developments in East Asian regionalism did not 
last long, as the nuclear crisis reached a stalemate in late 2004 and Japan’s North 
Korea bashers rose to central political positions amid anti-North Korean sentiment. 
Hamstrung by an unprecedented level of anti-North Korean feelings on the domestic 
front and an unwavering hard line stance toward North Korea on the part of its ally, 
the United States, the Koizumi government was unable to find a breakthrough over the 
North Korean issue. In September 2004, in an unusual meeting with a North Korean 
vice foreign minister on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly, Prime Minister 
Koizumi made another attempt at jump-starting the normalization talks. In this 
meeting, Koizumi asked the North Korean minister to convey his message to Kim 
Jong Il that “it is important to both normalize ties between the two countries and get 
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on with six-party talks.” While the North Korean minister stressed the importance of 
the six-party process, he made it clear that North Korea could not attend the talks due 
to what they viewed as “a hostile U.S. policy.”697 
Table 5-1. East Asian Regional Security Meetings (2002-2004) 
Venue Main Features 
The 2002 Korea-Japan 
Millennium Symposium 
October 26, 2002, Tokyo, 
Japan 
-Participation by former South Korean President Kim Young-Sam, 
Former Japanese Prime Ministers Mori Yoshiro, Nakasone 
Yasuhiro and regional experts. 
-Masao Okonogi of Keio University called for sharing regional 
identity, not just system (democracy, market economy and U.S. 
alliances). 
-Former Chairman of CSCAP Korea Dalchoong Kim called for 
regional multilateral cooperation led by China, Japan, and South 
Korea.698 
The First Conference of the 
Network of East Asian 
Think-tanks (NEAT) 
September 29-30, 2003, 
Beijing, China 
 
-The inaugural meeting of the NEAT, one of the two multilateral 
consultation agendas proposed in the previous APT meetings (The 
other one is the East Asian Forum below). 
-The conference was designed to promote Track II cooperation in 
East Asia with the aim to provide intellectual support and policy 
recommendations on key economic and security issues. 
-Discussed the establishment of a regional cooperation organization 
suited to the regional conditions.699 
The First East Asia Forum 
(EAF) 
December 16, 2003, Seoul, 
South Korea 
-Hundreds of members of the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) 
participated in the inaugural meeting of the EAF. 
-South Korean President Roh declared, “Resolving NK nuclear 
challenge and the peaceful settlement of the Korean Peninsula 
would contribute to the peace and prosperity in East Asia.”700 
Symposium on Northeast 
Asian Security Cooperation 
and the Six Party Talks 
May 28, 2004, Seoul, South 
Korea. 
 
-Hosted by South Korea’s Donga Ilbo, Japan’s Asahi Shimbun, and 
China’s State Council’s Chinese Institute of Contemporary 
International Relations. 
-Participants shared a similar view of the situation regarding the Six 
Party talks. 
-While admitting different interests of each country at the talks, 
participants assessed the six party processes as a good starting point 
for regional cooperation. 
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Table 5-1. (Continued) 
Venue Main Features 
The First China, Japan, 
South Korea Forum for 
Peaceful Development and 
Security 
October 11, 2004, Beijing, 
China. 
-In this forum, about 70 governmental and nongovernmental 
security experts from the three East Asian countries participated. 
-Participants exchanged their views of such diverse issues North 
Korea’s nuclear programs, China-Japan rivalry, and forging a 
Northeast Asian security framework.701 
 
 The U.S. hard line position on North Korea also made Chinese efforts to make 
headway at the Six Party talks difficult. At the beginning of the second crisis, the 
Chinese, along the lines of its closer cooperation with South Korea, saw the potential 
for cooperation between China and Japan over the issues of North Korea and the 
implementation of regional security mechanisms such as the APT meetings. As the Six 
Party talks reached a stalemate, one prominent Chinese analyst lamented that both 
parties did not seem to seize the opportunities for regional cooperation.702 Given 
Koizumi’s close personal relations with President Bush, some regional actors initially 
hoped that Japan would play a bridge-building role between the hawkish United States 
and more moderate regional countries.703 By late 2004, however, the stalled situation 
and the growing dominance of conservative voices in Japan’s political scene left the 
Koizumi government with few options. As a result, previous efforts at balancing 
Japan’s internally-shaped regional role and externally-expected role gave in to an 
exclusive focus on alliance ties with the United States. 
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 More broadly, Japanese moderates were losing ground over the issues of East 
Asian regionalism and normalization with North Korea. In their place, conservative 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) lawmakers led by then Deputy Secretary General 
Shinzo Abe and relatives of the abductees joined forces to push an anti-North Korean 
campaign and economic sanctions on North Korea.704 What filled the domestic power 
vacuum was a conservative call to expand Japan’s defense role under the framework 
of the revitalized U.S.-Japan alliance. In November 2004, the ruling LDP’s 
investigative committee on constitution finalized a draft constitution calling for the 
exercise of collective self-defense within the U.S.-Japan alliance and the use of 
Japanese military overseas in the name of contributing to the international 
community.705 The conservatives also considered an expanded role of Japanese 
defense forces for regional contingencies. In an effort to “revamp the national defense 
strategy,” Defense Agency officials even stipulated “three scenarios in which China 
attacks Japan,” which include “attacks stemming from disputes over ocean resources 
and claims over the Senkaku Islands as well as a clash across the Taiwan Strait.”706 
 Taken aback by the explicit language used against China, the Chinese 
promptly responded with a warning of Japan’s invoking the “Cold War mentality” and 
suggested that President Hu Jintao’s summit with Prime Minister Koizumi at the 2004 
APEC meeting might be difficult.707 In the midst of the mounting tension between the 
two countries, it was also reported that a Chinese naval submarine intruded into 
Japan’s territorial waters near Okinawa.708 While the Chinese Navy cited a technical 
problem, the damage had already been done. In a draft version of a New Defense 
                                                
704 Kanako Takahara, “Calls mount for sanctions on North Korea,” Japan Times, November 17, 2004. 
705 Yonhap News, November 17, 2004. 
706 “Defense strategists look to China’s attack threat,” Japan Times, November 9, 2004. 
707 “Japan on alert as suspected Chinese sub detected in territorial waters,” AFP, November 10, 2004. 
708 Reiji Yoshida and Kanako Takahara, “China’s sub intrusion sparks Tokyo protest,” Japan Times, 
Nov. 13, 2004. 
 187 
Program Outline (NDPO) presented to the ruling Liberal Democratic Party in 2004, 
Japan for the first time names North Korea and China as threats to its security: “North 
Korea’s military moves are a grave destabilizing factor in the region. At the same 
time, Japan must pay close attention to China’s modernization of its military and the 
expansion of its activities in the sea.”709 
 In response, the Chinese wasted no time in expressing their anger in a 
statement by a Foreign Ministry spokeswoman: “Official Japanese documents openly 
play up the so-called ‘China threat,” which is completely baseless and irresponsible . . 
. China expresses strong dissatisfaction with this, and hopes Japan will do more to 
improve mutual trust and the healthy and stable development of bilateral ties.”710 The 
Communist Party’s official People’s Daily also warned, “Japan appears to be 
following the United States in security strategy.”711 In another opinion piece in the 
same paper, a columnist claimed that Japan was becoming “the frontline of U.S. Asian 
policy” of containing China, which “entirely [went] against the trend of the times 
featuring peace and development.”712 The timing of the Sino-Japan tension was 
particularly unfortunate as East Asian countries were about to meet for the Ninth 
ASEAN Plus Three (APT) meeting and the first East Asian Summit in Malaysia. 
Citing the negative turn in Sino-Japanese relations, the Chinese government ruled out 
meetings between Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao and Prime Minister Koizumi at those 
meetings.713 
 Sensing troubled regionalism, even Southeast Asian officials began to call on 
China and Japan to dampen the rising tension between the two major powers. At the 
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meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi, Singapore’s Foreign Minister George 
Yeo, for instance, expressed concern: “It won’t be good for us if these two giants in 
Asia are going to have bad relations.”714 Unfortunately, the regional apprehension 
soon became the reality. By late 2005, the Sino-Japanese tension was morphed into a 
new “conflict between Japan and China over the form of a future East Asian 
community.” Whereas the Chinese asserted that the form of an East Asian community 
should be discussed within the framework of the ASEAN Plus Three centered on 
China, Japan, and South Korea, the Japanese insisted on building a regional 
community based on the broader East Asian summit including Australia, New 
Zealand, and the United States.715 
 Amid the Sino-Japanese rivalry, China’s early hopes of developing the Six 
Party talks into a new regional mechanism failed to materialize. Appearing on a 
national television in April 2006, Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Aso called China a 
military threat.716 Referring to Japan’s failure to hold summit talks with China and 
South Korea, Aso even hinted that Japan’s troubled relations with China and South 
Korea might not improve for some time: “We should be prepared to a certain degree 
and not expect too much that neighbors should always be on good terms.”717 Breaking 
away from a previous tendency not to publicly discuss the Taiwan issues, Japanese 
officials also began to state that they shared with the United States “a common 
concern about the future of Taiwan,” while expressing concern over China’s growing 
military buildup in the region.718 Citing a U.S.-Japan pronouncement that both the 
Taiwan and Korean peninsula issues were part of their “common strategic objectives,” 
                                                
714 “Region’s Leaders Ask China, Japan to End Feud: Dispute Between Economic Powerhouses 
Overshadows Historic Asia-Africa Forum,” Washington Post, April 21, 2005.  
715 “Japan, China clash over E. Asia summit,” The Yomiuri Shimbun, November 25, 2005. 
716 “Aso says China a threat; shrine overtures rebuffed,” Japan Times, April 3, 2006. 
717 “Asian relations won’t improve soon: Aso,” Japan Times, February 20, 2006. 
718 Joel Brinkley, “With Taiwan as Security Issue, Rice Prepares to Meet Japan Leaders,” New York 
Times, February 18, 2005. 
 189 
the Chinese warned that Japan was held hostage to U.S. global strategies. Chinese 
Foreign Ministry spokesman Kong Quan stressed that the U.S.-Japan alliance was “a 
bilateral scheme spawned during the Cold War period,” and “should not function 
beyond the bilateral framework.” 719 
 Against this backdrop, a “hate-China” sentiment was gradually spreading 
among top officials at the Japanese Foreign Ministry. Traditionally, Japanese leaders 
tended to compensate for Japan’s past aggression by showing deference to China in 
bilateral relations. China, for its part, tried to make the best out of such Japanese 
sentiments and received concessions from Japan over various bilateral issues. Led by 
the so-called “China School” diplomats within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Japanese deference to China gave rise to Japan’s lukewarm protest after the 
Tiananmen incident.720 Later in the mid-1990s when the U.S. and Japan agreed to 
expand the scope of the U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation Guidelines, many Japanese 
officials were mindful of China’s reaction, thereby deliberately couching the regional 
scope of the new guidelines in the vague phrase “in areas surrounding Japan.”721 As 
the Koizumi administration stressed alliance ties with the United States, however, the 
influence of the “China school” within the Foreign Ministry decreased substantially. 
As Japanese commentators have stated, it was in this changing political context that 
the Japanese government agreed with the United States on common strategies on the 
Taiwan issue, “a sensitive issue for Beijing.”722 
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Tension between Japan and South Korea and Failed Regionalism 
 Regional tension also spread to the relationship between South Korea and 
Japan. In early 2005, the two countries faced off over the small islets known as 
Tokdo/Takeshima, which had been annexed to Japan during the colonial period and 
later in the postwar years placed under South Korea’s administrative control. In 
February, a prefectural government in Japan inaugurated the Takeshima day, 
reigniting tension with South Korea over the disputed territory. When Japanese 
officials dismissed the incident as a local matter, South Korea canceled a scheduled 
visit to Tokyo by then Foreign Minister Ban Ki Moon. The dispute effectively put an 
end to the goodwill efforts made earlier by the two neighbors to celebrate 2005 the 
year of “mutual friendship.”723 South Korean resentment toward Japan further 
intensified, as Japan was seen in Seoul as “building up its military and taking a hard 
line position toward North Korea.”724 Amidst a swirl of controversy, the South Korean 
government publicly opposed Japan’s plan to become a permanent member of the UN 
Security Council. South Korean ambassador to the UN, Kim Samhoon, made it clear 
that a country not trusted by its neighbors is not worthy to play a greater role in the 
international community.725 
 As Japan’s relationships with China and South Korea headed toward the worst 
level in the postwar period, earlier regional developments toward forging an inclusive 
regional security mechanism were replaced with a narrowed, exclusive focus on the 
U.S.-Japan alliance. In a major shift from the region-focused Higuchi Report of 1994, 
the 2004 strategic report, known as the Araki Report issued by a blue-ribbon prime 
ministerial advisory council, proposed a markedly different foreign policy blueprint 
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for Japan. Its main recommendations include “strengthening Japan’s security alliance 
with the United States and changing the Self-Defense Forces into a ‘multifunctional, 
flexible defense force.’” The report proposed an “‘integrated security strategy’ that 
deals more actively with international security issues as well as self-defense under the 
alliance with the United States.”726 In this way, the transformation of the bilateral 
alliance took concrete form, but in a manner designed “to reaffirm the US-dominated 
hegemonic framework of security in the region.”727 The Chinese in turn blamed 
America’s “unsophisticated effort to encourage Japan to take a more activist regional 
and global security role” for the tension between China and Japan.728 
5-5. Conclusion 
 Comparing the Clinton and Bush administrations’ approaches to North Korea, 
one regional expert maintained that while Clinton was interested in reformulating the 
regional security order, Bush seemed to have no such interest.729 In fact, the Bush 
administration did have a regional plan of its own. It is rooted in a new global strategy 
of countering proliferation threats and reshaping the regional security structure in a 
mold that is markedly different what the regional countries have in mind. By shifting 
the strategic focus away from “intraregional issues toward a common global threat,” 
the Bush administration has paved the way for a transformation of the regional 
security order.730 As examined in this chapter, by intensifying role conflict and helping 
                                                
726 Natsumi Mizumoto, “Defense panel seeks enhanced ties with U.S., flexible force,” Kyodo News, 
October 4, 2004. 
727 Christopher W. Hughes, Japan’s Re-emergence as a “Normal’ Military Power, Adelphi Paper 368-9, 
The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2005, p. 146. 
728 Minxin Pei and Michael Swaine, “Simmering Fire in Asia: Averting Sino-Japanese Strategic 
Conflict,” Policy Brief 44, November 2005, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, p. 7. 
729 Interview 14-05, Beijing, April 28, 2005. 
730 Gilbert Rozman, Northeast Asia’s Stunted Regionalism: Bilateral Distrust in the Shadow of 
Globalization (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 348. 
 192 
the rise of conservatives in Japan, the Bush administration’s approach reshaped the 
regional order in East Asia. 
 One of the most significant outcomes is the change in the U.S.-centered hub-
and-spokes regional alliance structure, in particular the U.S.-South Korean axis. The 
South Korean government not only rejected the U.S. call for pressuring North Korea 
and joining the global coalition against proliferation but also aligned itself with China. 
At the beginning, the Japanese also emphasized the importance of balancing the U.S.-
Japan alliance and the trilateral cooperation among Asian allies.731 If Japan simply 
followed the American neo-conservatives, one Japanese scholar warned, its channels 
for cooperation with South Korea and China and the chance to forge a broader 
regional security framework would be lost.732 Amid the growing anti-North Korean 
sentiments and the predominance of “revisionist” voices on the domestic political 
scene, the Koizumi government’s normalization drive was hijacked by a conservative 
agenda of redefining Japan’s defense role in the regional and global realms. 
 Such a transformation did not bode well for the regional momentum sparked 
by the Perry Process. Having had high expectations of developing the Six Party talks 
into a new regional security mechanism, the Chinese government found itself in a 
rapidly worsening conflict with Japan over their respective strategic influence and the 
proper format of a regional security framework. Failing to realize its regional strategy 
of turning the Korean Peninsula into a new hub of regional integration and 
cooperation, the Roh Moo-Hyun government in Seoul even talked about South 
Korea’s balancer role in the region, while finding fault with anti-North Korean 
sentiments in Japan. Against this background, the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) and the 
East Asian summit did not reach their full potential. 
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 All in all, the Bush administration’s approach has seriously undermined 
regional “hopes for a more robust multilateral security order” in East Asia.733 Rather 
than showing flexibility in addressing the North Korean challenge and, in the process, 
turning the Six Party process into a broader regional security framework, the Bush 
administration insisted on addressing the short-term, proliferation dimension. By 
forcing the regional actors to adopt its preferred role as U.S. partners in the anti-North 
Korean coalition, the Bush administration not only stalled regional efforts to forge a 
broader regional security mechanism but also opened the way for a more exclusive 
and conflictual regional order. 
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Making Global Strategy and Regional Order Congruent 
6-1. Introduction 
 After North Korea conducted what appeared to be a sub-kiloton nuclear test in 
October 2006, some politicians and pundits were quick to point out that China’s 
limited pressure on North Korea, coupled with South Korea’s unconditional support 
for the North Korean regime, has sustained and emboldened the outlaw regime. 
Implicit in this view is an assumption that North Korea’s neighbors have different, 
idiosyncratic national priorities vis-à-vis North Korea, making a joint resolution at the 
Six Party Talks very difficult to achieve. David Steinberg, for one, chalks the 
difficulty in coping effectively with the North Korean challenge up to “disparate 
national security priorities” between the United States, with its global focus on 
preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and South Korea, 
whose interests remain fixed on the Korean Peninsula.734 
 As examined in this dissertation, the image of East Asian countries 
“nationalizing” the North Korean issue to the detriment of global security, however, 
misses the extent to which the North Korean challenge has been reshaping the larger 
regional security landscape in East Asia. Rather than a venue for defusing the nuclear 
crisis, the Six Party Talks have become a site of competing logics between the U.S. 
framing of North Korean as a clear-cut global challenge and the East Asian view of it 
as a complex regional problem whose solution will have repercussions for the East 
Asian security order. As one expert observes, the Six Party Talks have not resulted in 
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the resolution of the crisis in part because “North Korea figures very differently in the 
regional plans” of the countries involved.735 
 The question is precisely how North Korea is linked to the regional strategies 
of the East Asian countries and with what consequences. This dissertation has 
attempted to answer these questions by exploring the link between regional role 
conceptions and North Korea, as contested in the three East Asian countries. The East 
Asian experience surrounding the North Korean challenge is also emblematic of a 
larger shift in the regional order. As Mitchell Reiss points out, the Six Party process is 
not just a global campaign to prevent nuclear proliferation; more importantly, at stake 
is “the vigor of [US] alliances, the future of northeast Asia, America’s stature and 
standing in East Asia.”736 By examining alliance dynamics and regionalism, this 
dissertation has demonstrated how the North Korean challenge has been reshaping the 
post-Cold War regional order in East Asia. 
 This concluding chapter proceeds in the following manner. The next two 
sections provide a brief summary of findings and a discussion of both theoretical and 
policy implications. I then consider the possibility of applying the analytical 
framework advanced in this dissertation to other regional contexts and suggest a 
possible avenue of further research. The chapter concludes with a section discussing 
the potential implications and the future prospects of the latest developments at the Six 
Party Talks in which the Bush administration began to take a more flexible approach 
toward North Korea. Although the final outcome remains to be seen, how this recent 
policy shift unfolds in the coming years will have consequences for regional role 
conceptions and the evolving regional order in East Asia. 
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6-2. Findings and Theoretical Implications 
Summary of Findings 
 In this dissertation, I have put forth an argument that stresses the role of 
ideational factors, especially regional role conceptions. By examining the post-Cold 
War East Asian experience around the North Korean challenge, I have shown that 
regional role conceptions—the way political elites articulate regional roles—influence 
the understanding of threat and national interests vis-à-vis North Korea. Specifically, 
the search for new regional roles by East Asian countries shaped their understanding 
of and policy behavior toward North Korea. It also influenced the way East Asian 
countries responded to the Bush administration’s approach toward North Korea. They 
not only questioned the validity of the Bush Doctrine as applied to the North Korean 
case but also tried to persuade the United States to take an alternative, more flexible 
approach. 
 Such a regional response is a radical departure from East Asian behavior 
during the Perry Process of the Clinton presidency. During this period, East Asia’s 
quest for greater roles vis-a-vis North Korea blended well with the U.S. approach, 
facilitating role congruence in East Asia. Along with positive outcomes after the 
resolution of the crisis, the regional order in this period became more stable as new 
patterns of alliance cooperation and regionalism emerged amid role congruence. As 
the Bush administration took a hard line position toward North Korea and triggered 
role conflict, East Asian countries refused to go along with the United States. As a 
result, alliance relationship faltered, while regionalism among East Asian countries 
was promoted. However, as the prolonged crisis differently affected domestic security 
debates in each country, regional cooperation has backtracked since 2005. 
 More broadly, this dissertation has demonstrated how the same objective 
reality of facing North Korea has been interpreted differently by different actors 
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placed in different political contexts. Regional role conceptions powerfully shape 
understanding of the nature of threats and the appropriate means to address them. By 
forcing East Asian countries to adopt the global frame of fighting rogues and to play 
the roles it preferred for the North Korean issue, the Bush administration put itself on 
a collision course with the regional actors. At the domestic level, however, it also 
ignited domestic contestation in which different political actors compete for different 
regional roles and regional visions. In the process, the earlier collective regional 
resistance to the U.S. approach was replaced with a series of regional rivalries. All in 
all, the Bush administration’s approach toward North Korea and regional role 
conceptions in East Asia set in motion a transformation in the regional strategic 
landscape, blurring traditional boundaries between friends and foes, while creating 
new ones between allies and neighbors. 
Various Explanations and the Regional Outcomes 
 The empirical chapters provide a useful testing ground for several alternative 
explanations for the variation in the regional outcomes in different time periods and 
across the region. As summarized in Table 6.1, existing accounts are useful for 
explaining certain aspects of regional outcomes, but they provide only partial insight 
into the regional situation surrounding North Korea. Given the different regional 
responses to the U.S. approach in different time periods, power alone is limited in 
explaining regional behavior. With a more nuanced view of the power variable, the 
perceived power account is more effective in explaining the regional outcome during 
the second crisis. However, as demonstrated in the empirical chapters, it is not the 
perceived power itself, but the perceived legitimacy of power that is key. Of particular 
importance in securing the authority of the ruler is “the consent of the ruled.”737 The 
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East Asian response to the U.S. during the Perry Process represents a type of authority 
relationship where “shared understanding allows the powerful to exert legitimate 
control.”738 However, the Bush administration’s approach toward North Korea lacked 
such authority, prompting regional resistance. 
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No No Yes Yes 
 
 In this vein, one could highlight the effects of 9/11 as a key factor shaping the 
U.S. approach during the second crisis. From this vantage point, not just Bush, but the 
hypothetical third-term Clinton administration or a Gore administration would have 
pursued more or less a similar, hard line approach toward North Korea. Such 
counterfactual reasoning is plausible, yet largely untenable for two reasons. First, as 
evidenced in Chapter 4, during the 1998 missile crisis, despite the strong push for 
immediate action from the Republican-dominated Congress, the Clinton 
administration from the beginning frequently consulted the regional countries, 
extending the review process to almost a year. Given its tendency to coordinate with 
                                                
738 Paul K. MacDonald, “Correspondence: The Role of Hierarchy in International Politics,” 
International Security, Vol. 32 (4), Spring 2007, p. 172. 
 199 
the regional countries, even a post-9/11 Clinton administration would have pursued a 
cautious approach toward North Korea, a prospect that might have been facilitated 
further had President Clinton’s planned visit to Pyongyang occurred. Second, even 
prior to 9/11, the Bush administration pursued a markedly different approach toward 
North Korea, making regional actors worry about potential consequences for regional 
stability and regional visions. 
 The perceived decline of U.S. power may also have affected domestic 
coalitional politics by empowering different political groups. In fact, the Japanese 
conservative government since 2005 shifted to the U.S. position on the North Korea 
issue, at times taking an even more hard-line stance than the United States. In contrast, 
other regional countries remained unsupportive of the U.S. position.739 However, it is 
not clear what caused such regional divergence: Why, despite the similar change in the 
perception of U.S. power, did domestic responses vary? We cannot adequately assess 
the impact of perceived power on state behavior without understanding the nature of 
domestic contestation; especially the types of regional role conceptions that prevail in 
each country in the region. 
 The explanation based on threat perception can also be credited with some 
success, especially in accounting for the regional convergence on resistance to the 
coercive U.S. approach during the early part of the second crisis. One could also point 
out the different threat perceptions of North Korea among the regional actors as a 
factor influencing regional outcomes. Here Japan’s hard line approach toward North 
Korea since 2005 can be attributed to its heightened threat perception of North Korea. 
As examined in the empirical analysis, however, managing threats or reducing costs 
does not seem to be the first order of business in East Asia. This was the case even in 
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Japan where the North Korean threat is most widely voiced. It is suggestive in this 
regard that while Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe set up an office to manage the 
abductions issue, he did not establish a similar office in charge of addressing North 
Korea’s nuclear or missile programs.740 Similarly, Japan’s persistent efforts at raising 
the abduction issue at the Six Party talks, even to the point of disrupting negotiation at 
the multilateral meetings, indicate that the North Korean threat is often evoked for 
political purposes, rather than being seriously addressed. In this vein, one former 
Japanese diplomat points out that talks about the North Korean threat in Japan have 
resurfaced whenever the need to stress Japan’s ties with the United States arises.741 
 Moreover, as evidenced in Chapter 3, there is an element of elasticity in 
regional threat perceptions vis-à-vis North Korea: the North Korean threat is voiced by 
the regional actors who identify with the United States, while it is moderated in the 
assessments made by those in conflict with the U.S. approach. As such, East Asian 
countries’ threat perception of North Korea is largely a function of how the regional 
countries perceive their regional roles. The salience of particular regional role 
conceptions (e.g., external or internal role conceptions) then provides clues about 
whether or not the North Korean threat is (de)amplified in the region. In short, the 
regional threat perception of North Korea itself is endogenous to regional role 
conceptions, and the latter do not simply reflect the former. 
 With its focus on the regional countries’ disparate national interests vis-à-vis 
North Korea, the national interests account is most convincing in explaining the 
regional divergence during the latter half of the second crisis, but ignores the fact that, 
despite divergent national interests among regional actors, the actors converged on the 
importance of North Korea as a regional focal point during the Perry Process and the 
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early rounds of the Six Part Talks. As evidenced in Chapters 4 and 5, the explanations 
centered on regional role conceptions account for the variation in regional outcomes in 
both the Perry Process and the second crisis, while shedding light on the sources of the 
regional divergence since 2005. 
Role Conceptions and Power Transition 
 The analysis offered in the dissertation can also help us better understand 
power transition in the international system. Noting that China has both immediate 
security concerns and longer-term strategic objectives on the question of North Korea 
and the Korean peninsula, Henry Kissinger proposed a Sino-U.S. strategic dialogue 
aimed at discussing “the political evolution of the Korean Peninsula and of Northeast 
Asia.”742 In fact, Chinese commentators draw attention to a permanent peace 
mechanism on the Korean Peninsula specified in the September 2005 joint statement 
from the Six Party Talks. They stressed in particular a shift in the focus of the Six 
Party Talks from “discussion on solutions of the Korean nuclear issue to discussion on 
questions concerning Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asian security mechanisms.”743 
 Underneath China’s interest in broader regional security frameworks lie 
different priorities between the United States and China. Despite their common 
interest in stability on the Korean peninsula, their long-term goals tend to diverge. 
While the United States seeks to resolve the situation in ways that preserve and 
enhance its regional influence, China pursues “a post-Cold War security architecture 
that is less U.S.-centric.”744 Hence, the combined effects of unfolding events on the 
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Korean Peninsula and regional actors’ responses to such events will shape both U.S.-
China relations and “the security architecture” in the region.745 
 Paying due attention to the contingent nature of Sino-U.S. relations, Jeffrey 
Legro in a recent study has rejected deterministic claims such as the “rising China” 
thesis and the “interdependence argument.” Instead, he pointed out that such systemic 
factors are filtered through “enduring foreign policy ideas in domestic politics and 
subsequent national behavior.”746 The key question is what kinds of foreign policy 
ideas will prevail in China and under what condition? My research suggests that one 
way of discerning a prevailing foreign policy idea in China is to examine role 
conceptions—how Chinese political elites think about China’s role in the region and 
how certain regional issues (e.g., the North Korean question) are linked to that vision, 
shaping national policy behavior. 
 More broadly, the findings of this dissertation suggest that ensuring role 
congruence between the U.S.-directed and internally-shaped roles can be conducive to 
achieving a peaceful power transition. Singling out the Korean issue as a potential 
model case for U.S.-China relations and future cooperation on broader East Asian 
security issues, Ashton Carter and William Perry have argued that US regional 
leadership should engage in “catalyzing cooperative action” with China in ways that 
can be viewed by the Chinese as “being used to defend precisely those interests that 
China will share with the United States.”747 Thomas Christensen concurs by 
suggesting that a sensible U.S. Asia strategy would be the maintenance of a regional 
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presence anchored in its regional alliances “without attempting to undercut China’s 
diplomatic relationships with other regional actors, even with U.S. allies.”748 
 If the United States and China, along with other regional powers, were able to 
produce a positive outcome on the North Korean question, I argue, it would signal “a 
long-term strategic convergence between Washington and Beijing.”749 The Clinton 
administration was indeed close to this best-case scenario on a variety of issues, 
including stability on the Korean Peninsula, while the Bush administration’s approach 
has been fixated on the broader agenda of prolonging U.S. primacy even at the risk of 
endangering regional stability.750 Prolonging tension on the Korean Peninsula or 
seeking a regime change in North Korea would only intensify role conflict in China, 
with negative implications for Sino-U.S. relations in the future. 
 Conversely, facilitating role congruence can be an effective way for the United 
States to secure legitimacy in the era of US global primacy. As Stephen Walt 
observes, “the key [in maintaining US primacy] is not power but persuasion” through 
which the United State should demonstrate to the world why American primacy is 
better than possible alternatives.751 This view is echoed in the notion of a benign 
hegemonic order that John Ikenberry and others advance.752 Michael Mastanduno also 
follows this line of reasoning: “the more other states are willing to recognize the 
hegemonic project as legitimate and share its purposes, the more durable it will be.”753 
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Without “a reasonable degree of acceptance or acquiescence on the part of other major 
states in the system,” hegemonic order is bound to disintegrate. In this sense, 
hegemony differs from power preponderance, which is based on brute force, rather 
than “the legitimate exercise of power.”754 Christian Reus-Smit makes a similar 
distinction by pointing out that coercive power is useful only in “domination (rule by 
control),” but not in “governance (rule by authority).”755 
 Curiously though, existing literature does not explore how hegemonic power 
becomes legitimate in the eyes of local actors. We need to look at various regional 
processes in which the power-based framing gets shared or rejected. Moreover, as 
Francis Fukuyama notes, power and legitimacy, the two key factors required for the 
U.S. in the post-9/11 context, are often mutually inconsistent.756 This is because, as 
Colin Dueck reasons, the unilateral use of hard power often comes at the expense of 
soft power. Hence, in his view, it would be in the U.S. interest to focus less on the 
aggressive strategy of sustaining US primacy than on working with other countries via 
multilateral venues.757 The findings of this research provide another way to achieve 
legitimacy at the regional level: conduct global and regional strategies in ways that 
ensure role congruence on the part of regional countries. 
Role Conceptions and Regional Orders 
 More broadly, this dissertation highlights the importance of the regional level 
as an analytical focus in IR theorizing. Examining regional role conceptions can be a 
useful way to conceptualize regional orders. Despite the expectations of systemic 
                                                
754 Michael Mastanduno, “Hegemonic order, September 11, and the consequences of the Bush 
revolution,” in Mark Beeson, ed., Bush and Asia: America’s evolving relations with East Asia 
(Routledge: London and New York, 2005), pp. 25-26. 
755 Christian Reus-Smit, American Power and World Order (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2004), p. 60. 
756 Francis Fukuyama, America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy 
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006), p. 191. 
757 Colin Dueck, “Strategies for Managing Rogue States,” Orbis, Spring 2006, p. 202. 
 205 
theories, both realist and liberal, regional orders are not preordained, a simple 
outgrowth of systemic forces such as the balance of power, or economic 
interdependence. As Peter Katzenstein has observed, regions are not merely material 
objects within the world system. They are also “social and cognitive constructs that 
are rooted in political practice.”758 Constantly in the making through social interaction 
among regional actors, there are neither fixed regions nor fixed regional interests. 
Rather, they are formed “in the process of interaction and intersubjective 
understanding.”759 
 The dissertation has demonstrated how the North Korea challenge affects the 
pattern of regional interaction in a far more complex way than the existing literature 
leads one to expect, creating both new sources of cooperation and division in the 
region. While useful in explaining the regional order during Cold War period, realist 
and liberal/institutionalist theories of regional order are constrained by their largely 
static and deterministic claims about the future of East Asian security order. What is 
also common in realist and liberal/institutionalist analyses is the central role accorded 
to the United States in shaping the future of the region. 
 From a realist perspective, many scholars argue that the strengthening of the 
existing hub-and-spokes system centered on the U.S. and its allies is the key to 
regional stability in East Asia.760 Pointing to the absence of formal multilateral 
frameworks in the region, however, liberal/institutionalists stress the importance of 
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broadening the current U.S.-alliance system.761 In their article on the U.S-Japan 
alliance, for instance, Mike Mochizuki and Michael O’Hanlon argue that America’s 
Asian alliances need to be tightened up, “not against threat, but in the name of 
common interests and values.”762 They reason that the United States and Japan, as 
with the case of the U.S.-U.K alliance, should pursue a “liberal agenda that serves the 
goals of democracy, human rights, economic development, and regional 
inclusiveness,” thus laying the groundwork for a multilateral collective-security 
arrangement for the region.763 John Ikenberry and Michael Mastanduno concur by 
suggesting that rather than turning to “the realpolitik effort to prevent the deterioration 
of the Asian security environment,” it is time to take a “progressive step” toward a 
regional security community.764 
 However, the growing gap between the U.S. and regional understanding of—
and responses to—the North Korean challenge suggests an increasing difficulty in 
realizing U.S.-centered regional designs. Given the contested nature of the North 
Korean problem at different levels and the importance of the North Korea factor in 
regional role conceptions in East Asia, improving regional cooperation among U.S. 
allies and broader regional integration will be difficult. By locating contested regional 
role conceptions at the center of analysis, this dissertation explains both regional 
resistance to the U.S. approach and a lack of progress in building a broader regional 
security framework. 
 At a deeper level, regional role conceptions can help us better understand the 
nature of interaction among regional actors. In this regard, constructivist scholars have 
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begun to analyze regional actors’ different understandings of a proper regional order. 
In Europe, for instance, different members have different understandings about 
regional order building. The British tend to view European integration largely as “a 
process without a specific end.” In contrast, the French tie it to “the vision of a 
powerful independent Europe as a major player in world politics,” while the Germans 
consider it a steppingstone to an “eternal peace” in Europe. Given these different 
perceptions of region making process and visions for the future, Lisbeth Aggrestam 
argues, European stability hinges in large part on how its members harmonize their 
role conceptions and ensure stable expectations among themselves.765 My research 
extends this insight to East Asia. 
 The prospects of creating a new regional order in East Asia by harmonizing 
regional role conceptions were growing rapidly in the late 1990s. As inter-Korean 
reconciliation began new regional momentum, some scholars began to call for 
dialogue between the United States and East Asian countries on “how to move toward 
a more self-sustaining and stable regional order.”766 Writing in early 2001, Kent 
Calder also predicted that the combination of regional meetings on North Korea and 
the U.S.-Japan-South Korea policy coordination processes via the TCOG would bring 
about “an institutional basis for the new geopolitics” in East Asia.767 Such initial 
expectations, however, did not materialize as the Bush administration took a hard line 
approach toward North Korea. 
 In this vein, the Perry Process in the late 1990s provided a rare opportunity to 
build such a new regional framework that would make the existing U.S.-centered 
order more stable while satisfying regional actors’ yearning for greater regional roles. 
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The Bush administration not only failed to seize the opportunity but also ran the risk 
of disrupting the existing regional order. Frustrated by dwindling U.S. influence in 
East Asia during the Bush presidency, several IR scholars called for a “forward-
looking foreign policy” aimed not only at managing crises but also at proactively 
shaping “the context for future policy choices.” In this context, Francis Fukuyama 
recommends that the United States turn the Six Party framework into a permanent 
regional organization.768 Similarly, John Ikenberry proposes the formation of a 
broader regional multilateral organization involving all the regional countries to make 
the U.S.-centered order “more credible and durable.”769 I argue that paying attention to 
regional role conceptions is an important first step in achieving a new regional order in 
East Asia. 
6-3. Policy Implications 
 The findings from this dissertation also have several policy implications in 
both regional and global dimensions. First and foremost, East Asian dynamics around 
the North Korean nuclear challenge offer an important lesson for U.S. administrations: 
the success of future global anti-proliferation campaigns hinges on grasping the 
complexities of regional dynamics surrounding proliferators. In their campaign against 
proliferation, US policymakers should use America’s power and influence prudently, 
that is, in ways that are not in conflict with local dynamics. Conversely, facilitating 
role congruence can both contribute to the success of global proliferation policy and 
enhance regional order. At the heart of this issue lies role conflict on the part of United 
States: its traditional regional role as a stabilizer and its new global role as an enforcer 
of counterproliferation and anti-terror strategies. 
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Ensuring Role Congruence between America’s Global and Regional Roles 
 Just as East Asian countries are mulling over their proper regional roles, it is 
time for U.S. policymakers to think about how to reconcile the U.S.’s new role as a 
global proliferation enforcer with its traditional role as a regional stabilizer.770 The 
promulgation of the Bush Doctrine caused growing tension between these two roles. 
How to cope with this contradiction is a central task in effectively adddressing the 
global proliferation challenge and securing a viable U.S. East Asian strategy. At a 
minimum, efforts to solve a global problem should not come at the expense of U.S. 
leadership role in East Asia, a guarantor of regional stability throughout the Cold War. 
 Tension between global and local dynamics is hardly a new phenomenon. 
Peter Katzenstein, for one, observed that U.S. foreign policy is bound to fail “when it 
neglects the dynamics of region.”771 The key question is how to effectively manage 
both new global security priorities and old regional ones. Writing about a US regional 
force realignment plan under the Global Posture Review (GPR), Kurt Campbell and 
Celeste Ward cautioned against “collateral damage to long-standing arrangements and 
relationships” in the region. As they argued, it is pointless “to gain marginal benefits 
for possible future operations at the cost of undermining close existing alliances or 
causing important countries to question their security ties to the United States.”772 The 
same lesson can be applied to the Bush administration’s proliferation policy. 
 During the Clinton presidency, the United States made conscious efforts to 
balance global proliferation strategy with regional stability and U.S. regional 
influence. For instance, during the first North Korean nuclear crisis, the Clinton 
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administration at times promoted inter-Korean relations for nonproliferation reasons: 
As the United States needed South Korea’s support in its nuclear negotiations with 
North Korea, the Clinton administration bargained hard for South Korea’s request that 
it not be “excluded from negotiations on the peninsula.”773 More importantly, the 
Clinton administration approached the proliferation issue in ways that were not in 
conflict with regional stability. As the chief U.S. negotiator during the first crisis, 
Robert L. Gallucci, remarked at a congressional hearing, the Agreed Framework held 
out the “possibility of gradually opening the way for all countries in the region to 
establish more normal political and economic ties with North Korea,” which “would 
serve our broader interests in regional stability and prosperity.”774 
 A key problem with the Bush administration’s approach has been its emphasis 
on global priority in ways that negatively affect regional security. Its relentless focus 
on the war on terror and the global counterproliferation campaign came at the cost of 
regional stability and US influence in East Asia. As William Tow points out, a crucial 
question for the United States is “how to reconcile traditional alliance politics in the 
region with the new emphasis on more fluid and diverse force capabilities.”775 In this 
vein, William Odom laments that the Bush administration has pursued “a destabilizing 
and feckless nonproliferation policy at the expense of regional stability” in the Middle 
East and East Asia.776 In short, the regime change specified in the Bush Doctrine is “a 
losing nonproliferation strategy.”777 In this vein, the recent change in the U.S. 
approach toward North Korea marks a welcome development, which may portend 
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both a restoration of America regional influence and, at the same time, the fulfillment 
of its global role as the leader in addressing proliferation problems, including the 
North Korean challenge. 
US Regional Strategy 
 The analysis in this dissertation also suggests that the renewed U.S. strategy to 
turn its bilateral alliances with East Asian countries into a coherent regional alliance 
would be difficult to achieve, especially in the context of alliance tension between the 
US and South Korea and South Korea’s growing ties with China. It is in this context 
that the 2007 Armitage Report stresses the importance of maintaining “a robust, 
dynamic relationship with the new Asia,” with the central aim of “defining a regional 
architecture that will be consistent with U.S. interests.”778 Noting a recent discord 
between the U.S. and South Korea, it also calls for the U.S. and Japan to improve ties 
with South Korea, while raising question about China’s regional intentions.779 
Similarly, referring to a regional community centered on East Asian regionalism, a 
high-ranking U.S. official expressed concern that China hopes to dominate the region 
via such an exclusive regional mechanism, and, hence, he warned, “Japan cannot 
possibly afford to advocate Asian regionalism.”780 
 Such American’s attitudes, with their emphasis on the U.S.-directed regional 
roles at the expense of internally-shaped roles, are not well received in the region. 
Instead, regional actors prefer a U.S. regional strategy that harmonizes both externally 
and internally-shaped roles. This is why Yoichi Funabashi has argued that the U.S.-
Japan alliance and East Asian regionalism are compatible, “not a matter of choosing 
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one or the other.”781 From this vantage point, Japan’s ideal approach in the region is to 
promote an “Asia Pacific fusion,”782 or one Japanese business executive puts it, “Shin-
Bei Nyu-A (close to America and entering Asia).”783 
 While acknowledging that Japan’s search for an Asian identity could conflict 
with its geopolitical interest in keeping strong alliance ties with the United States, a 
former Japanese diplomat nonetheless makes the following statement. 
the harmonization of its power, efficiency, and identity can ultimately be 
achieved through its two fundamental postwar policy objectives: strengthening 
its alliance with the United States and reentering Asia. If the international 
situation compels Japan to choose one of the two, the consensus is clear: 
alliance will be given precedence. But this kind of zero-sum picture is not 
desirable for Japan. It must achieve both objectives in order to maximize its 
diplomatic posture and satisfy its national interest. (Emphasis added)784 
Proliferation and Renewed Focus on Demand-Side Measures 
 In the literature on nuclear proliferation, scholars have traditionally explored 
the sources and consequences of proliferation. Specifically, some of the key works 
analyze motivations behind states’ seeking or giving up nuclear ambitions,785 while 
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others address the question of whether or not proliferation contributes to stability in 
the international system.786 In the post-9/11 world, however, the analytical focus has 
been shifted decisively to the question of how best to contain the danger of nuclear 
proliferation.787 As a consequence, scholarly and policy debates have been fixated on 
addressing supply-side measures (e.g., what policy tools are to be used to contain the 
spread of WMD, etc.) at the expense of the demand-side of the ledger (e.g., how to 
mitigate permissive conditions, such as regional security concerns, that drive nuclear 
developments in the first place, etc.).788 
 Traditionally, U.S. nuclear policy utilized various demand side measures. For 
instance, the Carter administration offered negative security assurances (i.e., 
reassuring potential adversaries against a nuclear first strike). Such assurances, 
however, have been weakened by the Bush administration. Along with the axis of evil 
rhetoric, however, the doctrine of preemption and a renewed focus on new-generation 
nuclear weapons, as manifested in the December 2002 National Strategy to Combat 
Weapons of Mass Destruction, may signal to other nations that nuclear weapons may 
play “a growing, not diminishing, role in U.S. security decisions.”789 Instead of relying 
too much on “the overmilitarized means” for meeting the proliferation challenge,790 
the United States should utilize various resources to shape the incentive structure of 
rogue states.791 In this regard, the East Asian experience suggests that for proliferation 
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strategy to be effective, the United States should take into consideration not only the 
incentive structure of rogues but also that of their neighbors. Unless neighbors can 
align their interests with that of the United States over the proliferation challenge at 
stake, no solution will be sustainable. To this end, the United States should gain a 
deeper understanding of regional dynamics surrounding proliferation challenges. 
 More fundamentally, given the East Asian interest in engaging North Korea, 
another way to solve the rogue states problem would be to “[embed] them in regional 
security orders that constrain them while offering them the stability and 
encouragement needed for successful economic development.” Engagement in this 
sense can be “a part of a larger multilateral process of establishing a new security 
order involving great power cooperation.”792 Similarly, Richard Haass emphasizes a 
strategy of “incremental regime change or “regime evolution,” a policy that chooses to 
integrate, not isolate, despotic regimes.793 
6-4. Extension and Further Research 
Extending to the Situation in the Middle East 
 The analysis offered in this dissertation can be extended to other regions of the 
world where proliferation problems are intertwined with the complexities of broader 
regional situations. A case in point is Iran in the Middle Eastern context. As with the 
North Korean case, the Bush administration has been focusing on regime change, not 
regime evolution. Flynt Leverett, a Middle East expert who served on Bush’s National 
Security Council, revealed that the Bush administration has consistently refused to 
consider serious negotiations with Iran over its nuclear and regional ambitions: “The 
dirty secret is the administration has never put on the table an offer to negotiate with 
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Iran the issues that would really matter: their own security, the legitimacy of the 
Islamic republic and Iran’s place in the regional order.”794 
 Instead of pursuing regime change and using pressure tactics, the United States 
could have engaged in direct talks with Iran. In fact, there are a wide variety of shared 
interests between the United States and Iran, ranging from opposition to the Taliban 
regime to regional stability in the region.795 It is in this context that one scholar 
characterizes U.S.-Iranian cooperation as the single most important factor in 
improving “U.S. capacity to redress the power balance in the Middle East.”796 While 
relations have soured in recent years, there were missed opportunities during the first 
term of the Bush presidency. 
 In 2003, for instance, Iran approached the Bush administration via a Swiss 
diplomat with an offer of help in capturing terrorists, stabilizing Iraq, stopping support 
for Hezbollah and Hamas, moderating its position toward Israel, as well as solving 
Iran’s nuclear question. In return, Tehran asked for the lifting of U.S. sanctions and 
better ties with the United States. While some U.S. officials showed an interest in the 
idea of potential U.S.-Iranian cooperation on such wide-ranging issue areas, hawks in 
the administration not only rejected the offer, but also sent the Swiss ambassador a 
diplomatic cable, rebuking him for relaying the Iranian message to Washington.797 
 Instead of bilateral negotiations with the Tehran regime, some Bush officials 
later conceded that they had considered setting up a regional meeting, modeled after 
the Six Party Talks, mainly to confront Iran. As was the case in East Asia, such a 
move, however, had little chance of success since “none of Iran’s neighbors are 
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willing and able to play the decisive role alongside the United States.”798 The root 
cause of regional concerns about U.S. approach in the Middle East may well be role 
conflict between what U.S. policymakers expect from Iran’s neighbors and the 
regional actors’ own perceptions of proper roles in the region. While Iran’s neighbors 
are undeniably worried about Iran’s nuclear pursuit, they are equally concerned about 
America’s regional agenda manifested in the course of the ongoing war in Iraq. 
 Pointing to such regional worries, Jon Alterman singles out a lack of consensus 
between the Bush administration and Iraq’s neighbors over the future of Iraq as the 
most difficult factor facing the United States. Regional suspicion is widespread across 
the region, including both U.S. allies, such as Saudi Arabia and Turkey, and its 
adversaries, such as Iran and Syria. Regardless of their strategic ties with the United 
States, they are united in their view that the U.S. vision for the future of Iraq in 
particular and the region more broadly is deeply threatening.799 
 A sensible U.S. strategy in the Middle East would involve paying more 
attention to the delicate inner workings of regional politics and coming up with a way 
to narrow the gulf between the U.S. regional expectations and the domestic political 
interests of regional countries. As with the North Korean case, focusing narrowly on 
the idealistic neoconservative agenda of building a new Middle East at the cost of 
neglecting regional realities will be disastrous for both U.S. Middle East strategy and 
regional stability. Further research on the varied role conceptions held by countries in 
the region will shed light on the prospects for success in U.S. regional strategy and the 
nature of an emerging regional order in the Middle East. More broadly, a comparative 
analysis of different regional dynamics concerning proliferation challenges in various 
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parts of the world will not only help us cope better with the proliferation challenge but 
also contribute to our understanding of regional orders in the post-9/11 global context. 
Sources of Discord on East Asian Regionalism 
 An extensive analysis of regional role conceptions in East Asia can be useful in 
explaining a lack of progress in East Asian regionalism despite the expressed desire on 
the part of East Asian countries. Since the end of the Cold War era, various regional 
politicians and pundits have emphasized regionalism and multilateral frameworks in 
East Asia, but with little success. How can we explain the apparent gap between the 
region’s incessant calls for regionalism and multilateral frameworks and the regional 
realities centered on bilateral relations with the United States? For regionalism to be 
successful, regional countries need to foster elements of cohesive regional awareness, 
a gradual “shifting of national and individual consciousness of state to a new center—
a region.”800 As it stands, East Asian regionalism lacks such a shared vision. For 
instance, as Jitsuo Tsuchiyama observes, the majority of Japanese tends to view 
multilateral frameworks “as an academic argument partly because there appears to be 
no such common identity as “we” in East Asia.”801 Without a common conceptual 
framework for the region, chances of developing a common vision for the region will 
remain slim.802 
 The findings form this dissertation indicates that the main problem with East 
Asian regionalism is a lack of consensus on the nature and the proper shape of 
regional order. One possible reason for the discord may be different role conceptions 
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and role conflict on the part of the regional countries. If the United States conducts 
regional policy in ways that are sensitive to internally-shaped role conceptions, it will 
not only help U.S. policymaking but also facilitate regionalism, as was the case during 
the Perry Process. Absent such consideration, and with the U.S. push for the U.S.-
centered roles, East Asian countries will face role conflict, with growing difficulties in 
reaching a mutual understanding on regionalism. 
 This is indeed what has been taking place in the region. The Chinese, for 
instance, now tend to view regionalism as a way to balance the U.S. regional 
influence. The South Koreans increasingly see regionalism as a channel to revamp the 
stalled inter-Korean relations, whereas the Japanese regard regionalism as a hedging 
option in case of America’s withdrawal from the region. Lacking common threads or 
narratives about regionalism, East Asian regionalism is increasingly adrift. A careful 
survey of the different narratives about regionalism in each country during the Bush 
presidency would help us to better understand the sources of difficulty in forging an 
effective regional security framework. 
6-5. Recent Developments in the Six Party Talks and Future Prospects 
America’s About-Face and the New Deal at the Six Party Talks 
 After years of refusal to engage in direct, bilateral talks with North Korea and 
the coercive approach toward the North, the Bush administration, since 2007, has 
finally softened its hard line position. The immediate catalyst was North Korea’s 
nuclear test in October 2006. The subsequent defeat of the Republican Party in the 
2006 congressional elections further necessitated a new breakthrough in foreign 
policy, paving the way for the U.S. “reverse-course” policy toward North Korea.803 
This is particularly surprising given President Bush’s previous characterization of 
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John Kerry’s call for bilateral negotiations with North Korea as “naive and 
dangerous.” The policy shift also represents a marked relaxation of the previous 
position of rejecting East Asia’s call for adopting a “step by step” approach aimed at 
addressing North Korea’s plutonium capability first, and then discussing the issue of 
uranium enrichment.804 
 In January 2007, the first official bilateral meeting between Bush 
administration officials and North Korean representatives was held in Berlin. After 
two days of meetings with his North Korean counterpart, Christopher Hill even 
announced that, should North Korea forgo its nuclear path, the United States is 
prepared to pursue “a bilateral process” to establish “a normal relationship” with 
North Korea.805 In February 2007, the new gesture toward North Korea led to an 
agreement to shut down the Yongbyon reactor in return for energy support for North 
Korea. In July 2007, North Korea shut down the reactor and readmitted a permanent 
UN inspection team.806 Then in October 2007, North Korea agreed to disclose and 
disable its nuclear facilities by the year’s end in return for 950,000 tons of heavy fuel 
oil.807 In June 2008, North Korea also submitted a declaration on its nuclear programs 
in exchange for the U.S.’s lifting of sanctions and removal of North Korea from the 
list of states sponsoring terrorism.808 How will this flurry of recent developments in 
the waning months of the Bush administration affect regional role conceptions and the 
regional order in East Asia? 
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Signs of Change in Regional Dynamics? 
 Along with its contribution to the recent progress at the Six Party Talks, the 
U.S. policy shift toward North Korea seems to be contributing to role congruence and 
regional dynamics. Amid the nuclear breakthrough between the United States and 
North Korea, for instance, the two Koreas proceeded with their own breakthrough, 
resulting in the second inter-Korean summit in October 2007. Both sides issued a joint 
declaration signed by President Roh Moo Hyun and Chairman Kim Jong Il. In it, the 
two Koreas agreed, “[they] should end the current armistice and establish a permanent 
peace regime.”809 
 As Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s hard line position toward North Korea put 
Japan at odds with its neighbors, many Japanese elites began to express concern that 
Japan was “losing an opportunity to influence the talks and help shape the future of 
Northeast Asia.”810 Dismissing the Abe administration’s hard line stance toward North 
Korea as “a simplistic policy” amid the recent thaw between North Korea and the 
United States and between the two Koreas, an editorial in Asahi Shimbun declares, 
“Japan must not miss the bus” and urges the current Fukuda government in Tokyo to 
produce a comprehensive North Korea policy.811 Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda has 
recently decided to “seek a resolution to the North’s nuclear programs, missile threats 
and the abductions in a ‘comprehensive’ manner.”812 Along the way, Japan’s relations 
with its regional neighbors have also improved. 
 In fact, some members of the opposition, Democratic Party of Japan have 
raised question about successive LDP governments’ focus on the U.S. alliance at the 
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cost of regional cooperation. For instance, Shinkun Haku, a Democratic Party 
lawmaker who is a member of the upper house of parliament’s foreign affairs and 
defense committee, expresses concern about Japan’s exclusive focus on the alliance: 
“I don’t deny that the Japan-U.S. alliance is our most important one. But is it right to 
look only to the United States and turn our backs on China and South Korea?”813 A 
Japan Times editorial echoes the growing view by pointing out that the U.S.-Japan 
alliance is “only a starting point” for Japan’s foreign policy; its neighbors, especially 
China, are equally important strategic partners.814 
 Amid the latest developments in Japan, South Korean Foreign Minister Song 
Minsun spoke highly of the change in Japan’s stance toward North Korea, noting the 
difference in policy orientation between the Abe and Fukuda governments.815 Chinese 
Defense Minister Cao Gangchuan visited Japan in August 2007, the first visit by a 
Chinese defense minister since February 1998.816 In June 2008, in a new sign of 
institutionalized regional cooperation, China, Japan and South Korea also agreed to 
hold regular annual foreign ministerial meetings in each country, while agreeing to 
work on a trilateral summit in Japan in late September 2008.817 Now the key question 
is whether recent developments surrounding the Korean Peninsula portend new 
regional momentum, a la the Perry-Redux. 
Continuing Tension and the Uncertain Future of the Regional Order 
 While the situation is still evolving, another development concerning the 
alleged nuclear link between North Korea and Syria raises questions about the 
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prospects for the emergence of a cooperative regional order. In April 2008, the Bush 
administration, in a CIA-led briefing, made public the North Korea-Syria connection. 
The timing of the briefing, which came after several months of delay, was viewed with 
suspicion by the media. As the New York Times editorializes, it may be “another 
example of this administration insisting that information be withheld for national 
security reasons — until there is a political reason to release it.” 818 David Sanger 
suspects that by disclosing the intelligence, labeled only as “low confidence,” Vice 
President Dick Cheney and other hawks in the administration may have wished to 
scuttle the diplomatic efforts led by Christopher Hill. With the hawks on the rise again 
over the North Korean question, writes Sanger, Hill is “feeling pretty abandoned by 
Rice and Bush.”819 
 As of this writing, it is still uncertain how the latest developments will affect 
the processes of the Six Party talks and the U.S.-North Korea deal. As analyzed in this 
dissertation, however, the way the United States conducts regional policy making and 
its impact on regional role conceptions will help shape the nature of the regional order 
in East Asia. In this sense, no single thing would more enhance U.S. capacity to 
manage the regional order in East Asia than a regional solution that would skillfully 
address both nuclear and regional security dimensions. Given the continued influence 
of North Korea bashers in the United States and the limited time the Bush 
administration has, however, the recent about-face will not likely yield a final 
resolution of the North Korean situation. So, the crucial task of reconciling the global 
and regional roles of the United States and harmonizing global and regional priories 
over the proliferation challenge will fall into the hands of the next administration. 
How it will manage this task in turn will help redefine the nature and shape of the East 
Asian security order in the years ahead. 
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